This dissertation looks at the political behavior of three Taiwanese Buddhist organizations since 1989: the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), the Buddha Light Mountain monastic order (or Foguangshan) and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Association (or Ciji). It concentrates on trying to understand the rationale behind the different strategies that each of them has adopted in its interaction with the government. The BAROC has adopted a strategy of lobbying in an attempt to remedy the steady decline of its status throughout the 1990s: it has tried to sway the government to adopt a law that would restore the authority over Buddhists the association held before 1989. Foguangshan has resorted to a strategy of remonstrance to advance its religious ideals between 1995 and 1997: its founder Xingyun supported the bid of his lay disciple Chen Lii'an for the presidency of the Republic of China (ROC) and launched large public demonstrations critical of the government that followed that election. During the same period of time, Ciji has steered away from the controversies over the law on religion and conspicuously avoided supporting Chen, while continuing to grow to become the largest organization of its kind in Taiwan. The theological views of the three organizations' leaders are examined as key factors explaining the rationale behind the political strategies these organizations have adopted. Other factors such as availability of material resources, lay support, congruence between leaders and their followers on the dimension of ethnicity and gender are explored as possible sources of constraints on the leaders.

This dissertation looks at the political behavior of three Taiwanese Buddhist organizations since 1989: the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), the Buddha Light Mountain monastic order (or Foguangshan) and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Association (or Ciji). It concentrates on trying to understand the rationale behind the different strategies that each of them has adopted in its interaction with the government. The BAROC has adopted a strategy of lobbying in an attempt to remedy the steady decline of its status throughout the 1990s: it has tried to sway the government to adopt a law that would restore the authority over Buddhists the association held before 1989. Foguangshan has resorted to a strategy of remonstrance to advance its religious ideals between 1995 and 1997: its founder Xingyun supported the bid of his lay disciple Chen Lii'an for the presidency of the Republic of China (ROC) and launched large public demonstrations critical of the government that followed that election. During the same period of time, Ciji has steered away from the controversies over the law on religion and conspicuously avoided supporting Chen, while continuing to grow to become the largest organization of its kind in Taiwan. The theological views of the three organizations' leaders are examined as key factors explaining the rationale behind the political strategies these organizations have adopted. Other factors such as availability of material resources, lay support, congruence between leaders and their followers on the dimension of ethnicity and gender are explored as possible sources of constraints on the leaders. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate