Drawing on the relevant psychology literature, three procedural variables that could influence the auditors' information processing when making going concern opinion decisions were identified. These procedural variables are the decision frame, the order in which evidence is evaluated and the initial belief held by the auditor. With respect to the decision frame, it was predicted that belief revision after processing contrary information (mitigating factors) is higher for auditors who frame their initial hypothesis in terms of viability (failure). This prediction hinges on the assumption that more weight is put on disconfirmatory information than on confirmatory information, holding "information content" constant. Second, denoting P(C) as the auditors' judgment just before processing contrary information (mitigating factors), it was hypothesized that contrary information (mitigating factors) has a bigger effect on belief revision as ex ante P(C) increases (decreases). Finally with respect to the order of evaluating evidence, it was posited that recency effects occur in belief revision and that these recency effects will be manifest in the auditors' opinion decision. These predictions were tested in a field experiment using 70 experienced auditors from four Big Eight firms. Results of the experiment provided support for the predictions relating to the initial belief and the order in which evidence was evaluated. However, the predictions relating to the decision frame were not supported. Furthermore, the study indicated that auditors exhibited considerable variability in their interpretation of substantial doubt (the standard of proof in SAS 59). Whereas some auditors interpreted this requirement as the preponderance of probability, others required a substantially higher level of probability as a threshold of proof for issuing unqualified opinions. Incidentally, it was discovered that this variability was partly accounted for by auditors' firm affiliation. Implications of these results for the audit review, the standard setting process and the nature of expertise in auditing are discussed.

by Lau Tze Yiu, Peter. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 352-365). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

In response to the release of one of its Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) inspection reports, Deloitte notes that “[p]rofessional judgments of reasonable and highly competent people may differ as to the nature and extent of necessary auditing procedures, conclusions reached and required documentation” (PCAOB, 2008, 30). Other responses to PCAOB findings echo this sentiment. Stakeholders need to understand causes of differences between experts’ professional judgments to effectively utilize PCAOB inspection findings and firms’ responses to those findings. This study uses Social Identity Theory to explore whether role identity as an audit partner, internal reviewer, or PCAOB inspector, influences an expert’s judgments in an ambiguous decision environment. I find that professional judgments do not differ based on professional identity. This study also examines whether the presence or absence of outcome knowledge explains judgment differences among auditing experts. Consistent with prior research, e.g. Peecher & Piercey, 2008, outcome knowledge does affect experts’ professional judgment. I also find that experts’ level of organizational identification and membership esteem impacts professional judgment. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Auditors use substantive analytical procedures to make assertions about the adequacy and appropriateness of client balances. The analytical procedure process consists of auditors creating independent account expectations and corroborating unusual fluctuations through obtaining and evaluating additional audit evidence. Prior analytical procedure research has found that knowledge of clients' unaudited account balances biases auditors' expectations towards the current year figures. However, this research has failed to examine the impact of biased expectations on the subsequent stages of analytical procedures. This dissertation assesses the full impact of biased account expectations on auditors' use of analytical procedures. I experimentally test the hypotheses of my dissertation through administering an experiment to senior level auditors. After inducing an account expectation bias that favors the client account balance in half the participants, I examine the auditors' cognitive investigation into an unusual account fluctuation. The results indicate that a biased account expectation negatively affects auditors' judgment quality. In particular, a biased expectation leads auditors to favor hypotheses and additional information that supports the proposition that the client's balance is reasonably stated. Alternatively, auditors with unbiased account expectations are more willing to consider all hypotheses and are able to identify the most pertinent additional information to the decision task. As a result of the different decision strategies employed, auditors who form unbiased account expectations are significantly more likely than auditors with biased account expectations to identify the correct relationship among the underlying data and the proposed hypotheses during a substantive analytical procedure.