xi, 578 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Rational deterrence theory posits that deterrence is more likely to be successful when a state credibly communicates to its adversary that it has both the capability and intent to retaliate against threats. Yet, second-generation nuclear states, which often exist in severe security environments, have largely adopted postures of nuclear ambiguity where they do not acknowledge their nuclear weapons capabilities or the circumstances under which they would use them. To date, research has been insufficiently comparative. While some existing research offers explanations for the ambiguous nuclear postures of individual countries, it does not permit us to draw inferences across cases and assess relative explanatory power. Through comparison, both within and across cases, this project develops a more general explanation of why nuclear states choose ambiguity over a visible deterrence posture. To this end, this project analyzes the nuclear postures of three countries: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Using process tracing and the congruence procedure methodology, I assess the relative validity of existing explanations for each case and then compare these findings across the three cases. This research suggests that regional security environments, characterized by disparities in power, create strong incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities for deterrence as well as to retain an ambiguous posture. In particular, an ambiguous posture enables regional states to avoid the costs and dangers of competitive nuclear development vis-à-vis their adversaries. The three cases also suggest that patron state pressures for non-proliferation, which combine threats and incentives, are another important constraint on the nuclear posture of second-generation nuclear states. Other variables--such as the international non-proliferation regime, domestic political interests, and the personal moral reservations of some state leaders--play some role to varying degrees in individual cases. However, these effects are limited both within the broad history of individual cases as well as in cross-case comparison of the three states. Understanding these constraints is helpful for evaluating the efficacy of policy tools designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as well as how to manage crises and conflicts between regional nuclear-armed states. / Committee in charge: Lars Skalnes, Chairperson, Political Science; Jane Kellett Cramer, Member, Political Science; Ronald Mitchell, Member, Political Science; Shaul Cohen, Outside Member, Geography

Simulation and game content includes the levels, models, textures, items, and other objects encountered and possessed by players during the game. In most modern video games and simulation software, the set of content shipped with the product is static and unchanging, or at best, randomized within a narrow set of parameters. However, ideally, if game content could be constantly and automatically renewed, players would remain engaged longer in the evolving stream of content. This dissertation introduces three novel technologies that together realize this ambition. (1) The first, NEAT Particles, is an evolutionary method to enable users to quickly and easily create complex particle effects through a simple interactive evolutionary computation (IEC) interface. That way, particle effects become an evolvable class of content, which is exploited in the remainder of the dissertation. In particular, (2) a new algorithm called content-generating NeuroEvolution of Augmenting Topologies (cgNEAT) is introduced that automatically generates graphical and game content while the game is played, based on the past preferences of the players. Through cgNEAT, the game platform on its own can generate novel content that is designed to satisfy its players. Finally, (3) the Galactic Arms Race (GAR) multiplayer online video game is constructed to demonstrate these techniques working on a real online gaming platform. In GAR, which was made available to the public and playable online, players pilot space ships and fight enemies to acquire unique particle system weapons that are automatically evolved by the cgNEAT algorithm. The resulting study shows that cgNEAT indeed enables players to discover a wide variety of appealing content that is not only novel, but also based on and extended from previous content that they preferred in the past. The implication is that with cgNEAT it is now possible to create applications that generate their own content to satisfy users, potentially significantly reducing the cost of content creation and considerably increasing entertainment value with a constant stream of evolving content.

Thesis (M.S. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-75). Also available online.

No description available.

Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-136).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-312).

Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze and compare the impact of political and technological influences on the breakdown of disarmament efforts between the two world wars. This issue is approached by analyzing the string of disarmament conferences that took place in the interwar period and restrictions placed on the German military imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. The theory that serves both as inspiration and a tool to examine the subject is the Actor-network theory originating from École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris. This theory is used to view the subject in a new light. The author places military technology, the political movement of disarmament, and especially restrictions of Germany on par with states and international organizations. While the political turmoil and causes and effects are well researched and documented, the technological aspects of the issue less so. The author asks if the disarmament efforts were realistic in their scope. Whether a state abiding by the new rules could even mount a feasible defence in a case of attack and retain offensive capabilities. Whether the technology itself allowed the existence of alternative weapon systems not breaking these rules. And in the case of Germany, whether these restrictions were effectively limiting German potential...

Major fraction of eukaryotic genomes is composed of transposons. Mobilization of these transposons leads to mutations and genomic instability. In animals, these selfish genetic elements are regulated by a class of small RNAs called PIWI interacting RNAs (piRNAs). Thus host piRNA pathway acts as a defense against pathogenic transposons. Many piRNA pathway genes are rapidly evolving indicating that they are involved in a host-pathogen arms race. In my thesis, I investigated the nature of this arms race by checking functional consequences of the sequence diversity in piRNA pathway genes. In order to study the functional consequences of the divergence in piRNA pathway genes, we swapped piRNA pathway genes between two sibling Drosophila species, Drosophila melanogaster and Drosophila simulans. We focused on RDC complex, composed of Rhino, Deadlock and Cutoff, which specifies piRNA clusters and regulates transcription from clusters. None of the D. simulans RDC complex proteins function in D. melanogaster. Rhino and Deadlock interact and colocalize in D. simulans and D. melanogaster, but D. simulans Rhino does not bind D. melanogaster Deadlock, due to substitutions in the rapidly evolving Shadow domain. Cutoff from D. simulans stably binds and traps D. melanogaster Deadlock. Adaptive evolution has thus generated cross-species incompatibilities in the piRNA pathway which may contribute in reproductive isolation.