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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Testing the sufficiency of virtue ethics as theistic theory through a reading of the Book of Amos

Fettes, Carol January 2018 (has links)
The ancient theory of virtue ethics has been rejuvenated in recent years, and many believe that this ‘new’ approach to ethical theory might not only revitalise the sometimes stale and often intractable nature of contemporary moral debate, but also serve as a viable alternative to traditional normative theories. This thesis aimed firstly to test this claim, and secondly, to construct a modified version which would not only be useful for the theist, but could also serve as a heuristic device for reading the text of the Old Testament. The method employed to conduct this investigation was to identify and critique the essential features of a virtue-based theory, and then suggest theological interpretations of each based on the text of the OT. These interpretations would be subsequently tested through a canonical reading of the Book of Amos. It was found that an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics admitted the closest parallels with the biblical text, and provided the best framework for the construction of a theistic version. But it was also found that virtue ethics, in all its contemporary forms, was unable to justify an account of right action, and so explain the source of normativity. We concluded that, while a theistic version of virtue ethical theory could indeed provide a useful heuristic device for reading the biblical text, virtue ethics alone could not provide a viable alternative to traditional normative theories. However, it was suggested that this shortcoming could be rectified through a partnership with a modified natural law theory.
2

Nietzsche and moral inquiry : posing the question of the value of our moral values

Leach, Adam January 2018 (has links)
The continued presence and importance of Christian moral values in our daily lives, coupled with the fact that faith in Christianity is in continual decline, raises the question as to why having lost faith in Christianity, we have also not lost faith in our Christian moral values. This question is also indicative of a more pressing phenomenon: not only have we maintained our faith in Christian values, we fail to see that the widespread collapse of Christianity should affect this faith. To tackle this latter phenomenon, I claim, we have to pose the Nietzschean question of the value of our moral values, so as to see that this value can be a possible object of questioning. In chapter one, I consider different approaches found in the history of moral philosophy that look like potential candidates for this task. I argue that, ultimately, the task requires simultaneously taking our familiarity with Christian moral values as both sui generis and a questionable phenomenon. In chapter two, I articulate in detail the sui generis nature of this familiarity with moral values,in terms of the phenomena of habituation and sedimentation. In chapter three, I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity with moral values, by focusing on the role of cognition. I demonstrate how cognition, in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented, habituated nature of our moral values through a form of ironic disruption. In chapter four, I develop this account by considering the possibility of an appeal to an alternative moral outlook. To do so, I draw upon the structural isomorphism that is present between the process of estrangement and a rite of passage.

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