Contemporary materialism, which tries to explain the working principles of the mind and the universe, become less meaningful after the developments in the modern physics. The modern physics showed that the definition of matter, as it is used in defining materialism, is no longer valid. Chomsky states his position as &ldquo / Chomsky&#039 / s challenge to materialism&rdquo / by claiming that with the abolishment of the definition of the matter, there is no reason to defend materialism, which depends on that definition. Therefore, materialism becomes an empty doctrine thus cannot be used in explaining the mind. The developments in the modern physics creates the need for a new doctrine, which can explain the mind and at the same time be compatible with the modern physics and possible any future physics. This new doctrine, the methodological physicalism, aims to explain the mind by using the modern physics. Creating such a doctrine requires understanding of materialism and its form as well as understanding the problems of materialism and its forms. By identifying the defects in materialism and by using the modern physics as a standing point methodological physicalism can achieve a more successful understanding of the working of the mind. By using the modern physics, the methodological physicalism can explain why the currents models of the mind fail. Moreover, it can explain how certain models of the mind constructed, which employs the quantum mechanics while explaining the mind. The methodological physicalism will help understanding the mind where materialism fails to do so.

This thesis analyzes the reasons for Socrates&#039 / being presented as a paradoxical figure in the early dialogues of Plato. Irony as a fundamental philosophical attitude in Socratic philosophy is discussed with reference to some of the major philosophers of the history of philosophy. The thesis also suggests the possibility of seeing philosophy as an ironic activity and it traces the etymology of the concept of irony in terms of its philosophical importance.

The primary aim of this thesis is the consideration of neuroscientific studies regarding the localization of high-level cognitive (i.e., nonsensory and nonmotor) processes into the brain. To accomplish this aim, I briefly summarized history of the localizations which lead to the cortical localization of high-level cognitive processes. Then, I present a case study, memory consolidation to compare molecular neuroscience (MN) and cognitive neuroscience (CN) as to how they differ in their localizations. After I put forward the difference between MN and CN, I make use of Uttal&rsquo / s arguments to consider the localizations of MN and CN. His arguments resemble the underdetermination problem and pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) highly debated topic in scientific realism debate. In this respect, I examine UD and PMI with its relevance to MN and CN.

The purpose of this study is to discuss the appropriateness of a cognitive approach to Donald Davidson&#039 / s meaning theory. Davidson makes the bold proposal that a truth theory, modified for a natural language, may be treated as a meaning theory for that language. According to Davidson, a meaning theory is an empirical theory. Radical Interpretation is at the center of such an empirical inquiry which places restrictions on the truth theory to make it suitable as a meaning theory without appeal to semantic notions. Davidson&lsquo / s aim in presenting this bold proposal and radical interpretation is to shed light on the concept of meaning, not to define the actual semantic competence of language users. But what Davidson&lsquo / s project does not aim to define is the main thing that a cognitive approach must account for. Whether a truth theory can represent the semantic competence of language users is discussed in this work. It is concluded that, although there is no a priori reason for such a representation claim, the cognitive approach&mdash / with the right assumptions to make the claim testable&mdash / can lead to an empirical research programme.

What is the meaning of life? This has been one of the major questions of philosophy for centuries / from Socrates to Nietzsche and from Tolstoy to the famous comedy writers&rsquo / group Monty Python. People from diverse intellectual backgrounds asked what the meaning of life is. Although there are doubts that this question is now outdated, meaning of life seems to me still an intriguing subject. In this thesis I argue that life&rsquo / s meaning must be discussed according to two different notions. One of these notions is the content of life where life&rsquo / s meaning can be analyzed according to its coherence with a value system, its achievements or its influence on others. The other is the notion of life&rsquo / s meaning as a mental concept, as an experience. I provide reasons to think life&rsquo / s meaning as a composite mental state and propose its components. My point of view carries subjectivist implications, however by introducing necessary conditions of the formation of the composite mental state that provides a life with meaning I argue that such a mental state attains objectivity.

In this thesis, Seneca&rsquo / s notion of self as self-love and the problem of self-deception are analyzed. In examining three types of self-love, &ndash / ignorant, progressing selves,&ndash / three models of self-deception are discussed. Self-deception is related to the problem of self-knowledge. I discuss the nature of self-love as self-esteem and self-preservation and self-shaping all of which are innate qualities and develop into more complex forms of knowing. Passions are concrete examples of the representations of deceived self / central to the overestimation of indifferents, the deceived self displays a pattern of reasoning that creates a paradox between what the self intends to do and what it actually appears or what the self wants to see himself as and what it actually is. In discussing various types of self-deception, it is argued that problem of deception can hardly be overcome practically even by education, although it is naturally possible. While the ignorant deceive themselves beyond their recognition, in the case of the educated selves, the tension between the knowledge of ignorance and the desire to be the person play an important role in self-deception. No one except the sage is free from self-deception. The thesis deals with the issue of self-knowing as a scarce possibility.

The main concern of this thesis is to show Plato&rsquo / s solution of the problem of falsehood in his dialogue of the Sophist. In the Sophist, it is argued that false statements are the expressions of something which are not real by Plato. On the other hand, what is not real has been considered as what does not exist, namely, as non-being in the ontological tradition until Plato. Furthermore, non-being can neither be thought nor be stated / since thought must be thought of something which exists. Therefore, to speak of the possibility of false statements is a contradiction because it means to attempt to state nothingness. However, Plato overcomes this difficulty by asserting a different definition of non-being. Plato asserts that non-being is not necessarily opposite of being. According to this, non-being is only &lsquo / different&rsquo / from being and exists as much as being and this is possible by the combination of &lsquo / Kind of Being&rsquo / and &lsquo / Kind of &lsquo / Difference&rsquo / . In this context, this thesis purposes to show firstly how Plato renders an ontological possibility to non-being and secondly how he applies this inference to statements in order to solve the problem in the Sophist. In addition, the results of Plato&rsquo / s assumption that there is a correspondence between language and reality are discussed with respect to the problem of falsehood.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the passions in Cartesian philosophy. It analyses the nature, characteristics and the causes of passions as discussed by Descartes in his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth and his last book The Passions of the Soul (Les passions de l&rsquo / &acirc / me). This thesis purports to explain Descartes&rsquo / ethical view by examining the physical mechanism of the passions and their relation to the soul. The reason, will and their essential roles in Cartesian ethics are discussed.