Thèse--Université de Toulouse. / "Bibliographie": p. [9]-11.

Univ., Diss. 2007--Lund, 2007. / Enth. 4 Beitr. Dissertation -- Thesis. Sammlung -- Collection of articles written by one author. Spieltheorie / Auktion / Gleichgewichtsstabilität / Mobiltelefon / Lizenzvergabe. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2005. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-95).

Although most governments sell their bonds through a share auction, little is known about behaviour of bidders in these auctions. This thesis analyzes the literature on government securities auctions, focusing primarily on structural empirical estimation. Additionally, it examines bidders behaviour in Colombian government bond auctions during 2007, including the additional sale done after the auction. The thesis summarizes the different structural methodologies that have been developed to determine what the best auction for a particular case is. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each methodology and explores assumptions and robustness when confronted with data. To make these comparisons more straightforward, a unified notation is introduced and several methods are applied to the same auctions, uniform price auctions conducted by the government of Colombia. / Thesis (Ph.D, Economics) -- Queen's University, 2010-01-14 11:03:29.635

by Chi-Lun Chau. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-93). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / List of Figures --- p.viii / Definitions --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 1 - --- Introduction --- p.2 / Chapter 1.1 --- Background --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Testing Environment --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Game Overview --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- Auctions --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- Utility and Scores --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3 --- Thesis Contribution and Organization --- p.10 / Chapter Chapter 2 - --- Relatfd Work --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1 --- Traditional auction theory --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2 --- Technologies related to online auctions --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3 --- Recent researches on online auctions --- p.14 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Priceline (proposed by Amy Greenwald) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- ATTac: Integer Linear Programming (ILP) --- p.17 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- RoxyBot: Beam search --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 3 - --- Theoretical model for agents in online auctions --- p.20 / Chapter 3.1 --- High-level planning --- p.20 / Chapter 3.2 --- Mathematical model --- p.21 / Chapter Chapter 4 - --- Agent Architecture and Mechanisms --- p.26 / Chapter 4.1 --- Architecture --- p.26 / Chapter 4.2 --- Cost Estimator (CE) --- p.29 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Closed auction --- p.29 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- "Open ""take-it or leave-it"" market" --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Open continuous double auction (CDA) --- p.31 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Open multi-unit ascending auction --- p.33 / Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- Historical clearing prices --- p.33 / Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- Increasing marginal costs --- p.35 / Chapter 4.4.2.3 --- Bid winning probability --- p.37 / Chapter 4.3 --- Allocation and Acquisition Solver (AAS) --- p.39 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Un-coordinated VS coordinated aspiration --- p.39 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Optimal VS heuristic approach --- p.40 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- An greedy approach with coordinated aspiration --- p.41 / Chapter 4.4 --- The Bidders --- p.44 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- """Take-it or leave-it"" market" --- p.44 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Multi-unit ascending auction --- p.46 / Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- Budget bidding --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- Low price bidding --- p.49 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Continuous double auction (CDA) --- p.51 / Chapter 4.4.3.1 --- Review of fuzzy reasoning mechanism --- p.52 / Chapter 4.4.3.2 --- Fuzzy Reasoning in FL-strategy --- p.54 / Chapter 4.4.3.3 --- Adaptive Risk Attitude --- p.59 / Chapter Chapter 5 - --- Results --- p.61 / Chapter 5.1 --- TAC '02 Competition --- p.62 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Tournament result of our working agent --- p.63 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- "Comparisons between CUHK, ATTac and Roxybot" --- p.65 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- Low-price Bidding --- p.66 / Chapter 5.2 --- Controlled Environment --- p.67 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Software platform --- p.67 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Aggressive agent vs. Adaptive agent --- p.68 / L-agent (aggressive agent) --- p.68 / S-agent (adaptive agent) --- p.69 / Experimental Setting --- p.70 / Experimental Results --- p.71 / The Hawk-Dove Game --- p.72 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Our agent model --- p.73 / Experimental Setting --- p.73 / Experimental Results --- p.74 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Historical clearing price --- p.75 / Experimental Setting --- p.76 / Experimental Result --- p.76 / Comparisons among different approaches --- p.77 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- Increasing marginal cost --- p.79 / Experimental Setting --- p.79 / Experimental Result --- p.79 / Chapter 5.2.6 --- Bid winning probability --- p.81 / Experimental Setting --- p.81 / Experimental Result --- p.81 / Chapter 5.2.7 --- FL-strategy --- p.82 / A-strategy --- p.83 / Experimental Setting --- p.84 / Experimental Result --- p.85 / Chapter Chapter 6 - --- Conclusion and Future work --- p.87 / Reference --- p.91

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 131-139). Also available on microfiche.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 78-82). Also available in print.

Not available / text

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen.