A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts in fulfillment of the requirements for degree Master of Arts in the Department of History at the University of Zululand, 1991. / It is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that no study of this nature has ever been undertaken in the field of history in South Africa. This justifies the necessity of undertaking a comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the crucial decade 1975-1985. It was during that decade that these two political groupings moved closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa. By this time the NP, in spite of preserving hegemonic principles on behalf of the White electorate and amid increased international isolation, had proved itself the invincible doyen in the body politic of South Africa. Inkatha cadres argued that their movement was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's, spawned by Black resistance to apartheid and had authentic roots in the core of the liberation struggle. The principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha were devoid of discernible dissimilarities. One may assert, however, that it was enigmatic that such principles and aims could not compel the two groupings to solve the socio-economic and political problems facing South Africa in that decade. Such a dismal failure to seek solutions that would benefit all the people of South Africa reflected negatively on both the NP and Inkatha. In 1985 this emerged as a harbinger for the state of morass in South Africa's political scenario. The organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha remained by far the best organized in South Africa, capable of overwhelming any challenge mounted by other groups. In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and Provincial leaders, while Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from Branches, Regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making bodies. The National Council (NC) was the policy-making body and represented all national leadership formations of Inkatha. It was not possible to stipulate how many members of Inkatha at any one time belonged to the NC. This was due to the fact that organizations were constantly affiliating to - the movement. The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress. The organisational policies of the NP and Inkatha had vestiges of commonality. Both groupings accepted and respected the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. They both endorsed the notion of a multi-party democracy, although the NP comprehended this in the context of separate development. Inkatha noted this as taking into account the fact that no single organisation, from whatever quarter, would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa. Disinvestment, sanctions and violence were abhorred by both groupings as a strategy to dismantle apartheid. They favoured negotiation politics and non-violence both as objectives and strategies. Both groupings conveyed assurance to achievements of a political apparatus that could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities through negotiations. The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. They both believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common goal. It could be mentioned, however, that the different situations and platforms from which they operated, polarised them against each other. The NP and Inkatha's relations with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings created a hiatus in terms of their aims and strategies. This crippled the evolvement of consensus politics in South Africa. In the decade 1975-1985 the Parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) , the New Republic Party (NRP) , the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) . In principle, they agreed with the NP and Inkatha in standing for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa. The NP and Inkatha had unfavourable relations with the extra-parliamentary political formations. These were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NF), and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Their relations with both the NP and Inkatha in terms of their aims and strategies were marked by what one may convoke "timorous digressions." Most of them referred to the NP Government as illegitimate while viewing Inkatha as perpetrating political tribalism which to them was the greatest enemy of African freedom. By 1985 this intricate structure of political groupings and different aims and strategies, characterized a divided South Africa. / University of Zululand and Standard Bank

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / This study explored the socio-political capacity and agency of the professional Black middle class (BMC). It examined how Black professionals construct their professional and socio-political identities and the relationships therein. It finds that for the Black middle class race is a stronger identity marker than class, which affects its support and attitudes towards the African National Congress. Race, residence, intra-racial inequality function as the factors through which the BMC rejects a middle class identity. At the same time, education, income and affordability form the variables of middle class location for many of the BMC members. The rejection of a middle class identity enables it to maintain class unity with the poor and working class. In this way, the study found that these were the major markers of identity for the middle class. This study also found that while the apartheid-times BMC support for the liberation movement and the ANC was never unanimous or unambiguous, in the post-1994 era the ANC has consolidated BMC support. However, 20 years into democracy, this support is beginning to fragment. The primary reasons are the politicisation of state resources and workplaces, and widespread unfettered corruption. Second, the study finds that the need to consolidate middle class position, Black tax and debt sustains the BMC’s support for the ANC. The BMC support for the ANC is instrumental and sustained by its precarious class position of asset deficit, Black tax and debt. More crucially the perpetuation of racial economic exclusion or the floating colour bar, particularly within the corporate sector reinforces its support for the ANC – as it seeks this government party to improve the socio-economic conditions in the country. This suggests the socio-political character of the upper and middle class is maturing, much more complicated and consolidating democracy in particular ways to the South African political economy. It follows the Rueschmereyian analysis of political character of the BMC. / MT2016

M.A. (Historical Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract