Chiu Wai Shing, Lam Ming Kei. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-37). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF TABLES --- p.iv / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.v / CHAPTER / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- PREVIOUS RESEARCH --- p.5 / Chapter III. --- DATA AND METHODOLOGY --- p.11 / Chapter IV. --- COMPARISON OF BANK STOCK RETURNS WITH MARKET RETURNS --- p.19 / Chapter V. --- FACTORS INFLUENCING BANK STOCK PRICE --- p.21 / Chapter VI. --- INTEREST RATE SPREAD SENSITIVITIES AND ELASTICITIES OF BANK STOCK RETURNS --- p.26 / Chapter VII. --- CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS --- p.33 / REFERENCES --- p.35

This thesis examines the effect of bank-specific variables on investment bank performance, as estimated by efficiency and financial indicators, in the G7 and Switzerland countries, over the 1997-2012 period. Moreover, we investigate the impact of expansionary monetary policies on the risk-taking of investment banks between 2007 and 2014. Firstly, we investigate the impact of risk, liquidity and fee-based income on cost efficiency prior to and during the crisis. Then, we examine the presence of possible threshold effects of bank-specific variables on performance (cost efficiency). Moreover, we investigate whether there is difference between the impact of liquidity on the performance of stand-alone investment banks and on investment banks that belong to a larger banking entity. Secondly, we assess the impact of corporate governance on the performance (profitability and profit efficiency) of the US investment banks. We focus on five different categories of governance measures: i) board structure, ii) executive compensation, iii) ownership, iv) CEO power and v) operational complexity. We put emphasis on the impact of board size and board ownership on performance by examining for threshold effects of these variables. Thirdly, we examine the impact of M&A advisory fees on bank performance, as estimated by technical inefficiency, using a methodology that includes as an undesirable output the bank-individual level of risk. Then we test the level of convergence in terms of M&A advisory fees and technical inefficiency of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland prior to (1997-2007) during (2007-2010) and after the financial crisis (2010-2012). Fourthly, we study the effect of unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) on the risk-taking of investment banks in the US over the 2007-2014 period. We employ a number of alternative proxies that capture both directly UMPs: i) central bank's assets over gross domestic product ratio ii) monetary aggregates iii) Taylor gap; and indirectly through the usage of low-interest rates: i) federal fund rate and ii) shadow short rate. Finally, we provide conclusions together with limitations of this research and a plan for a future work.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 148-154). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Essay one. For banks, good governances can reduce both the abilities and incentives of insiders to expropriate bank resources and promote bank efficiency, and are supposed to have real economic effect on their customers and firms in that country. This study examines how banking sector's ownership structure is related to the firm-level investment efficiency on a sample of 88,764 firm-year observations across 36 developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2006. I find that, ceteris paribus, a country's banking sector with more cash flow rights by controlling owners improves firms' investment efficiency; whereas, a country's banking sector with larger divergence between cash flow rights and control rights by controlling owners reduces firms' investment efficiency. In addition, I find that the relation between a country's banking sector ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for low growth firms, suggesting banks' stronger debt monitoring role on firms with free cash flow problem. Besides, banks have more influence on investment efficiency of firms, which rely on more external financing. Finally, the relation between banking sector's ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is more pronounced in countries with stronger private monitoring for banks and better information environment of banks. On the whole, the results suggest that banking sector's ownership structure is an important instrument to govern banks' operation with regard to efficient lending and sound governances on firms' investment decision. / Essay two. In this study, we examine whether and how incentives in bank lending, in emerging market like China, influence firms' investment behaviors, the key determinant of firms' productivity. First, being connected with bureaucrats provides firms with a comparative non-economic advantage of access to debt in China. Our empirical results show that loans granting to political connected firms is less sensitive to those firms' profitability, which is consistent with "rent-seeking" hypothesis. Second, political connection is a violated factor in debt markets and politically connected lending is accompanied by less monitoring posted by banks. Consequently, we find that firms with political tie invest less efficiently than firms without political tie when they can access to abnormal debt through political tie. Moreover, the negative relation between politically connected lending and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for SOE firms and low growth firms. Finally, we find that region development with regard to financial development and government quality improvement reduces politically connected lending's negative impact on firms' investment efficiency. In sum, soft lending, like politically connected lending, destroy economic growth because of misallocation of scary resources among firms and also because of less incentive to monitor firms' project selection. / essay 1. Bank ownership structure, bank regulation, and firm investment: international evidence -- essay 2. Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China. / Zheng, Ying. / Adviser: Joseph P.H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2173. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-90). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

This study examines the differential effect of each of the ten largest bank failures on shareholders' wealth of non-failed banks over the period from 1973 through 1984. It examines how contagion and information effects of major bank failures have changed over time. FDIC policy for settling failures has important implications for system stability, and has changed over time. This study's purpose is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of FDIC policy. The FDIC's handling of the Penn Square failure signaled a policy shift and offers a unique opportunity to examine changes in market reactions to large bank failures. The literature on the capital market effects of major bank failures provides limited evidence on the impact of bank failures and related FDIC policy. Most fail to discriminate between contagion and information effects, and conduct analysis on one (or a few) bank failure(s) in the mid-1970s using traditional event study methodology. This study considers multivariate regression (MVRM) an appropriate methodology for bank failures which are likely to have simultaneous impact on non-failed banks. MVRM, which accounts for contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence of residuals, has three advantages over standard residual analysis: no "event clustering" problem, multiple hypotheses tests, and computational efficiency. This study uses daily stock-return data for fifty-one non-failed commercial banks. For each bank failure, the non-failed banksare grouped into three portfolios: "information-related," "large," and "small." The impact on each portfolio is tested for an average effect and joint hypotheses on excess return. This study offers evidence on no contagion effects and lack of information effects before Penn Square, strong information effects since Penn Square, contagion effects in post-Penn Square failures, and capital market discipline on large banks since Penn Square. There has been a change in the nature of the impact of bank failures since Penn Square.