Historians and political scientists have explained the pre-eminence of Social Credit in British Columbia during the last half of this century as an institutionalized protest against the seeming inactivity of partisan governments and as a reaction to the strength of the social democratic element in the province's political culture. This thesis examines the period from 1932 up to and including the BC Social Credit movement's electoral breakthrough in 1952 and suggests that economic and political conditions during that time affected the way that Social Crediters organized and changed the focus of Social Credit ideology in BC from monetary reform to a call for good government and conservative values. It also suggests that some previous conclusions about BC's Social Credit movement - that it was an outgrowth of Alberta Social Credit, that it was a populist organization, that it was too small to be intellectually significant - should be modified in the light of new evidence. This thesis should serve as a starting point for more specialized studies of the Social Credit movement in British Columbia.

Historians and political scientists have explained the pre-eminence of Social Credit in British Columbia during the last half of this century as an institutionalized protest against the seeming inactivity of partisan governments and as a reaction to the strength of the social democratic element in the province's political culture. This thesis examines the period from 1932 up to and including the BC Social Credit movement's electoral breakthrough in 1952 and suggests that economic and political conditions during that time affected the way that Social Crediters organized and changed the focus of Social Credit ideology in BC from monetary reform to a call for good government and conservative values. It also suggests that some previous conclusions about BC's Social Credit movement - that it was an outgrowth of Alberta Social Credit, that it was a populist organization, that it was too small to be intellectually significant - should be modified in the light of new evidence. This thesis should serve as a starting point for more specialized studies of the Social Credit movement in British Columbia. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is a review and analysis of the selection of William N. Vander Zalm as the third leader of the British Columbia Social Credit party on July 30, 1986. It examines in detail the events and circumstances which allowed the last candidate to enter the most contested leadership race in Canadian history to win the convention. This thesis incorporates an overview of the British Columbia Social Credit party, its traditions, leaders, and criteria for selecting its leaders. The sixty-nine day campaign is chronicled and the other eleven candidates and their campaigns are examined. In addition to reviewing the public and private record on these matters, several interviews were conducted. This thesis also benefits greatly from the analysis and articles on the Social Credit leadership contests produced by the University of British Columbia’s Political Science department. Personal observations are also incorporated into this paper, as the writer was a voting delegate. (I have been a Social Credit party member since 1981. At the leadership convention I supported Vander Zalm on all four ballots. While I readily acknowledge my political biases, I nevertheless have endeavoured to write a balanced academic account of this event). The Vander Zalm victory contradicts much of the conventional wisdom on the organization and conduct of successful leadership campaigns. The Vander Zalm campaign effort was poorly organized with no real strategic planning. The campaign finances were modest. The candidate had little caucus support and no endorsements from the party elites. Furthermore, the candidate did not enter the contest until it was half over and eleven other candidates were already in the race. How then did he win? In this thesis, I argue that the Vander Zalm victory was the result of four factors, all linked and all essential to his success. First, Vander Zalm himself offered a populist style and persona many delegates found attractive. Second, the party’s antiquated constitution provided only one delegate category, those selected directly by the membership. This not only prevented manipulation or control of delegate categories (as seen in other party contests), but ensured that several long-time party activists who were predisposed to the Vander Zalm candidacy would emerge as delegates. Third, Vander Zalm’s candidacy was boosted greatly by polls during the campaign showing him to be the party’s best hope to lead them to victory in the upcoming provincial election. And finally, many delegates saw a vote for Vander Zalm as a means to repudiate the modernization and isolation of the party and government seen during the last years of outgoing Premier W.R. Bennett, and return the party to its populist origins.

The traditional objectives of leadership conventions have been two-fold; First, the choice of a new party leader; second, the reaffirmation and renewal of party activists as well as unification of them behind the newly chosen leader. This thesis analyzes the Social Credit party leadership selection process with particular focus on the 1991 leadership convention. The study draws upon data and written material with respect to the 1986 leadership convention, but primarily information gathered from an extensive survey of behavior and attitudes of the nearly 1900 delegates to the 1991 leadership convention as well as newspapers and personal observation and interviews with attendees. It explores how the Social Credit party tried but failed to achieve both of the traditional objectives with their 1991 leadership convention. They chose a new party leader. However, entering the 1991 convention, the party was divided by numerous rifts which had developed during the 1986 leadership convention and since that event. Rather than heal the rifts, the 1991 leadership convention exacerbated them. Thus, as the 1991 leadership convention closed the party was more divided than when the year's leadership politics had begun.

The traditional objectives of leadership conventions have been two-fold; First, the choice of a new party leader; second, the reaffirmation and renewal of party activists as well as unification of them behind the newly chosen leader. This thesis analyzes the Social Credit party leadership selection process with particular focus on the 1991 leadership convention. The study draws upon data and written material with respect to the 1986 leadership convention, but primarily information gathered from an extensive survey of behavior and attitudes of the nearly 1900 delegates to the 1991 leadership convention as well as newspapers and personal observation and interviews with attendees. It explores how the Social Credit party tried but failed to achieve both of the traditional objectives with their 1991 leadership convention. They chose a new party leader. However, entering the 1991 convention, the party was divided by numerous rifts which had developed during the 1986 leadership convention and since that event. Rather than heal the rifts, the 1991 leadership convention exacerbated them. Thus, as the 1991 leadership convention closed the party was more divided than when the year's leadership politics had begun. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this thesis is to posit an explanation for the rather spectacular reversal of Social Credit fortunes in British Columbia during the 1972-75 period and the concomitant creation of the province's present two-party system. A detailed examination of the political events of the period was undertaken in an attempt to determine what had taken place and in what order. The research involved analysis of electoral statistics and press clippings, personal interviews and the traditional review of available academic literature. The thesis rejected a monocausal explanation of Social Credit's 1975 electoral victory. Research indicates that Socred leader Bill Bennett was able to capitalize on "the widespread -and largely self-created - disenchantment with the NDP government and position his party to be seen by the public as the only credible alternative. Contrary to popular perception, the post-1972 version of Social Credit was not a "coalition" in the political sense. Rather, Liberal and Conservative elites recognized Bennett's success in projecting Social Credit as the only realistic alternative to the NDP and joined him to protect their legislative seats and further their respective political careers. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is a review and analysis of the selection of William N. Vander Zalm as the third leader of the British Columbia Social Credit party on July 30, 1986. It examines in detail the events and circumstances which allowed the last candidate to enter the most contested leadership race in Canadian history to win the convention. This thesis incorporates an overview of the British Columbia Social Credit party, its traditions, leaders, and criteria for selecting its leaders. The sixty-nine day campaign is chronicled and the other eleven candidates and their campaigns are examined. In addition to reviewing the public and private record on these matters, several interviews were conducted. This thesis also benefits greatly from the analysis and articles on the Social Credit leadership contests produced by the University of British Columbia’s Political Science department. Personal observations are also incorporated into this paper, as the writer was a voting delegate. (I have been a Social Credit party member since 1981. At the leadership convention I supported Vander Zalm on all four ballots. While I readily acknowledge my political biases, I nevertheless have endeavoured to write a balanced academic account of this event). The Vander Zalm victory contradicts much of the conventional wisdom on the organization and conduct of successful leadership campaigns. The Vander Zalm campaign effort was poorly organized with no real strategic planning. The campaign finances were modest. The candidate had little caucus support and no endorsements from the party elites. Furthermore, the candidate did not enter the contest until it was half over and eleven other candidates were already in the race. How then did he win? In this thesis, I argue that the Vander Zalm victory was the result of four factors, all linked and all essential to his success. First, Vander Zalm himself offered a populist style and persona many delegates found attractive. Second, the party’s antiquated constitution provided only one delegate category, those selected directly by the membership. This not only prevented manipulation or control of delegate categories (as seen in other party contests), but ensured that several long-time party activists who were predisposed to the Vander Zalm candidacy would emerge as delegates. Third, Vander Zalm’s candidacy was boosted greatly by polls during the campaign showing him to be the party’s best hope to lead them to victory in the upcoming provincial election. And finally, many delegates saw a vote for Vander Zalm as a means to repudiate the modernization and isolation of the party and government seen during the last years of outgoing Premier W.R. Bennett, and return the party to its populist origins. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate