This study aims at exhibiting the strong correlation between the question of subjectivity and the question of being. If the question of subjectivity is to be formulated in terms of the relation between the inner realm of consciousness and the outer world, then the question will have an epistemological form and becomes the question of the objectivity of our knowledge. In the dissertation, however, it will be claimed with the German philosopher Martin Heidegger that the critical stand taken against the subject-object schema of the Cartesian epistemology must be of an ontological kind, and should criticize the substantial difference between the two realms of being. v In order to fulfill the aforementioned task, Dasein as the entity which is capable of asking the question of being will be claimed to be the ontological condition of possibility for something like subjectivity. By the help of the phenomenological concept of Dasein, we will claim that the most neutral and basic being-in-the-world of human beings is not cognizing or perceiving things, but caring for them. The last objective we hope to fulfill in this study is to show that the only question of philosophy for Heidegger, i.e., the question of being, can first become comprehensible when the philosopher&rsquo / s investigations of the modern philosophy have been well examined. It is our contention that, unless thedead-ends of the modern philosophy of subjectivity is apprehended well enough, the obligation of asking the question of being as such cannot be felt.

The self-knowledge has been a central problem throughout the history of philosophy, but it has remained, as Kant also declares, as the

Many philosophers tend to defend the view that there is a significant relation between the problem of determinism / indeterminism and the problem of free will. The belief that there exists such a significant relation is supported by our intuitions / however, in this thesis, I defend just the opposite view: free will has no significant dependence on the deterministic or indeterministic character of causal relations. In the same way, I propose that the question, whether or not determinism is true, cannot be answered based on observations about the problem of free will. I believe that the genuine question whose answer would illuminate the darkness surrounding free will is whether or not will supervenes on anything other than itself. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not we are free, the question we should ask is &ldquo / Does will supervene upon something other than itself?&rdquo / Moreover, I defend the position that no matter whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, if physicalism is true, i.e. if properties of free will supervene upon physical properties, then we cannot enjoy genuine freedom. The position of the thesis has some important ethical implications: If we cannot be genuinely free, we cannot be genuinely responsible for our actions either. This implies that retributive and admirative desires towards other persons are rationally untenable. I defend the view that only practical attitudes like reinforcement and punishment or isolation and inclusion are rationally tenable.

The main objective of this study is to make a comprehensive analysis of the question &ldquo / Why is there something rather than nothing?&rdquo / , which is one of the major questions of metaphysics, and to find a plausible answer at the end, if it is possible. To begin this analysis, a clarification of what we understand by this question is needed first. For the clarification, a definition of &lsquo / nothingness&rsquo / will be sought. Afterwards, the motivation for us to ask this question, the significance of it, and the content of it will be investigated. This investigation will help us concentrate on and discuss within the framework of causation and necessity our understanding of &ldquo / contingent beings&rdquo / and &ldquo / nothingness&rdquo / . Two main approaches sought to answer this question till now are by theists and physicists. Those approaches will be discussed and compared. And at the end of the comparative analysis of these two approaches, a metaphysical approach which will be a layer of them will be sought.

The main concern of the thesis is the problem of reconciliation of freedom and natural causality and to investigate how Kant makes a room for freedom. Kant, firstly, in &ldquo / Analytic&rdquo / , constitutes the conditions of knowledge upon which the objective validity of the law of causality entirely rests. This process of constitution also determines the limits of experience. On the other hand, Kant, in &ldquo / Dialectic&rdquo / , postulates freedom as a noumenal cause together with the law of causality. Transcendental freedom, in this case, is a problematic concept which transcends the limits of experience, as it seems to destruct the unity of experience. However, Kant gives up neither the law of causality nor the idea of freedom, but rather he insists upon the idea that they can exist together without contradiction by asserting the distinction between phenomena and noumena as different grounds on which these two different types of causalities rest. According to Kant both are indispensable, as the former is necessary for the knowledge and the latter is absolutely needed for morality. In this context this thesis aims to explain the objective validity of natural causality which is proved in Second Analogy and the transcendental ground of the idea of freedom which is established in the solution of Third Antinomy in Kant&rsquo / s Critique of Pure Reason. And it is discussed whether Kant&rsquo / s solution of this issue is satisfactory and legitimate or not.

The purpose of this study is to present the metaphysical status of &ldquo / language game&rdquo / in later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and to deal with the revolutionary role of &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / by means of Hintikka&rsquo / s interpretation of later Wittgenstein. It is usual to divide Wittgenstein&rsquo / s work into the early and the later period. The early period is based upon the picture theory of meaning, according to which a sentence represents a state of affairs. On the other hand, the later period gives special emphasis on the actions of people and the role their linguistic activities. The early period ignored factual or cognitive meaning since it relied on mirroring the structure of state of affairs by sentences. So, early period of Wittgenstein was concluded that &ldquo / whereof we can&rsquo / t speak, thereof we must be silent.&rdquo / This idea gives clues about metaphysics of early Wittgenstein. In this sense, language is treated in abstraction from activities of human beings. In the later work, Wittgenstein emphasizes everyday usage of language in &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / as social activities of ordering, advising, measuring, and counting and so on. These different &ldquo / language-games&rdquo / make up &ldquo / form of life&rdquo / . &ldquo / Language game&rdquo / with other vital notions of later Wittgenstein, as &ldquo / form of life&rdquo / , &ldquo / agreement&rdquo / establishes language matrix. So, later period of Wittgenstein is a rejection of his early period. Actually, his treatment of philosophy and philosopher is different from his early period. In addition to this, later Wittgenstein mainly focuses on the principle of &ldquo / meaning=use&rdquo / which is called contextual theory of meaning. In his later period, Wittgenstein aims to bring back words from metaphysics to everyday usage. On the other hand, metaphysics still plays a role in his later period as his early period, although he altered his early philosophy of language. To sum up, the notion of &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / is conceptually/ ontologically prior to its rules. In this sense, Wittgenstein forms &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / as a model for the other social activities of human beings. Furthermore, &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / is regarded as a bridge between language and reality and it shows &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / s revolutionary role in later Wittgenstein.

This study is an attempt to explicate Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz&rsquo / s search for a way out of the labyrinth of the continuum in his early years of philosophizing. The main motive of the study is the belief that it would be worthwhile to see how Leibniz initially goes into the labyrinth and comes across with the riddles contained in it. Accordingly, this thesis is intended to discuss what the problem of the composition of the continuum is for the young Leibniz, which concepts and metaphysical problems are associated with the labyrinth, and what particular difficulties challenge Leibniz in his struggle. More importantly, the study seeks to delineate how Leibniz responds to these difficulties, what kinds of solutions he suggests, and how and why he changes his mind and offers different accounts concerning the composition of the continuum in his early writings. In this search for a way out of the labyrinth, some of the early writings of Leibniz written between 1666 and 1675 were studied with a particular emphasis on those directly related with the labyrinth of the continuum. During the study, the differences and transitions between geometrical, physical, and metaphysical accounts concerning the problem of the composition of the continuum were examined with a special focus on the bridging role of &lsquo / motion&rsquo / and the notion of &lsquo / conatus.&rsquo