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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

CEO compensation, Corporate Governance, and Firm performance

Yu, Hsueh-Yu 14 June 2003 (has links)
Abstract Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation is a potent instrument through which people and investors can improve their understanding of organization substance and symbol. Good compensation package can not only improve the performance of worker but also lift employees¡¦ commitment to work. However, we are not so sure about the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance because of the existing of ¡§agency theory¡¨. The degrees of alignment of interests with those of the agents in the firm who control the major decisions in the firm are also different. This gives rise to potential conflicts among the stakeholders, and these incentive conflicts have now come to know as ¡§agency (principal-agent) problem¡¨. Being desirous of the problem, this thesis reviews and integrates the literature on CEO compensation, focusing on both determinants and consequences of this complex, often controversial phenomenon. Thus, a model of the determinants of CEO compensation is presented and investigated. Based on a sample of 422 from Taiwan listed companies, I investigated the data both from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and the annual report of each listed company to combine in order to examine the compensation model. The definition of CEO in this thesis is one of the following three identities: chairmen of the board, general managers, and people who serve as both positions, that is, CEO duality. Hypotheses are tested and the study finds that CEO compensation has complex links to several factors: firm sizes, performance, stock return, and board stock ownership. The main factors for deciding CEO compensation are economic determinants and the only significant board control variable is board stock ownership. Contrary to some foreign literature, the index of duality is not significant at all since that people who serve as both chairmen and general manager obtain below average compensation level than others. In summary, the thesis provides the different results of a matrix of different identities and industries, and hopes to have some contribution to following research.

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