本文研究了海外背景的董事在中国上市公司中的表现和作用。本文从董事最基本的两个作用监督和指导出发，研究了海外背景的董事对于董事会治理和公司表现的各项投入和产出。研究结果表明，海外背景的董事在董事会会议的缺席记录更多，更少参与特殊委员会的工作。海外背景的董事对于高管薪酬水平的管理更弱，但在解雇表现不佳的CEO有积极的作用。在指导作用上，海外背景的董事表现得并不尽如人意。海外背景的董事并没有利用自己的海外经历为公司在海外并购业务来带好处。最后，海外背景董事占比最高的公司，托宾Q所代表的公司表现更低。这篇文章的重要性在于，这是第一篇用国内数据研究海外背景董事在公司治理和表现中的作用的文章，同时也是第一篇详细阐述不同的海外背景所具有的不同影响的文章。 / This paper discusses the presence and the roles of directors with foreign backgrounds in China’s listed companies. Starting from the two basic roles of boards, monitoring and directing, this paper examines the inputs and outputs of foreign-background directors (FBDs) on board governance and firm performance. The result shows that FBDs are associated with worse board meeting attendance records, less special committee assignments, weaker control in senior executive compensation level, but more strength in firing underperforming CEOs. In directing-related functions, FBDs does not meet the expectation that they can benefit the firm’s cross-border merger and acquisition decision by taking advantage of their foreign background knowledge. Finally, firms with higher fraction of FBDs on board are associated with poorer performance in terms of Tobin's Q. This research is significant because it is the first exploration of the functions of FBDs in listed corporations using China’s data, and the first attempt to identify the role of each different foreign background. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Xia, Keqin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 30-34). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Foreign Background Directors and Corporate Performance: Empirical Evidence from China’s listed Companies --- p.I / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 摘要： --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.IV / Chapter SECTION I --- : INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter SECTION II --- : LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Board Functions--Monitoring and Directing --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Monitoring function & agency problem --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Directing function --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board Governance and Firm Performance --- p.6 / Chapter SECTION III --- : DATA AND METHODS --- p.7 / Chapter 3.1 --- Individual characteristics --- p.7 / Chapter 3.2 --- Board characteristics --- p.8 / Chapter 3.3 --- Firm characteristics --- p.10 / Chapter 3.4 --- Different foreign backgrounds --- p.10 / Chapter SECTION IV --- : EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Board Meeting Attendance Problem and FBDs --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Regression analysis of absence ratio --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Regression analysis of the total absence ratio --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Conclusion on attendance problem and foreign backgrounds --- p.17 / Chapter 4.2 --- Probit Regression Analysis of Committee Assignments --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Regression Analysis of Senior Executives’ Compensation --- p.19 / Chapter 4.4 --- Regression Analysis of CEO Turnover Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 4.5 --- An Event Study: Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Analysis --- p.23 / Chapter 4.6 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: FBDs and ROA --- p.26 / Chapter 4.7 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: Tobin’s Q and FBDs --- p.28 / Chapter SECTION V --- : SUMMARY --- p.29 / REFERENCES --- p.30 / FIGURES AND TABLES --- p.35