Orientador: Jose Carlos de Souza Braga / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-20T06:21:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Corazza_Gentil_D.pdf: 7311601 bytes, checksum: 0f7858a60f74188201a84e271fbc96fd (MD5) Previous issue date: 1995 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: This thesis inquires the central banks and the relations of them wi th government and private banks when the independence question comes into view. In this context, the thesis presents an intitutional analisys about central banks as well as it shows the logic of historical evolution of central banks and the importance of them for regulating the financial and monetary instabilities in the capitalist economy. The thesis is divided in five chapters: first of all, there is an introdution; in chapters two, tree and four it presents the historical origins of central banks, the evolution of their functions and the relations of them with government and private banks; the last one presents the principal conclusions. The historical analisys of central banks concludes that they are important institutions to the economic system. Why? Because they result from a process that shows the relation between the evolution of payments system and the public action. Due to this, the central banks are singular institutions: at the same time, they are part of State structure and of the private credit system. How do the relations between the central banks and the private banks apear? The answer comes into view when an important function of central banks is analysed, that is to say, the "lender of last resort" function. The performance of this function creates a basic trade-off to the central banks: the central banks condition of "lender of last resort" conducts the private banks to a situation which they can have more risk positions. The classics denominated this trade-off as "moral azard". By the way the "moral azard" defines the characteristic private banks of the relations between central banks and On the other hand, the ambivalence of the central banks and the relations of them with the private banks determine a specific connection between the central banks and government: the central banks can not be totally independent as well as they can not be completly dependent from government. Finally, the idea of interdependence defines the characteristics of central banks as well as it shows the relations of them with government and private banks. Why? Because the concept of interdependence brings the contradiction and the ambivalence that are part of these relations. On the other hand, the notion of interdependence explains the variability and the evolution of central banks norms as well as it shows the permanent conflict between the lagal rule of central banks and their specific actions / Doutorado / Doutor em Economia