Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The main objective of this research is to asses the effectiveness of the channels (collective bargaining and workplace forums) created by the LRA for employee‟s participation in decision making in the mining sector. Problems related to employee participation will be examined to determine whether they are structural or due to shortcomings in the LRA. If it is found that there are shortcomings of the labour legislation in this regard, recommendations on how the shortcoming can be addressed will be made. The significance of this research paper is that it attempts to determine the efficacy of the current statutorily protected channels for employee participation in the mining sector against the backdrop of prevalent theories on employee participation. Although many labour law authors have commented on the role of workplace forums in South Africa, the relative advantages of workplace forums have not been analysed through the lens of the theories on employee participation.

Recent accounts of workplace union representation have emphasised the exclusion of shop stewards from management decision-making processes, and have posited a shift in shop steward activity away from dealing with collective issues through bargaining, towards dealing with individual issues through casework, as part of the wider decline of union influence. This thesis challenges those accounts by showing that they utilise a problematic conceptual framework and rest upon questionable empirical foundations. An alternative framework is proposed which incorporates a clearly conceptualised definition of bargaining - something missing from previous accounts - and which develops and synthesises conceptual elements from Marxist-influenced sociologies of work, bargaining theory, and industrial relations scholarship. It is shown that efforts to influence management decision making and to restrict managerial prerogatives continue to figure prominently in shop steward activity, even though the reduction of union influence is undeniable and formal arrangements for union-management relations have been recast. Moreover, these efforts are often to some extent successful. This analysis is supported by considerable evidence from two detailed workplace studies, including an innovative use of diaries, which contribute important new insights into the activity of contemporary shop stewards. This thesis argues that the persistence of shop steward bargaining is best understood in relation to underlying dynamics of conflict and exploitation within the employment relationship under capitalism. Bargaining processes are explored in terms of changing patterns of bargaining opportunities and bargaining resources, which are linked to changing management practices. While the form and location of bargaining processes have changed, the prevalence of issues around the effort bargain and frontier of control demonstrate the continuing influence of the dynamics of workplace relations on patterns of shop steward activity. While further research is required, the theoretical and conceptual framework developed in this thesis suggests that similar processes are likely to be found elsewhere.

This study examines collective bargaining in 14 unionized community colleges in British Columbia. It provides a broad overview of bargaining in the colleges and insights into the tensions commonly associated with collective bargaining. The study combines qualitative data and quantitative data through the use of interviews, contractual analysis and two questionnaires. One survey examined the opinions of board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders on various aspects of collective bargaining. The latter included the competitive characteristics of distributive bargaining, governance, the scope of the collective agreements and a number of proposed modifications aimed at improving bargaining in the colleges. The study is significant as it fills a void in the research related to the above issues in British Columbia's colleges. The literature review encompassed a wide range of research. This included material related to the evolution of collective bargaining in higher education; factors that influence opinions of bargaining; constructive conflict, destructive conflict and dysfunctional competition; conflict resolution techniques associated with bargaining; and integrative bargaining. The study revealed a competitive collective bargaining climate in the colleges, characterized by such factors as a lack of trust and respect, inexperienced faculty negotiators, contractual constraints and a lack of bargaining priorities. The competitive climate was aggravated by a number of external factors (government policies); internal factors (the management style of a president); the composition of the faculty associations (combined vocational and academic faculty associations); and personal factors (age and political preferences). In terms of governance issues, the scope of the collective agreements and their political orientation, the board members and the senior administrators are essentially from the same population. The faculty leaders come from a different population. The respondents favour modifications that would enhance communications, training, and equal access to information, as well as the resolution of labour matters at the local level rather than at the provincial level. Distributive bargaining will likely remain the cornerstone of negotiations in British Columbia's colleges. Although it does not have to be as competitive as it is, the distributive model appears to be best suited to the resolution of Level I issues, e.g. salaries, benefits. Given the collegial traditions of higher education, the varying professional needs of the faculty, the issue of management rights and the intrinsic values of the parties involved, a more collaborative model of bargaining is necessary to accommodate Level II issues. The latter include faculty participation in college governance, peer evaluation, and the selection of other faculty. The study contributed to the research literature and produced a number of recommendations for practice. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

This thesis is an attempt to combine two opposing arguments which have appeared in the literature of labour economics for nearly 25 years. The analysis deals with the formulation of a collective bargaining model which yields some insight into the wage-determining process. The economic criteria for a wage settlement proposed by J. T. Dunlop in his book, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, are combined with the 'political' or 'power' variables which A. M. Ross had advocated as the most important determinants of wages in his book, Trade Union Wage Policy. The result is an analysis very similar to that of recent bargaining theory studies. Six industries from the British Columbia economy are examined within the concept of the model developed. These industries produce a major part of the output of this region. The examination of these industries, therefore, provides a key to the comprehension of the general trends and forces at work in the British Columbia labour market. The model attempts to discover the variables most significant in explaining the movement of wages in each industry from 1948 to 1968. The variables examined represent a combination of the economic and political forces which are hypothesized to act upon the wage determination process. In addition, the thesis examines those industries in the-context of a general wage structure. It is hypothesized that the existence of such a structure plays a large role in the wage determining process and has a significant influence upon trends in the economic activity of the province. The end result will be an explanation of the single and collective wage movements of these six industries. The findings generally support the theoretical hypothesis that the wage determining process is subject to both political and economic forces. Economic variables are able to confine wage settlements within a range. The size of this range also depends upon economic forces. Within the range, however, bargaining may involve a multiplicity of criteria. Both the union and the firm will often choose some easily observable criteria upon which to base wage settlements. This study attempts to determine the main criteria chosen within each industry. The conclusions reached show that wage comparisons made among industries by both workers and employers are able to explain the largest part of wage movements. A bargaining theory model is supported and ample evidence of a wage structure which plays an important role in the wage determining process is found. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

The object of this research is to study how unions and firms divide the surplus or rents available to them. Many instruments are used in practice to make this division, but standard micro data only includes two: wages and employment. I use a new approach to study wage and employment contracts as I consider them equilibrium points in a noncooperative bargaining game. This work is an extension of wage-employment determination models, the extension being the incorporation of a bargaining model, specifically, a Rubinstein bargaining game. Given the objective functions of the two players, the wage and employment equations are specified by the equilibrium conditions for the game. Also, additional determinants of the contracts are identified. One of the characteristics of the model is that the wage and employment contracts are affected by the relative strike costs of the two negotiating parties even in the absence of strikes. The data involve the B.C. wood products industry and the IWA, a powerful union believed to have been successful at capturing rents. The data include input and output quantities and prices and equations representing input demands and output supply are estimated simultaneously with the negotiated wage and employment equations. Four estimation models are derived corresponding to two bargaining frameworks and two sets of assumptions on the firms' technology. The two bargaining frameworks correspond to two polar cases that have been assumed in the wage-employment determination literature: in one case, the wage is set through bargaining while the employment level is chosen by the firm, in the second case, both the wage and employment level are negotiated. In one pair of models, output is treated as exogenous to the bargaining while in the second set of models, output is endogenous and capital is exogenous. The bargaining game is successfully implemented in the sense that technology and union utility parameters are generally reasonable and comparable to previous estimates. Also, the determinants of relative strike costs enter significantly in the estimation. The union is seen to care about employment as well as the wage with slightly more weight being placed on the employment level. Rent maximization is always rejected. Bargaining powers are calculated at each data point and results indicate that the 1980's recession increased the relative power of the union. The hypotheses of equal bargaining powers and complete union bargaining power are tested and rejected. Also, the proportion of rents captured by the firm is found to be a poor indicator of its bargaining power. Although the qualitative results mentioned above are robust across the four models, parameter values are generally sensitive to both the technology assumptions and the bargaining framework. Ignoring the simultaneity of wages, employment and other variables chosen by the firm can be very misleading. Finally, the model in which both wages and employment are negotiated consistently performs better than the framework in which employment is unilaterally set by the firm. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

New Zealand presently operates a "free market" system of employment and labour relations in which there are no prescribed or mandatory bargaining procedures. When this system was introduced by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (the "ECA" ) it represented a dramatic departure from the previous system of state regulated collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration: a system that had existed in New Zealand for almost a century. Although this change in approach was supported by free market advocates, it also generated considerable international and domestic criticism. In response to that criticism, a number of New Zealand politicians stated in 1996 that they would consider imposing on employers and employees a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. However, since the end of 1996, very little has occurred in respect of this issue. Indeed, it now appears that the current New Zealand Government may have abandoned this proposal altogether. If this is, in fact, the Government's decision, it ought to be viewed with concern, for it has been made without the benefit of informed debate. Little, if any, substantive consideration has been given to whether such a duty ought to be introduced, and if so, the form it might take and impact it might have. If an informed decision is to be made to enact a duty of this nature, or not, as the case may be, its merits must be the subject of further debate. This thesis will endeavour to contribute to that debate by examining how one approach to the duty to bargain in good faith, that which applies in British Columbia, Canada, might operate in New Zealand. This examination will consist of six chapters. The first will contextualise the New Zealand arguments on whether a duty of this nature ought to be introduced into the ECA. Chapter two will then examine the duty to bargain in good faith as it applies in British Columbia industrial relations. Chapter three will take that duty, and examine the extent to which it is currently replicated in New Zealand. It will be concluded that little of the substance of this duty is to be found in the law which presently governs the New Zealand labour market. Chapter four will assess the costs of introducing a duty of this nature into the ECA, particularly in terms of reduced efficiency and freedom. Chapter five will identify a number of specific issues that will require resolution if the duty is to operate effectively in New Zealand, and the terms of a suggested statutory amendment will be proffered. It will be concluded in chapter six that introducing a duty to bargain in good faith, akin to that which applies in British Columbia, would benefit New Zealand employers, employees and society as a whole. Further, it will be argued that such a duty must be introduced if labour bargaining in New Zealand is to occur in any meaningful way for most employees. And finally, it will be suggested that if this duty is to be introduced effectively, legislative amendment will be required. For these reasons, it will be asserted that the New Zealand Government ought to revisit the issue of introducing into the ECA a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This study explores the relevance of the Bargaining Council for the Food, Retail, Restaurant, Catering and Allied Trades (BCFRRCAT) on a group of small restaurant enterprises in Pretoria. An investigation into the functioning of the BCFRRCAT in Pretoria was done with special reference to their accommodation of small restaurant enterprises in the Bargaining Council (BC). The aim of the study was to determine if the BCFRRCAT understands the needs and problems of small restaurant enterprises in the industry and whether small restaurant enterprises adhere to the provisions of the main collective agreement of the BC. The approach of the study was based on the fact that, in order to understand how the BC could be impacting on small restaurant enterprises, one needs to start by examining: <ul> <li>the representativity position and coverage of the Council to put into perspective the number of employers and employees covered by the Council;</li> <li> Examine the actual process of extended BC agreement that is extended to non-parties by the Council; </li> <li>the enforcement capacity of the Council’s inspectorates over collective agreements, and</li> <li> the nature of exemption system at the BC, reviewing the number of exemption applications received, the number of exemptions granted and the number of exemptions refused.</li> </ul> Against this background, the literature on BCs pointed out that the applicability of the BC system to small enterprises has come under considerable scrutiny since the 1980s. The trend has always been that the development of the BC system has made it much more convenient for large employers to negotiate their interest at the Council level than for the small enterprises. Small enterprises tend to oppose BC activities and some of the issues that have been raised include the extent to which Councils are representative of small enterprises and accommodate their needs at the Council. To address the main research objectives, semi-structured interviews were adopted as a specific type of qualitative research method. The mode of understanding qualitative research as an adopted research design has been analyzed on the basis of a practically orientated description around the research problem of the study. The motivation to carry out this study qualitatively was founded on the following characteristics: <ul> <li>its ability to understand the phenomena from the perspective of the people being studied;</li> <li>its ability to provide detailed descriptions of specific settings under investigation, and</li> <li>its ability to allow the application and testing of concepts that produced a wealth of detailed data about a small number of people.</li> </ul> The immediate conclusion that emerged from the study was established through the examination of three measures of representativity (i.e., the number of covered employees at party employers as a proportion of all covered employees, the members of party trade union as a proportion of all covered employees and the party employers as a proportion of all registered employers). Hence, the Council was found to be less representative on the third measure (i.e., party employers as a proportion of all registered employers). This appeared to be for the reason that the extension of collective agreement covers only a very small proportion of small restaurant enterprises. Copyright / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Human Resource Management / unrestricted

<div> This dissertation consists of three essays examining the nature of pricing in the pharmaceutical industry and the behavior of physicians prescribing drugs. I use a combination of structural modeling and reduced-form econometric techniques to illuminate how factors such as bargaining, competition, and network membership can affect prices and prescribing behavior. Ultimately, these insights can be used to influence public policy goals such as reducing prescription drug costs for patients or limiting unnecessary prescribing. </div><div> </div><div> In Chapter One, which is joint work with Sebastian Linde and Ralph Siebert, I focus on the determinants and effects of bargaining power on wholesale pharmaceutical drug prices. We estimate a structural bargaining model and find that large differences in bargaining power explain drug price heterogeneities across buyers, drug classes, and time periods. Our results show that transaction-specific determinants between buyers and sellers (such as transaction volume, buyer's loyalty, multiple drug purchases from the same seller, etc.) exert strong effects on buyer bargaining power and drug prices. Our counterfactuals show that group purchasing organizations achieve price reductions that vary across drug classes and that these price reductions primarily depend on buyer price sensitivity.</div><div> </div><div> In the second chapter, joint with G\"unter Hitsch, Sebastian Linde, and Ralph Siebert, I turn to the retail prescription drug market. Here, we show that there is a significant amount of price variation for prescription drugs in the retail pharmaceutical market. Both negotiated prices (price between retail pharmacies and third-party insurers) and out of pocket prices (prices between retail pharmacies and insured patients) for a drug exhibit a high degree of price variation even when controlling for drug manufacturer, geographic location, pharmacy chain, etc. Furthermore, the nature of this price variation changes depending on if a drug is branded or generic. </div><div> </div><div> In the third chapter, joint with Svetlana Beilfuss and Sebastian Linde, I examine the problem of antimicrobial resistance and how physician membership in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) can influence antibiotic prescribing behavior. We use a two-part structural model that accounts for selection into treatment (the ACO group), and non-treatment (control group). We then compare physician antibiotic prescribing across these groups with adjustment for volume, patient, physician, and institutional characteristics. We find that ACO affiliation reduces antibiotic prescribing by about 23\% per year. Furthermore, we show that failure to account for selection into treatment results in an understating of the average treatment effect.</div>

The topic of this dissertation is the fact-finding stage of Oregon's public sector impasse resolution procedure. The use of fact-finding has dramatically increased because of the recent and rapid growth in public sector collective bargaining, and the resulting increase in public sector strikes. Beginning in 1962 with John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10988, a series of federal and state laws were passed granting and expanding collective bargaining rights to public employees. Many of the state laws resemble the private sector model provided under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley); however, the use of the strike as a weapon to enforce bargaining in good faith and resolution of conflict has been limited for public employees because of the potential threat of disruption of public services and interference with the sovereignty of the government. Such anti-strike legislation, however, has not prevented public employee strikes. The purpose of this study is to analyze the purpose, nature, and effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding phase of impasse resolution. Because of the impact the home rule issue has had on the use of Oregon's impasse procedures, this study will focus on those sectors where use of fact-finding has been extensive, consistent and unaffected by the home rule issue. This analysis of fact-finding represents the first comprehensive and systematic assessment of the impasse procedure to be undertaken in the state since the 1973 law was passed. Such analysis will identify the significant variables in the efficacy of fact-finding and will bring together practitioners' views on the viability of the process. This latter dimension is critical in that the opinions of these participants in the labor relations field will likely affect and shape future legislation on fact-finding.

This dissertation consists of three essays in empirical industrial organization. In the first essay, I develop a method of estimating the bargaining power allocation between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers using limited data. Retailers and manufacturers engage in pairwise Nash bargaining sessions to set wholesale prices, and then retailers set retail prices to maximize their profits. By solving the model using backward induction, I compute marginal costs as functions of bargaining power parameters and choose the parameter that produces marginal costs that best fit the variation of input costs to identify the bargaining power allocation. Using retail market-level data in the yogurt industry, I find that retailers have higher bargaining power and charge higher markups than manufacturers. Additionally, higher retailer bargaining power allows them to negotiate lower wholesale prices, which leads to lower retail prices. Consumers and retailers benefit from higher retailer bargaining power, while manufacturers suffer losses. In the second essay, I simulate vertical mergers using the results in the first essay. Vertical mergers promote efficiency by eliminating double marginalization and lowering upstream rival wholesale prices, but harm welfare by increasing downstream rival costs and introducing upward pricing pressure on retail prices. To compare the relative magnitude of various effects and evaluate their overall impact on the market equilibrium profit and welfare, I simulate vertical mergers between firms of various sizes and compute the change in prices, markups, firm profits, and consumer welfare. The overall consumer welfare increases after a merger, but consumers purchasing nonvertically integrated brands are worse off. In the third essay, I study how consumers learn the healthfulness of ready-to-eat cereals from the introduction of front-of-package nutrition labels and how they make purchase decisions accordingly. I first examine consumers’ purchasing decisions in a static setting and then allow consumers to gradually learn from the FOP labels. In each shopping trip, consumers update their information on the healthfulness of cereals based on FOP labels, and they consider the perceived information when they make purchasing decisions. I find that consumers learn slowly after the introduction of FOP labels, and they prefer cereals with high healthfulness.