M.A. (Latin) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

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Thesis advisor: Richard M. Kearney / What is the relation between sex, death, and the divine? This question, which is of vital importance to Plato and which Freud tacitly takes up by turning to the Symposium at the end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, can be seen as standing at the foundation of philosophy, theology, and psychoanalysis. It ought not to surprise us, then, to observe the vibrant conversation going on between Continental philosophers, theologians, and psychoanalysts today. This attempt to untangle and analyze the intersection where the “Heavenly Powers” of sex and death converge with the divine is that which allows Julia Kristeva to state, during a recent interview with Richard Kearney, that of all “the human sciences and the social sciences, the only rational approaches to human beings, psychoanalysis . . . come[s] closest . . . to the experience of faith.” It is that which enables Lacan to assert that “Saint Augustine . . . foreshadowed psychoanalysis” and to insist that psychoanalysts ought to “become versed in Augustine.” It is that which compels thinkers like Emmanuel Falque—who advise philosophers of religion to speak first and foremost about “finitude, the consciousness and horizon of death” —to write books on Freud and philosophy. And it is that which drives the work being undertaken today. The purpose of this dissertation is to approach once more the dark mystery of Eros and Thanatos which, to paraphrase Dostoevsky, forever struggle with God on the battlefield of the human heart. In order to broach this topic, I will attempt to establish a connection between carnal, bodily love and man’s relation to the divine. To do so, I will rely upon and further develop what Paul Ricoeur has called “the nuptial metaphor”—the recurring biblical motif that portrays God’s relation to man as a kind of love affair, neither reductively sexual nor legalistically marital, but passionate, romantic, protective, desirous, even jealous. Such an understanding of the connection between sexuality and spirituality is not without precedent. Consider, for example, the statement by Ignatius of Antioch from which this work derives its title—“my Eros has been crucified”—which Pseudo Dionysius reads as a supreme affirmation of divine desire. John Panteleimon Manoussakis, commenting on this link between the carnal and the spiritual, writes, “The desire for God is not independent from the desire for the other human . . . One who has not felt the latter rarely and with difficulty would seek the former.” I would add that, as Jean-Luc Marion argues in The Erotic Phenomenon, one who has felt the latter has perhaps already experienced the former, if only in a veiled way. Thus, where Freud reads the desire for God as a sublimation of the sex drives, I would suggest the opposite: erotic desire often reveals a deeper, more fundamental longing—a longing for the divine. And yet, Freud might counter, one must consider not only Eros but Thanatos. How does the desire for death factor into this religiously-inflected reading of the drives? That human sexuality implies both perversion and perfection, that it brings together man’s baseness and his beatitude, is one of the most important insights offered by Freudian drive theory. As Freud himself notes, “The highest and the lowest are always closest to each other in the sphere of sexuality.” But why this is the case remains for Freud a great mystery. Here, I would suggest, is where philosophy of religion can make an important contribution. Relying on the works of philosophers such as Manoussakis, Kearney, and Marion, theologians, in particular Hans Urs von Balthasar, and psychoanalysts such as Freud and Lacan, this work aims to both provide a possible answer to this fundamental question and to foster further dialogue between thinkers whose fields were born of similar concerns. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2019. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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<p>This work aims to shed new light on Augustine of Hippo’s mature dualistic view of the world, the master argument he advanced in support of it, and how it was different from the competing physicalist model that was both prevalent during his time and of which he had earlier been a proponent. Specifically, it aims to understand these topics in light of Augustine’s position on the relation of <i>nonphysical</i> (or <i>incorporeal</i>) objects to space. This topic has yet to be extensively discussed and the secondary claims one finds regarding the matter differ: for some authors claim that Augustine did take nonphysical objects to be located in space and others claim that he did not. I hold that part of the reason for the lack of consensus on this topic is the reliance by each group of authors on limited and distinct sets of direct quotations from Augustine’s writings. In contrast to previous treatments, I approach Augustine’s position by way of his account of <i>spatial location</i> and his account of <i>incorporeal</i> objects. On these grounds, in addition to a more comprehensive set of direct textual data, <i>Chapter 1</i> argues for <i>Modal~SLI</i> or the thesis that <i>pace</i> the affirmative position and <i>beyond</i> the negative one, Augustine was committed to the view that incorporeal objects generally, and God and human souls in particular, not only <i>lack</i> spatial location – they <i>cannot</i> be so located.<i> Chapter 2</i> argues from <i>Modal~SLI</i> in conjunction with further forms of evidence, against <i>spatial readings</i> of Augustine’s notion of <i>presence</i> and for a ca<i>usal account</i> (or <i>CP</i>). The causal account holds that Augustine took presence <i>per se</i> to be a kind of causal relation which does not require or entail spatially located <i>relata</i>. On the basis of <i>CP</i> and <i>Modal~SLI</i> and additional forms of evidence, <i>Chapter 3</i> argues against spatial readings and for a causal analysis of Augustine’s argument from presence to the incorporeality of human souls. <i>Chapter 4</i> argues on these same bases against the spatial reading and for a causal analysis of Augustine’s argument from omnipresence to God’s incorporeality. Additionally, <i>Chapters 3</i> and <i>4</i> contain extensive discussions of the support that Augustine’s provides for the premises in each of the arguments that is their focus. <i>Chapter 5</i>, which is the capstone of this project, draws out the implications of earlier chapters to advance new and more complete models of Augustine’s mature dualistic view of the world, the rational basis upon which he endorsed the dualistic model and rejected the competing physicalist one, and the comparative relations between his mature model and the physicalist one. Among the conclusions it advances are the following: (i) in including both physical and nonphysical objects Augustine’s mature view includes objects that are and must be located in space and objects that are not and cannot be located it space; (ii) in including God and human souls as nonphysical objects it includes them as objects that are not and cannot be located in space; (iii) causal claims (i.e., claims expressing causal relations) were central drivers of Augustine’s personal transition from a physicalist to a dualistic view of the world and were central elements of his impersonal or public case against physicalism and for dualism; and (iv) the dualist and physicalist models were similar in that each included physical objects, objects with spatial location, and God and human souls; but they differed in that unlike the physicalist model, the dualist model also included nonphysical objects, objects without spatial location, and numbered God and human souls as nonphysical objects and hence objects without spatial locations. </p> <br> <p> </p>

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Thesis advisor: Jeremy D. Wilkins / The basic question of this dissertation is, “Why a crucified God?” The history of this question is traced through strategically chosen increments in Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Lonergan. Each contributes in some important way to the development of a tradition that focuses on the choice of divine love and wisdom to answer evil through the justice of the cross rather than by coercion. In light of these earlier transpositions and Lonergan’s own development, this dissertation examines the meaning and justice of the cross, as epitomized in Lonergan’s Law of the Cross, and re-contextualizes this law in relation to our collective responsibility in and for history. This teleological re-reading of Lonergan’s soteriology brings to the forefront that a fitting remedy to the problem of a dis-ordered love is a re-ordering and (re-)ordered love, not coercive power. According to Lonergan’s Law of the Cross, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption is the transformation of evil into good by love. This love, caritas ordinata et ordinans, is understood by analogy with the antecedent offer of diffusive friendship and by analogy with sacramental penance. The restoration of right order through the cross is fitting because, if the laws of nature and history are not suspended, retaliation would only multiply the objective surd. The constructive part of this dissertation further specifies ontological conditions for the fittingness of the cross by bringing the lex crucis into dialogue with Lonergan’s general theory of historical process. In continuity with the emerging world order (as subject to classical, statistical, dialectical, and genetic laws), the cross manifests an orderly communication of divine friendship to sinners. Correspondingly, the justice of the cross regards, not retributive justice, but the possibility of justice among sinners. This possibility, it is argued, is inaugurated by Christ’s transformation of suffering into the means of a new finality in history, the probabilities of which are decisively shifted in the cross event and concretely realized through the emergent agape network, the higher integration of the human good of order through the whole Christ, head and members, by the power of the Holy Spirit. The justice of the cross, then, is an emergent agapic justice which proceeds from the dynamic state of being in love with God as its principle and is realized in a dialectic unification of all things in Christ, constituting the “cruciform” transformation of human (inter-)subjectivity and the recovery of human progress as ordered to the eschatologically definitive reign of God. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

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During Augustine’s early years in ministry, he promoted the idea of using the pen rather than the sword when it comes to converting those who were not Christians. However, during the Donatist Controversy. Augustine advocated the use of violence to convince the Donatists to return to the Catholic fold. This dissertation argues that disgust played a crucial role in Augustine’s change of heart. Emotions play a huge part in an individual’s decision-making process. Studies on disgust discuss its role in interpersonal conflict and in religious violence. The dehumanizing language present in Augustine's letters when he describes the Donatists helps create an atmosphere where disgust's strong presence can be felt. The question of purity became an important question since both groups argued that they were the “true, pure Church.” Both groups traced their spiritual lineage to Cyprian as proof that they belonged to the true African Church. By examining Augustine's Letters, one can see the shift in tone and characterization of the Donatists by Augustine. Over the years, the disgust felt by Augustine led to a shift in his attitude, leading him to sanction the use of violence against the Donatists. Initially, the role of disgust was to prevent humans from coming into contact with harmful pathogens. As a result, humans developed a strong revulsion against harmful substances in order to protect themselves from harm. While disgust has this physical component, it also has a sociomoral component where it manifests itself against disgusting stimulus. Within this schema, anything that it deems as a moral transgression, especially as it involves question of purity, is considered as a stimulus to be avoided and rejected strongly and vehemently. While it poses no problem for a human to avoid what it deems as a disgusting stimulus such as a cockroach, it does pose a problem when another human being is seen and labelled as a cockroach. Disgust has the power to “other” human beings and creates a very strong us-vs-them mentality. Once this us-vs-them mentality is enforced, it is only natural to label another group as a "cockroach” and kill them as such. In examining Augustine's relationship with the Donatists, it is important to acknowledge disgust’s role in this particular theological and historical event. This dissertation will conclude with a contemporary application of disgust in modern theological controversies, especially as it relates to homosexuality and the role of women in leadership. Disgust’s ability to elicit such a strong and violent response in humans is a reminder of the strength of emotions to govern our actions. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)