In recent years, upon the urgent request of increasing administrative efficiency by all circles, how to maximize the effect from the limitative resource shall be the goal that every unit of Armed Forces has to labour on. Internal control, internal review and internal auditing can be the unlackable roles In these process. Every unit can reach more outcomes in promoting effect and performing financial resource if use them perfectly. Loopholes that influence the order of financial affairs still occur from time to time. Researcher wants to probe into the roles of supervising in military organization. How can they establish a system which promote what is beneficial and abolish what is harmful to reach the goal of reorganization. This study probes into role performing of accountants by questionnaire method under internal control, internal review and internal auditing system, also referring to related documents as researching tools of this study. The object of the questionnaire will be members of Naval Command and it¡¦s subunits. The result of this study is as follows: 1.There are highly identifications but no differences by point of view from (non)accounts in institution, execution and outcome of internal control, internal review and internal auditing system. 2.In the internal control system, there are no remarkable differences in execution and outcome from gender, age, education, seniority, rank and position of accountants. There are differences in institution from positions of supervisor or non-supervisor. 3.In the internal review system, there are no remarkable differences in institution, execution and outcome from gender, age, education, seniority, rank and position of accountants, which leads a result that the accountants have a highly identification in the internal review roles. 4.In the internal audit system, there are differences in outcome from age and rank of accountants, as well in institution and execution from seniority. Suggestion on the follow-up researcher: 1.Review the limitation and deficient of this study. 2.State to relevant topics which this research institute derive, in order to offer to a follow-up researcher and consult.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (viewed Jan. 25, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-60).

Thesis (M.Com.(Internal auditing))--University of Pretoria, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Includes bibliographical references.

Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 2002. / Field problem. Includes bibliographical references.

The basic premise of risk-based auditing is that more (fewer) audit resources should be allocated to accounts that are more (less) likely to be misstated. However, financial reporting managers can exploit such allocations by intentionally misstating balances that are less likely to draw auditor attention. If auditors do not recognize this strategic implication of risk-based auditing, undetected misstatements among ostensibly low-risk accounts could be much more common than traditional risk assessment procedures suggest. The purpose of this study is to examine whether prompting auditors to form beliefs about managers’ expectations of, and responses to, audit strategies can enhance auditors’ sensitivity to the strategic risk of fraud among accounts typically considered low-risk. Using a multi-account audit game, I find that auditors do not naturally attune to strategic risks but instead tend to focus resources on “highrisk” accounts. However, when auditors are prompted to reason strategically, they utilize more resources and devote that increase almost entirely to “low-risk” accounts. I also find that, although increasing available resources does result in an overall increase in the amount of utilized resources, the relative effect of the strategic prompt is robust to the level of available audit resources. / text

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This study uses the principal-agent framework to investigate the trade-off between the benefits of internal control stemming from a reduction of the losses from inappropriate employee actions and the cost of implementing it brought about by the possibility of collusion that it creates. It is shown that, when the agents find it relatively easy to collude, implementing internal control reduces agency welfare, defined as the sum of expected payments accruing to the principal and the agents, even as, with positive transaction costs of collusion, it improves productive efficiency, defined as the expected output. As a result, the principal, under certain conditions, finds it in her best interest to use internal control as a threat instead of implementing it. When this is the case, the principal sometimes prefers to decrease the accuracy of the accounting information system. The analysis of the agents' side contracting indicates that, even if the principal can prevent explicit collusion, for some values of parameters the possibility of tacit collusion still results in a loss. The study also investigates the effect of the choice of organizational form on the value of internal control. The analysis of two different versions of the model demonstrates that, for a wide range of parameters, creating a hierarchical structure reduces, albeit does not eliminate, the loss from collusion -- i.e., internal control and hierarchical delegation are complementary instruments of organizational design. It is also shown that, when one agent is ex ante more likely to be efficient than the other, in most cases the principal optimally appoints to the supervisory position the one who is less likely to be efficient. As a result, the supervisor, in expectation, exerts a lower effort level than the subordinate and collects higher salary. / text

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