This thesis is intended to enhance our knowledge of the processes behind the relinquishing of Canada's nuclear roles. As such, the underlying factors which helped bring about this change in Canadian defence policy are to be isolated and assessed. The process of retiring Canada's nuclear roles was long and complex, involving many actors and influences. The factors examined in this thesis are looked upon in the greater context of the 1960s and 1970s. The global and domestic political climates, the strategic environment and Canada's power within the global community as a whole during this time period, are considered. This study has revealed several interesting conclusions which one may draw concerning the relinquishing of Canada's nuclear roles. First of all, the Trudeau government's position on nuclear weapons coincided with growing opposition to nuclear weapons within the Canadian public. Furthermore, it is evident that public opinion on the nuclear issue was closely related to an individual's perception of the United States and his or her position on defence spending. Secondly, the process of retiring the nuclear weapon systems was led largely by Pierre Trudeau and some of his close associates, in particular Ivan Head and Donald MacDonald. This was done in the face of intense bureaucratic resistance. Thirdly, abandoning the nuclear roles was strongly related to Canada's declining position in the global community and also to the growth of detente. In addition, it was also partly the result of a rapidly changing strategic environemnt in which weapon systems were quickly made obsolete. Perhaps most importantly, this thesis shows that relinquishing Canada's nuclear roles was an extremely important part of the 1971 defence review. The issue of nuclear weapons is one which has been largely overlooked by defence and foreign policy analysts in the past, such as Thordarson as well as Granatstein and Bothwell, and therefore merits our attention. For this thesis, telephone interviews had to be conducted because very little written material is available to the public. Regrettably, these interviews must remain confidential for the time-being. Several books, articles and public opinion surveys also were very helpful in conducting this analysis. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Although Great Powers are often thought to be the most influential actors in terms of international arms control efforts, during the 1990s Canada showed itself capable of successfully leading several arms control initiatives. This research sets out to (a) explain why Canada has been able to enjoy these successes while other recent Canadian arms control leadership efforts have failed, and (b) further the abstract thinking around Canadian foreign policy. This is done by introducing the Identity Management model of arms control to explain the process by which Canadian arms control processes succeed or fail, and testing it against four post-Cold War Canadian-led initiatives: the Open Skies initiative, the landmines initiative, the MOX fuel initiative, and the small arms initiative. / Within the Identity Management model, Canada is classified as an Activist State, a categorisation that rejects and improves upon the popular, yet heavily flawed, Middle Power concept. Blending together critical insights from realism and constructivism, the Identity Management model focuses on the foreign policy preferences of states, distinguishing between the preferences of Great Powers, such as the United States, and the preferences of Activist States. The foreign policy preferences of Activist States are designed and promoted by important elite domestic actors, and expressed as the country's chosen identity on a given arms control issue. The Identity Management model thus postulates that while states such as Canada can express independent policy initiatives, these identities are offered up into the international system, the character of which is defined by the foreign policy preferences of Great Powers. Overall, the Identity Management model establishes that Canadian arms control initiatives are successful only when Canada's chosen identity accurately reflects the constantly changing character of the international system.

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The objective of this thesis is to determine why Canada, a state that pioneered nuclear technology, and that faced, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet threat to its national security, consistently rejected any opportunity to convert its latent nuclear capability into an indigenous nuclear weapons program. The answer to this research question must address a number of explicit contradictions in Canadian foreign policy. While Canada has, on the one hand, rejected the bomb, it has, on the other hand, pursued defence and industrial policies based upon intimate involvement with nuclear weapons. Moreover, Canada espouses, on the one hand, a clearly realpolitik view of international relations, while, on the other hand, committing to forging for itself a role as an international peace broker. It becomes, therefore, unclear which theory of international relations could adequately explain this dualism in Canadian policy formulation. This thesis argues that power and self-interest are not separable from Canada's decision to reject the bomb, and that by modifying certain precepts of realist theory, we may substantiate the hypotheses that two disincentives to proliferation are at the root of Canada's policies: first, Canada's political and geographical proximity to the United States and thus a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella; and second, prestige, where Canada interpreted both the rejection of its nuclear option and its internationalist policies as a sign of independence vis-a-vis the United States.

The timeframe of 1978-1984, a period of critical importance in the development of the nuclear world, sets the boundaries for this analysis of Canadian nuclear arms control policy. The situation brought about by increasing hostility between the superpowers, and changes in doctrine and advances in technology that facilitated nuclear war-fighting scenarios, was extremely grave. Therefore it would seem appropriate for Canada, in its traditional role as mediator and middlepower devoted to easing the danger of world conflagration, to have taken an active stand in its nuclear arms control diplomacy. Such was not the case, as bureaucratic politics, cybernetic decision-making, and cognitive dissonance made adherence to the status quo, or minimal rhetorical changes, the order of the day. While that changed towards the end of the period under examination, there remained little substantive modification of policy, despite the growing threat of nuclear disaster. Four examples of Canadian nuclear arms control policy are examined with the aid of official government documents and appropriate commentary from a variety of analysts. Canadian arms control policy at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the question of testing the American Air-Launched Cruise Missile in Canada, and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's personal peace initiative provide a wealth of information that is used to illustrate the struggle of bureaucratic politics versus rational decision-making. Some of the more influential theoretical and structural difficulties within the foreign policy-making process in Canada that posed real impediments to comprehensive analytical decision-making are presented. These problems are outlined in order to provide a framework for the analysis of the four policy situations. In the first three cases, the decision-making indicates the predominance of the bureaucracy's cybernetic conduct. In the last instance, the attempts of the Prime Minister to impose rational/analytical decision-making on the policy process caused him to actively circumvent the bureaucracy within Canada, but he was bested by external forces. The thesis of this monograph is that Canadian nuclear arms control policy for much of this period was reactive, limited to well-crafted rhetoric, and oblivious to the changing nature of the strategic environment. The reasons for this policy behavior may be traced to external constraints imposed by the dynamics of the international system, the nonrationality of the nuclear world, and the weakness of Canada's influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. As well, the importance of not alienating the United States by too forceful a criticism was an essential consideration in the policy process due to the many issues of contention that already existed between Canada and the United States, and the vulnerability of Canada in economic terms to the negative reactions of its North American neighbour. When the Prime Minister did try to set policy and actively change the nuclear world via his personal peace initiative, the same factors and forces proved to be his undoing. In addition, the reactions on the international scene by some of the more powerful Western players indicate that Canada did not have the credibility to attempt such an influential role in the nuclear world. This response may have been prompted by Canada's minimal defence spending in recent years, or it may well have been the fate of a middlepower trying to exert influence in areas where the other nations were loathe to accept it. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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