This thesis is concerned with hypothesis testing in models where data exhibits time dependence. The focus is on two cases where the dependence of observations across time leads to non-standard hypothesis testing techniques. This thesis first considers models estimated by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, Hansen (1982)) and the approach to inference. The main problem with standard tests are size distortions in the test statistics. An innovative resampling method, which we label Empirical Likelihood Block Bootstrapping, is proposed. The first-order asymptotic validity of the proposed procedure is proven, and a series of Monte Carlo experiments show it may improve test sizes over conventional block bootstrapping. Also staying in the context of GMM this thesis shows that the testcorrection given in Hall (2000) which improves power, can distort size with time dependent data. In this case it is of even greater importance to use a bootstrap that can have good size in finite samples. The empirical likelihood is applied to a multifactor model of U.S. bank risk estimated by GMM. The approach to inference is found to be important to the overall conclusion about bank risk. The results suggest U.S. bank stock returns are sensitive to movements in market and liquidity risk. In the context of panel data, this thesis is the first to my knowledge to consider the estimation of cost-functions as well as conduct inference taking into account the strong dependence of data across time. This thesis shows that standard approaches to estimating cost-functions for a set of Canadian banks lead to a downward bias in the estimated coefficients and therefore an upward bias in the measure of economies of scale. When non-stationary panel techniques are applied results suggest economies of scale of around 6 per cent in Canadian banking as well as cost-efficiency differences across banks that are correlated with size. / Thesis (Ph.D, Economics) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-24 17:25:22.212

Diss.: Frankfurt (Main), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 2009. / Inludes bibliographical references (p. 217-223).

Depository institutions must properly manage their liquidity to meet daily cash needs, to deal with a decline in the relative size of the industry, and to avoid the possibility of a bank run. Members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System can use the Advance Program to enhance their liquidity and simultaneously limit some of the interest rate risk associated with mortgage lending and mortgage related securities. This study investigates which factors influence the decision to use the Advance program and which factors influence the volume of Advances held by participating thrifts. A logistic regression analysis is used to evaluate which variables significantly impact a thrift's decision to use the FHLB Advance Program. A multiple linear regression model of thrifts with FHLB Advances measures which variables significantly affect the level of Advances held by thrift institutions. Fed Funds Borrowed .and Repo Agreements Sold was found to have a negative impact on the decision of a thrift to have FHLB Advances. Total Assets ( + ), Equity (-), Deposits Less Than $100,000 (-), and Deposits Greater Than $100,000 (-) were all found to have a significant influence on both the decision to have Advances and the volume of Advances held.

This dissertation studies the demand and supply of liquidity with a particular focus on the financial intermediation sector. The first essay analyzes the role of financial intermediaries as suppliers of inside money. The demand for money arises from the needs of nonfinancial corporations to buffer liquidity shocks. The dynamic interaction between inside money supply and demand gives rise to a mechanism of financial instability that puts the procyclicality of intermediary leverage at the center. Introducing outside money, in the form of government debt, can be counterproductive, as it may amplify the procyclicality of inside money creation and intermediary leverage, making booms more fragile and crises more stagnant. The second essay addresses an issue that is left out in the first essay -- the interaction between money and credit. It offers a model of macroeconomy where intermediaries are needed for both money and credit creation. Specifically, entrepreneurs hold money to finance new projects, while intermediaries issue money backed by investments in existing projects. The complementarity between money and credit arises from financial frictions and amplifies economic fluctuations. In the third essay, my coauthors and I model the liquidity demand of banks. To buffer liquidity shocks, banks hold central bank reserves and can borrow reserves from each other. The propagation of liquidity shocks, depend on the topology of interbank credit network, but more importantly, on the type of equilibrium on the network (strategic complementarity vs. substitution). The model is estimated using data on reserves, interbank credit, bank balance sheets, and macroeconomic variables. We propose a method to identify banks that contribute the most to systemic risk, and offer policy guidance by comparing the decentralized outcome with the choice of a benevolent planner.

The financial crises and bank runs in the past decade increased attention to the financial systems. In Turkey as in Europe banks are main financial intermediaries and financial crises occur mostly due to realization of risks in banks. Although liquidity risk is embedded into daily operations of banks unless controlled it may take banks into insolvency and even bankruptcy. This thesis aims to examine liquidity risk structure of Turkish banking sector. As a sample the domestic commercial banks in Turkey is chosen. The risk profile of the sector is examined by using a ratio analysis. The accounting figures in balance sheets and income statements of banks are employed for statistical analysis about liquidity risk of the sector. The means of liquidity ratios among different groups of banks are compared via analysis of variance. Moreover relation between liquidity risk and return in the sector is analysed by using panel data regressions.

This study investigates whether bank regulations pertaining to capital and liquidity, which are designed to promote a resilient banking system, cause risk migration from the banking industry to the real economy. Specifically, I examine whether borrowers increase their risk-taking after incurring higher borrowing costs due to Basel III. Using a difference-in-differences research design to compare borrowers of banks that are more affected by Basel III (i.e., banks with $250 billion or more in total consolidated assets) with borrowers of banks that are less affected, I find that the borrowers more affected by Basel III (a) experienced a relative increase in loan costs, (b) displayed a relative increase in accounting- and market-based volatility, and (c) incurred a relative increase in investments in risky activities with uncertain benefits. These findings suggest that borrowers are exposed to moral hazard: to compensate for the increased borrowing costs, they are incentivized to take on more risk in pursuit of higher expected returns. Such results are not driven by adverse selection, time trend, or bank size. This study highlights a potential unintended consequence of bank regulations on borrower risk-taking.

With recent financial crisis the importance of liquidity not only as indicator of financial health of banks heightened. Thus this thesis aims the focus to relationship between real economy and bank liquidity creation, and provides empirical evidence of significant relationship between bank liquidity creation and GDP or inflation. Moreover, it shows that implementation of bank liquidity creation indicator into Taylor rule, in order to address for financial stability and health, is suitable alternative for financial stress index.

This dissertation consists of three separate essays which address questions in the field of banking. The first two essays are motivated by the Great Recession, and study key aspects of the experience of commercial banks during this period. One is the impact of liquidity risk on credit supply, and the second is the effect of portfolio choices on the probability of bank failure. The third essay shifts the focus from commercial banks to M & A transactions, and studies the impact of a key provision in merger agreements on the initial offer premium and target firm value. In the first essay, titled "Liquidity Risk and the Credit Crunch of 2007-2009", I document the connection between liquidity risk and the credit crunch experienced during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Using extensive micro-level data on mortgage loan applications, I construct a measure of the supply of credit that is free from demand-side bias. I then use this measure of credit supply to estimate the effect of cross-sectional differences in unused lines of credit and core-deposit funding on the supply of mortgage credit moving through the crisis. I find that lenders with higher liquidity risk contracted their supply of mortgage credit more. The channel of contraction was significantly stronger for larger lenders, which had the largest exposure to liquidity risk. The first phase of the contraction was due to liquidity risk arising from high exposure to lines of credit and was immediately followed by further tightening due to the collapse of the markets for wholesale funding. I estimate that the total contraction of mortgage lending due to liquidity stresses experienced by lenders during 2007-2009 was $41.5 billion - $61.9 billion, or 5.2%-7.8% of total mortgage originations during that period. In the second essay, titled "Commercial Bank Failures During The Great Recession: The Real (Estate) Story" I identify the channels through which shocks to the real estate sector contributed to the wave of commercial bank failures during the Great Recession. I focus on the banks' loan, marketable securities and credit line portfolios, and consider how choices which shifted the composition of each portfolio towards real estate products impacted the probability of bank failure. I find that augmenting a baseline model of failure with variables that capture the composition of these three portfolios improves the fit of the model by approximately 70% for small banks and 230% for large banks. I find no evidence that banks which held more of their loans in traditional closed-end mortgages suffered a higher probability of failure. Rather, it was investments in loans for multifamily properties and other non-household real estate loans, as well as off-balance sheet exposures to credit lines issued to non-household real estate borrowers, that are robustly identified as precursors of bank failure for both small and large banks. Exposure to open-end residential real estate loans contributed to the failure rates of small banks only. Exposure to private-label MBS is strongly associated with a higher probability of failure for large banks, but not for small ones. On the other hand, high holdings of agency MBS are associated with a higher probability of failure only for smaller banks, but this result is less robust. The third essay, titled "No Free Shop: Why Target Companies in MBOs and Private Equity Transactions Sometimes Choose Not to Buy 'Go Shop' Options" is joint work with Charles W. Calomiris and Donna M. Hitscherich. In this essay, we study the decisions by targets in private equity and MBO transactions whether to actively "shop" their initial acquisition agreements prior to the shareholders' approval of those contracts. Specifically, targets can insert a "go-shop" clause into their contracts, which permits them to use the agreement to solicit offers from other would-be acquirors during the "go-shop" window, during which the termination fee paid by the target is temporarily lowered. We consider the "go-shop" decision from the theoretical perspective of value maximization under asymmetric information, and also consider conflicts of interest on the parts of management, bankers, and attorneys that might affect the decision. Empirically, we find that the decision to retain the option to shop an offer is predicted by various firm attributes, including larger size, more fragmented ownership, and various characteristics of the firms' legal advisory team and procedures. These can be interpreted as reflecting a combination of informational characteristics, litigation risk, and attorney conflicts of interest. We employ legal advisor characteristics as instruments when analyzing the effects of go-shop decisions on target acquisition premia and value. We find, as predicted in our theoretical framework, that go-shops are not a free option; they result in lower initial acquisition premia, ceteris paribus. Our theoretical framework has an ambiguous prediction about the effects of go-shop choice on target firm valuation. Consistent with theory, we find no significant effect on abnormal returns from choosing a "go-shop" option.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisors: Russell Cooper and Beatrix Paal. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Also available from UMI.

This study examined the determinants of commercial bank liquidity in South Africa. The panel regression approach was used, applying panel data from twelve commercial banks over the period 2006 to 2016. A quantitative research method was used to investigate the relationship between bank liquidity and some microeconomic and bank-specific factors and between bank liquidity and selected macro-economic factors. The regression analysis for four liquidity ratios was conducted using the pooled ordinary least squares regression, fixed effects, random effects and the generalised methods of moments. However, the system generalised methods of moments approach was preferred over the other methods because it eliminated the problem of endogeneity. Results show that capital adequacy, size and gross domestic product have a positive and significant effect on liquidity. Loan growth and non-performing loans had a negative and significant effect on liquidity. Inflation had both a positive and a negative but an insignificant effect on liquidity. The study concluded that South African banks could enhance their liquidity positions by tightening their loan-underwriting criteria and credit policies. Banks should improve their credit risk management frameworks to be more prudent in their lending practices to improve the quality of the loan book to enhance liquidity. They also need to grow their capital levels by embarking on efficient revenue enhancements activities. Banks may also to look at their clients on an overall basis and not on transaction bases, and they need to improve non-interest revenue by introducing innovated products. The South African Reserve Bank could push for policies that might enhance capitalisation by ensuring that the sector is consolidated and thus merging smaller banks to create banks with stronger balance sheets and stronger capital base. This study contributes to the empirical research repository on the determinants of liquidity and more specifically, it identified the significant factors that affect South African commercial bank liquidity. Identifying the determinants of South African commercial bank liquidity will provide the South African Reserve Bank with insight into ways of enhancing liquidity management reforms, to improve the sector’s liquidity management practices and help to maintain a sound and liquid banking sector. / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)