Within interstate militarized disputes, states use different kinds of influence strategies, like bullying, reciprocating, and trial-and-error. My dissertation examines state influence strategies within border disputes. This context serves as a hard test which could testify if state behaviors in world politics are mainly driven by the salience of contested issues. Or other factors, like leader militarized backgrounds (e.g., participating in rebellions or military service), may also at work. On the other hand, focusing on state influence strategies could be a promising direction to investigate the dynamics of border disputes, like border crisis outcomes. My dissertation contains three chapters. The first chapter explores the rationales behind state choices of influence strategies in border crises by focusing on leaders and their militarized experiences. The second chapter focuses on the influence strategy's short-term effect by examining how do hey influence border crisis outcomes? The third chapter examines the influence strategy's long-term impact by investigating how do they affect the durability of border claims? My dissertation has some important findings. First, leader militarized backgrounds influence state choices of influence strategies. Second, bullying strategies create escalations, which make border crises more likely to end in stalemate or decisive outcomes. By contrast, both reciprocating and trial-and-error ease the tension and make border crises more likely to end in compromises. Third, in the long term, the bullying strategies enable states to learn the costs of territorial fights, who then are willing to drop territorial claims. Neither reciprocating or trial-and-error strategies has this effect.