A research report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA Research Psychology by Coursework and Research Report University of the Witwatersrand 7 June 2017 / This research examines the ways in which atheist identity is constructed and performed in online settings worldwide. The study focuses on the discursive methods through which atheism as an identity is constructed and performed, and the social functions that the use of such methods may serve in these settings. The qualitative method of discursive psychology is used to analyse the performative aspects of blog posts and forums which display instances of atheist identity performance and construction. Three methods of construction and performance are identified, namely the use and contestation of labels and their boundaries, the use of analogies, and the resistance of negative constructions of atheist identity. These methods draw on discourses such as morality versus amorality, intellectualism versus anti-intellectualism, and adult versus child-like beliefs, in order to construct boundaries and produce individual identity performances. Taken together, these performances achieves the construction of a minority collective identity, as well as destigmatising the minority. / MT2018

Thesis (M.A.)--Lancaster Bible College, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-59).

Thesis (M.A.)--Lancaster Bible College, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-59).

Bibliography: prelim. p. [43]-[46]. / Added t.p. and separate paging ([10], 136 p.): Polytheismus vapulans, or, There is but one God. Catchword on p. 187 indicates that these two titles were published as a unit. Marginal notes. "A table ..." [i.e. index]: prelim. p. [47]-[50]. Reproduction of original in Cambridge University Library.

The present research aims to investigate whether atheism is present in the thought of medieval Muslim thinkers. So far, these thinkers have been usually disregarded or poorly addressed in studies about the historical evolution of atheism. Previous studies about the evolution of atheism have pointed out that this concept is expressed both through the rejection of a specific, usually the most dominant religion, as well as through claims that do not aim to reject the divinity, but that considerably limit the presence of the supernatural in human affairs. In order to identify whether atheism is present in medieval Islam, this study focuses on the thought of Ibn al-Rāwandī, al-Rāzī and al-Ma'arrī, three major representatives of the Muslim medieval intellectual milieu. They never rejected God explicitly, but they clearly doubted the possibility that Allāh existed, attributing traditional monotheistic views about Him to an invention of the prophets. What is more, their atheism appears evident in the view they had of the world. They believed in an essentially secular world, where the individual should seek a personal and collective realisation; human existence is not finalised to the realisation of divine plans, rather to the individual contribution to the creation of a better existence in the present moment; reason and critical thinking should never be subordinated to religious considerations; and, finally, morality is independent from religious considerations. These aspects, highlighted in the studies about the evolution of atheism in Western thought, are central elements of the Muslim medieval thinkers analysed as well. The research shows that during the period of the formation of the Islamic dogma, views that excluded God from the ways human existence was regulated were well known and debated among Muslim thinkers, anticipating of many centuries the European Enlightenment.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / Leviathan drawn out by its tail: The religious ideas of the second half of Leviathan Jonathan Harmon In this dissertation, I examine the religious writings of Thomas Hobbes, primarily as they occur in the second half of Leviathan (but drawing from other sources as necessary). My aim is to illustrate the continuity between Hobbes' thoughts on religion and other areas of his philosophy, especially his political theory. Hobbes' distinctive philosophical position, filtered through the lens of the Bible, is what animates the theology of the second half of Leviathan. In short: Hobbes is a materialist, a determinist, an empiricist, a nominalist, a political absolutist, and a social and intellectual elitist. He came of age in a Anglican-Calvinist context and had a humanist education. He was born on the cusp of the scientific revolution, and considered himself a scientist and a mathematician. All of these influences affect the views presented in Leviathan. Hobbes approaches the Christianity of his era hypercritically, with an eye to excising foreign and irrational influences (Greek, Scholastic philosophy, pagan religion, Catholic hierarchy) and replacing them with (ostensibly) Biblically-grounded and philosophically-robust doctrines. In effect, Hobbes is attempting to rationally reconstruct Christianity on the basis of Scripture and his own philosophical system, and his overriding concern is with political stability and the absolute authority of the sovereign. In Chapter 1, I focus on the first half of Leviathan. My discussion explores issues and controversies in the natural theology of Hobbes. Chapter 2 draws some parallels between Hobbes' determinist physics and the doctrine of predestination most often associated with Jean Calvin. Chapter 3 begins the analysis of the second half of Leviathan. I consider Hobbes' position on the relationship between reason and revelation. I consider the sources of religious belief from a Hobbesian perspective - miracles, prophecy, and scripture. Hobbes subjects all of these to rigorous epistemological critiques. In Chapter 4, I examine Hobbes' unique account of eschatology, and the purposes to which he puts it. Hobbes' account of heaven and hell, the soul and salvation, are startling to the modern reader, but actually are a idiosyncratic blend of the radical ideas of some of Hobbes' contemporaries and his own philosophical commitments. I consider some of the potential sources for these innovations in his theory, whether direct or indirect. Hobbes embraces a vision of the relationship between Church and State that emphasizes their unity and absolute subordination to the sovereign. In Chapter 5, I analyze this extended argument, highlighting Hobbes' encyclopedic attempt to demolish any argument that splits authority into temporal and spiritual realms. In Chapter 6 I consider the double question of Hobbes' religious sincerity: both as an individual and as the author of Leviathan. I consider the thoughts of the Straussian school as they apply to Hobbes. I return to the thoughts of Hobbes' contemporaries and what they believed that Hobbes was saying about religion. I compare Hobbes to Machiavelli on a major point of overlap. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thèse--Montauban. / Bibliographie: p. [5]-8.

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [97-100]).

Thesis (PhD(O.T.)--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

Recent polls (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, 2006) have consistently found that atheists are the least liked group in America today, a type of prejudice that has barely been researched. This anti-atheist prejudice is surprising because atheists do not constitute a cohesive, recognizable, or powerful group. To the degree that people feel that religion provides a unique and necessary source of morality, they may dislike atheists primarily because of moral distrust towards them. This suggests a distinct origin for anti-atheist prejudice that sets it apart from ethnic, racial, and gender prejudice. We explored this broad hypothesis in a series of three experiments. First, we find that on an implicit level anti-atheist prejudice is driven by distrust rather than a feeling of generalized unpleasantness towards atheists. Second, we find that discrimination against atheists is limited to contexts requiring a high degree of trust. Finally, we find that anti-atheist prejudice is malleable. These findings are discussed in terms of prominent evolutionary theories of religion.