Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties. / Master of Arts / When you taste a Golden Delicious apple, drink Ethiopian coffee, feel dental pain, hear classical music or have many other conscious experiences of things, there's *something it's like* to be in those states. The taste of the apple and the coffee and the feel of dental pain are phenomenal properties - the "feels" of things in the broadest possible sense. Philosophers wonder what these things - "feels" - really are. Are they neurological features of your brain or a material features generally or are they something different? In a recent essay, Antonin Broi attacks the idea that they are something other than material or brain states. If Revelation - the idea that experiences reveal the essences of phenomenal properties - and some ideas about the general nature of phenomenal properties are both true, then strange results arise. I argue against his reasoning and I give a better way to understand Revelation.