Drawing on the notion of faultlines – a hypothetical dividing line that splits a group into two or more subgroups based on the alignment of one or more individual attributes – this thesis proposes a new approach to the measurement and assessment of board diversity to understand how high(er) performing boards can be built i.e., the multi-dimensional diversity index (MDI). The proposed MDI captures the joint effect of differences in director attributes at four diversity levels for 26,743 directors, namely: (i) surface (or baseline); (ii) identity; (iii) demographic; and (iv) meso-level. The current study uses three-stage least squares (3SLS) with a panel of 3,357 FTSE All-Share index non-financial companies from 2005 to 2018. To this end, a key implication of this study – and by extension, the proposed MDI – is that it challenges the conventional notion that boards are improved ‘enough’ by focusing on the micro-dimension and increasing stand-alone diversity attributes, such as gender. Collectively, this study’s results suggest that a well-diversified board incentivises managers to disclose more information on social and environmental activities in contrast to firms with an extreme faultline score. The results show that highly effective boards with a moderate faultline score at meso-level diversity (e.g., identity, information, and non-demographic attributes) lead to better accounting profitability, corporate value, and market-based performance. Remarkably, the present study finds that nationality diversity per se positively impacts corporate performance; in contrast, the dominance of male directors hinders firm performance significantly.

No / Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure practices in the UK and Italy and also studies the impact of those practices on market liquidity. Research Findings/Insights: We find that governance factors principally influence the decisions of UK (Italian) firms over whether to exhibit risk information voluntarily (mandatorily) in their annual report narratives. When we distinguish between firms with strong and weak governance (in terms of board efficiency) in each country, we find that the factors that affect mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure appear to be driven more by strongly governed firms in both countries. Furthermore, strongly governed firms in the UK tend to provide more meaningful risk information to their investors than weakly governed firms. In Italy, however, we find that strongly rather than weakly governed firms exhibiting risk information voluntarily rather than mandatorily improves market liquidity significantly. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure when studying the impact of corporate governance. Our findings differ across strongly and weakly governed firms, in terms of both the factors that influence risk disclosure practices and the exact informativeness of those practices. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results support the current regulatory trend in risk reporting within the UK that emphasizes the importance of directors and encourages rather than mandates risk disclosure. However, the results generally signal a need for further improvements in the Italian context. Our evidence also supports the value of the confidence in the UK governance system, compared to that in Italy, which motivates British firms to provide highly informative risk information more often than Italian firms.