This Master's thesis deals with the development of a mobile application for a control of the supervisory system in caravans and motorhomes. The thesis presents the currently available principles and research of the existing solutions. This custom solution includes an Android application and a desktop application of the central unit simulator of the supervisory system. The simulator is based on the Node.js and node-webkit technologies. The simulator communicates with the devices available via RF Transciever and it simulates other devices. The mobile application communicates with the simulator via Bluetooth Low Energy and GSM. Major part of the implementation description is devoted to the Bluetooth Low Energy technology and to issues, which are associated with it. The resulting solution puts emphasis on the usability of the user interface and the ability to supervise a wide range of connected devices. The system also implements custom logic alerts for tracked events. The thesis concludes with evaluation of the resulting system and outlining the future development options.

The purpose of this project was to create a gateway between a Z-Wave device and a Bluetooth device.The gateway is supposed to make it possible for the company AES AB to sell and install a dynamic load balancer to their EV charger, even after it’s already been installed. The method that was used during this project was LIPS, where the project where divided into multiple subtargets. Each subtarget then had it’s own test which is shown in the results. The results for the overall project and not just the subtargets, are that a concept solution was created. The concept solution was able to forward the Z-Wave devices values to the Bluetooth device that was the target, but did so using a Raspberry Pi and a Z-Wave stick instead of a Z-Wave transceiver. The conclusion for the bachelor thesis is that the concept solution worked, and the demands of the assignment was fullfilled.

<p>Bluetooth is the de facto standard for short-range wireless communications. Besides Bluetooth Classic (BC), Bluetooth also consists of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and Bluetooth Mesh (Mesh), two relatively new protocols, paving the way for its domination in the era of IoT and 5G. Meanwhile, attacks against Bluetooth, such as BlueBorne, BleedingBit, KNOB, BIAS, and BThack, have been booming in the past few years, impacting the security and privacy of billions of devices. These attacks exploit both design issues in the Bluetooth specification and vulnerabilities of its implementations, allowing for privilege escalation, remote code execution, breaking cryptography, spoofing, device tracking, etc.</p> <p><br></p> <p>To secure Bluetooth, researchers have proposed different approaches for both Bluetooth specification (e.g., formal analysis) and implementation (e.g., fuzzing). However, existing analyses of the Bluetooth specification and implementations are either done manually, or the automatic approaches only cover a small part of the targets. As a consequence, current research is far from complete in securing Bluetooth.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Therefore, in this dissertation, we propose the following research to provide missing pieces in prior research toward completing Bluetooth security research in terms of both Bluetooth specification and implementations. (i) For Bluetooth security at the specification level, we start from one protocol in Bluetooth, BLE, and focus on the previously unexplored reconnection procedure of two paired BLE devices. We conduct a formal analysis of this procedure defined in the BLE specification to provide security guarantees and identify new vulnerabilities that allow spoofing attacks. (ii) Besides BLE, we then formally verify other security-critical protocols in all Bluetooth protocols (BC, BLE, and Mesh). We provide a comprehensive formal analysis by covering the aspects that prior research fails to include (i.e., all possible combinations of protocols and protocol configurations) and considering a more realistic attacker model (i.e., semi-compromised device). With this model, we are able to rediscover five known vulnerabilities and reveal two new issues that affect BC/BLE dual-stack devices and Mesh devices, respectively. (iii) In addition to the formal analysis of specification security, we propose and build a comprehensive formal model to analyze Bluetooth privacy (i.e., device untraceability) at the specification level. In this model, we convert device untraceability into a reachability problem so that it can be verified using existing tools without introducing false results. We discover four new issues allowed in the specification that can lead to eight device tracking attacks. We also evaluate these attacks on 13 Bluetooth implementations and find that all of them are affected by at least two issues. (iv) At the implementation level, we improve Bluetooth security by debloating (i.e., removing code) Bluetooth stack implementations, which differs from prior automatic approaches, such as fuzzing. We keep only the code of needed functionality by a user and minimize their Bluetooth attack surface by removing unneeded Bluetooth features in both the host stack code and the firmware. Through debloating, we can remove 20 known CVEs and prevent a wide range of attacks again Bluetooth. With the research presented in this thesis, we improve Bluetooth security and privacy at both the specification and implementation levels.</p>

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