本文通过研究自改革开放以来计划生育政策在广东省潮汕地区的执行情况，尝试回答一个理论问题，即在一个威权政体中，是什么因素削弱了国家对社会的控制能力，从而民间形成了对刚性国家政策的有效对抗，导致国家的一些政策指令无法在基层得到落实。上世纪八十年代，计划生育政策作为一项"基本国策"在中国大多数地区都得到了严格的执行，并基本完成预定的政策目标。然而，该政策在潮汕地区却遭遇到极大的阻力，无论是城镇还是农村都出现了普遍的严重的超生现象。 / 作者在对该地区进行了实地调研后，有三个主要发现：第一，随着改革开放政策的实行而迅速复兴的宗族文化对于潮汕地区的生育观念和生育行为的影响非常强烈。"多子多福"，"重男轻女"仍被绝大多数人视为理所应当，"儿孙满堂"更是许多农村人的追求。因此，虽然大部分的干部和群众经过计划生育的宣传都能理解该政策的必要性，但是由于生儿育女事关个人家庭和宗族的"兴衰"，所以明知抵触法规但仍会寻求各种可能的办法偷生。第二，在强大的传统文化作用下，基层政府、干部和群众形成了依赖利益和人情而建立起来的"乡规民约"，县镇村的干部群众都在这种民间自订的非正式制度下默契地规范约束自己的行为并且互动合作，因此上级的政策到了基层就遇到了无形的有弹性的成体系的抵抗，换言之，人们找到了实现"上有政策，下有对策"的软性抗争方式。第三，在这种强大的利益人情网络的软性对抗之下，上级的政府已经失去了对于基层计划生育的控制。一则他们没有足够的资源和能力去落实对下级的监管，二则上级官员自身也处在一定的利益关系网络中。因此，整体而言，市级乃至更上级政府在计生工作中也只能采取折中的策略，最后"容忍"了基层欺上瞒下的行为。因此，作者认为在潮汕地区县级以下的农村基层，依靠影响力极强的宗族文化而形成的"乡规民约"，作为一种软性非正式制度弱化了国家正式的行政体制，形成了一种对计划生育政策不成文的，富有弹性的，自成体系的非暴力抵抗，以及"上有政策，下有对策"的折中局面，使得计划生育政策在这一地区发挥了十分有限的作用。 / This study focuses on "Family Planning Program" ever since the "Opening-up Policy" in Teochew area, Guangdong. By doing so, it aims at answering one theoretical question: within an authoritarian regime, what sorts of factors can impair the state’s control over society, leading to effective resistance against the state’s rigid policies and ineffective implement of those policies at grass-roots level. In the 1980s, the "Family Planning Program", as a fundamental national policy, was strictly implemented in most parts of China, accomplishing its policy goals. However, this policy encountered enormous resistance in Teochew area, Guangdong. "Extra kids" have been widely observed in rural areas. / By carrying out on-site field research, the author has three main findings: / First, clan culture, reviving rapidly after the "Opening-up Policy", has been exerting significant impact over birth concepts and birth behaviors in Teochew area. Such thoughts as "the more sons, the more blessings" and "sons are better than daughters" are taken for granted. Having lots of children and grandchildren is considered the best luck possible. Therefore, even though most cadres and citizens understand very well the necessity of the "Family Planning Program", since having children is a serious matter of family’s and clan’s prosperity, people are striving to have more kids, disregarding the laws and policies. / Second, under the big umbrella of traditional culture, governments at grass-roots level, cadres and masses have formulated so-called "village regulations and folk rules", which are based on mutual interests and relationship, and they behave and cooperate consciously according to these informal institutions. As a result, policies from upper levels have met invisible, flexible and systematic resistance at grass-roots level. In other words, people have found a way to use soft countermeasures to resist rigid institutions. / Third, impacted by these soft resistance, governments from upper levels have lost control over the implementation of family planning at grass-root level. Partially because they do not have enough resource and capability to enforce supervision, partially because they themselves are nested heavily in this interest network. Thus, by and large, governments at prefecture or upper levels can only compromise in family planning related issues, leading to the toleration of grass-roots cheating behaviors. / In sum, the author believes that in rural Teochew area, "village regulations and folk rules", which are based on a strong clan culture, as soft informal institutions, have impaired the state’s formal administrative system, generated unspoken, flexible, systematic and nonviolent resistance against "Family Planning Program", and led to a compromising predicament. Therefore, "Family Planning Program", as a national policy, has generated limited impact in Teochew area. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 庄棟杰. / Parallel title from added title page. / Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-91). / Abstracts also in English. / Zhuang Dongjie.