It is agreed upon by many philosophers that perception represents the world to be in a certain way. However, there is disagreement among those philosophers about whether perceptual content is conceptual or not. The aim of this thesis is to provide a clear presentation of the debate and to propose an account of nonconceptual perceptual content that can tackle many philosophical problems related to the issue. Conceptualism about perceptual content is the view that perceptual content is wholly conceptual. Proponents of this view claim that a subject cannot be in a contentful perceptual state without possessing concepts that fully characterize the content of his experience. The main motivation behind conceptualism is the justificatory role perception is supposed to play in forming perceptual beliefs. It is claimed that if perceptual content provides rational ground or reason for forming perceptual beliefs, it has to be conceptual just like the belief it is a reason for. However, there are several philosophical problems that arise from such an understanding of perceptual content. Most of them mainly derive from the implausibility of the claim that a subject needs to possess every concept that figures in the characterization of the content of his perceptual state. So, nonconceptualism is based on the assumption that a contentful perceptual state can occur albeit the absence of all or some concepts that characterize the content. Therefore, in this thesis I aim to provide a notion of nonconceptual perceptual content that is epistemically relevant, i.e. that can ground perceptual beliefs in spite of its nonconceptual character.

In light of the notions of freedom, legitimacy, equality, autonomy, plurality, publicity and action in the philosophies of Rousseau and Arendt, it can be seen that formal democracy, having ceased to be the expression of the sovereignty of the people, fell into a legitimacy crisis and has become a system which makes the people apolitical. Behind these problems, there are many reasons like the ethical deficiency of the monetarist system, deputies&rsquo / abuse of authority and tyranny of the majority. The facts in question have pushed philosophers to re-think the fundamental concepts underlying democracy and search for new conceptions of democracy. Nevertheless, it seems that no political model can succeed unless the people reach a certain level of ethical maturity. In this context, we are confronted with two models: liberal deliberative model which is criticized for giving negative rights priority over the process of public will-formation, and Habermas&rsquo / proceduralism which is based on the theory of discourse ethics. Habermasian democracy&mdash / which, contrary to majoritarianism, assumes the consent of all people as the basis of legitimacy&mdash / has goals like intersubjective understanding through rational justification and consensus in an ideal speech situation. Although it has criticizable sides, being the most appropriate account for our understanding of democracy ethics, which considers politics as a part of being human rather than a matter of governance, proceduralism can be defended with the contributions of Benhabib and Young. In the end, the point is making ethics of democracy prior to political models for re-politization of the people.

This thesis aims to explicate the claim that in Heidegger&#039 / s thinking techn

The purpose of this study is to examine concepts of freedom and evil, and to clarify their relation in terms of Kant&rsquo / s moral philosophy. In this study, I firstly examine Kant&rsquo / s understanding of freedom and the problems that this understanding leads to. I also discuss how the concept of freedom can be reconciled with the concept of evil expressed in the form of &ldquo / propensity to evil&rdquo / . Additionally, I attempt to show the significance of the notion of evil for Kant&rsquo / s moral theory. Evil is one of the most criticized concepts of Kant&rsquo / s philosophy and it is considered as inconsistent with his earlier thoughts by his contemporaries. Kant claims that the &ldquo / propensity to evil&rdquo / is universal to all of human race, but it does not mean that human beings are actually evil. They become good or evil with their free will (Willk&uuml / r). In this study, I propose that Kant&rsquo / s understanding of evil is a concept that helps to conceive one&rsquo / s own freedom in terms of Kant&rsquo / s morality. I also try to show that in spite of its similarities with the Christian doctrine of &ldquo / original sin&rdquo / , Kant&rsquo / s conception of evil should not be considered as a religious issue / it is a matter of freedom as the extension of his moral theory and his earlier thoughts. Kant&rsquo / s earlier works do not seem to be sufficient for comprehending his moral thoughts. Therefore, it can be proposed that with the introduction of the concept of evil in the Religion within the Limits of Reason, the missing part of Kant&rsquo / s moral theory is completed.

This study aims at investigating Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of meaning. In this sense, philosopher&rsquo / s early and later periods will be examined. Key notions of Wittgenstein&rsquo / s philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, language-game, rule following, Private Language Argument and his assertion that &lsquo / meaning is use&rsquo / will be analyzed. Out of this analysis, Wittgenstein&rsquo / s answer to the following basic question will be sought: How is meaning derived in a language? The outcome of this query will be comparatively read with four linguistic theories so as to position Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of meaning with regard to the linguistic turn. As a result of this, it will be argued that Wittgensteinian meaning can be regarded as the very first step of post-structural understanding of meaning and discourse theory.

In this study, the standpoint that discourse on ethics is impossible is examined. As Ludwig Wittgenstein is the first philosopher who explicitly said that ethics is inexpressible, the main concentration is on Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of ethics. Analytic philosophy&rsquo / s questions regarding ethics are about the meaning of the expressions of value rather than conduct. It is generally recognized that the distinction between these questions and the emphasis on the definition of value judgements starts with G.E. Moore&rsquo / s Principia Ethica (PE). So G.E. Moore is included in the scope of this study. Wittgenstein&rsquo / s manifestation of the inexpressibility of metaphysical and ethical utterances influenced logical positivists. Hence, it is necessary that our scope should also include the Logical Positivist&rsquo / s two main meta-ethical theories, i.e., the emotive theory of ethics and naturalistic ethics. Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of ethics in his early and later periods are examined separately. This is because it is generally believed that his later works could provide a means of saying what &ldquo / cannot be said&rdquo / for early Wittgenstein. It is concluded that the conception of a language-game reflects well how we may have a discourse on ethics.

Michel Foucault characterizes power as ubiquitous and productive in the sense that there is no power-free truth, subject, and knowledge. Moreover, he studies the historical conditions of truth and subject to have an existence in a way that he historicizes them rather than delineating truth as corresponding to reality and subject as a self-subsistent and ahistorical substance. In this respect, his anti-essentialist account of power, truth, and subject is criticized on the account that he excludes the possibility of resistance against power through deconstructing any firm ground which is absolutely free from history and power and thus a promising substratum on which resistance can be substantiated. In this study, I will argue that these criticisms are ill-founded because they are either based on the misunderstandings of Foucauldian account of power or functioning with an assumption that resistance entails essentialist metaphysics as a ground, the assumption which is itself devoid of justification. Moreover, I will claim that it is an anti-essentialist ground&amp / #8212 / an epistemico-ontological ground&amp / #8212 / that supplies Foucault with a basis for substantiating the account of resistance.

The doctrine of eternal recurrence is not only an aspect of Nietzsche&rsquo / s philosophy, but a notion that structures the base of his philosophy. The doctrine is analyzed by many interpreters in various ways. The cosmological and the ethical-existential approaches to the doctrine are at the very base wrong. The doctrine&rsquo / s impact cannot be adequately understood in these terms. Besides, the doctrine of eternal recurrence has multiple problems within it, problems which can be solved if the doctrine is understood and analyzed properly. In this thesis it was suggested, following Lawrence J. Hatab and Pierre Klossowski, that the doctrine should be read in terms of mimetic literality. And in this way the reading and the understanding of the doctrine lead the self to a dissolution which solves many of the problems within the doctrine.

Normativity of biological functions create a serious obstacle against the reduction of functional biology into molecular biology. Normativity of biological entities has two interconnected sources. One is the internal complexity and self organization demonstrated by the organism. The second source is external to the organism: Natural selection. An organism adapts to its environment by its internal autonomy. Species or populations adapt by natural selection. If these two sources of normativity can be reduced to statistical generalities achieved by theoretical models, reductionism will prevail.

This thesis defends Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) against both Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) and Traditional Scientific Realism (TSR). It is argued that TSR cannot properly explain what actually happens throughout radical theory changes in science / in the sense that a plausible version of Scientific Realism should, somehow, satisfy Scientific Anti-Realists&rsquo / concerns about the link between &ldquo / truth&rdquo / and &ldquo / success&rdquo / of our scientific theories. On the other hand, it is claimed that OSR is not a form of Scientific Realism but rather basically a modified form of Pragmatism. To that effect, it is further argued that Modern Physics does not provide convincing reasons to accept the conclusions that advocates of OSR derive from it. It is finally asserted that a Structural Realist understanding of Scientific Explanation is not possible. In that regard, it is argued that a defense of Structural Realism by No Miracle Argument (NMA) against Pessimistic Meta Induction Argument (PMIA) will be effective if and only if the NMA is formulated by the predictive success of scientific theories, rather than constructing it on the explanatory power of them.