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Macro-theoretic models of an economy in transitionTsenova, Tsvetomira Stoyanova January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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The Impact of Equity Ownership Groups on Investment: Evidence from UkraineMykhayliv, Dariya, Zauner, K.G. 2017 March 1918 (has links)
Yes / We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’
investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on
present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged
investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial
group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability
significantly affects investment; the presence of and increases in state ownership have a
negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial
companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain
the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints) and the extent
of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and underinvestment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis.
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Firm growth and productivity in Belarus: New empirical evidence from the machine building industryCrespo Cuaresma, Jesus, Oberhofer, Harald, Vincelette, Gallina A. 08 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Using a unique dataset comprising information for (up to) 153 firms in the machine building sector in Belarus, we investigate the determinants of firm growth for an economy where state ownership of enterprises is widespread. We use panel data models based on generalizations of Gibrat's law, total factor productivity estimates and matching methods to assess the differences in firm growth between private and state-contolled firms.
Our results indicate that labor hoarding and soft budget constraints play a particularly important role in explaining differences in performance between these two groups of firms.
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Essays on Incentives and LeadershipHolte, Martin Bech January 2008 (has links)
<p>"Taxation, Career Concerns and CEO Pay". This paper proposes a simple dynamic model of equilibrium CEO compensation. Motivated by the strengthened career incentives stemming from the fall in the top income tax rates over the past decades, I study the implications of a model where the quality of talent identification depends on how hard individuals work in order to be among the winners in the contest for managerial positions. It is shown how the compensation of CEOs can be interpreted in this light, across time, across industries, and across countries, and I provide some evidence showing that the predictions of the model are in line with several empirical developments over the past decades.</p><p>"Incentives under Communism: The Value of Low-Quality Goods". In this paper, I study how efficiently centrally planned regimes can provide incentives across different stages of economic development. In particular, I study the attractiveness of an incentive system based on exclusive provision of high-quality goods to high-ranked members of society. At low levels of economic development, a self-interested regime can exploit such an incentive system to reduce the cost of providing incentives. However, such an incentive system generally loses its attractiveness as the economy grows. The economic performance of the centrally planned economies is then analyzed in light of this result.</p><p>"The Business of Troubled Autocrats". Many autocrats control resource rents. Typically, they rely on these rents in order to buy political support. In this paper, I study how such autocrats behave in product and capital markets, in particular at times of financial distress. The main questions are: How does the asset position of an autocrat affect his behavior as a producer in a market with rents? From whom does the autocrat obtain financing in order to get out of difficulties? I show that when the asset position of the autocrat drops below a certain threshold, output drops below the level of a standard monopolist. Further, the autocrat can obtain less expensive financing domestically by exploiting the presence of vested interests, implying that there is zero foreign debt in equilibrium.</p>
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Essays on Incentives and LeadershipHolte, Martin Bech January 2008 (has links)
"Taxation, Career Concerns and CEO Pay". This paper proposes a simple dynamic model of equilibrium CEO compensation. Motivated by the strengthened career incentives stemming from the fall in the top income tax rates over the past decades, I study the implications of a model where the quality of talent identification depends on how hard individuals work in order to be among the winners in the contest for managerial positions. It is shown how the compensation of CEOs can be interpreted in this light, across time, across industries, and across countries, and I provide some evidence showing that the predictions of the model are in line with several empirical developments over the past decades. "Incentives under Communism: The Value of Low-Quality Goods". In this paper, I study how efficiently centrally planned regimes can provide incentives across different stages of economic development. In particular, I study the attractiveness of an incentive system based on exclusive provision of high-quality goods to high-ranked members of society. At low levels of economic development, a self-interested regime can exploit such an incentive system to reduce the cost of providing incentives. However, such an incentive system generally loses its attractiveness as the economy grows. The economic performance of the centrally planned economies is then analyzed in light of this result. "The Business of Troubled Autocrats". Many autocrats control resource rents. Typically, they rely on these rents in order to buy political support. In this paper, I study how such autocrats behave in product and capital markets, in particular at times of financial distress. The main questions are: How does the asset position of an autocrat affect his behavior as a producer in a market with rents? From whom does the autocrat obtain financing in order to get out of difficulties? I show that when the asset position of the autocrat drops below a certain threshold, output drops below the level of a standard monopolist. Further, the autocrat can obtain less expensive financing domestically by exploiting the presence of vested interests, implying that there is zero foreign debt in equilibrium.
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Srovnání konceptu fiskálního federalismu ve Švýcarsku, USA a EU. / Comparison of fiscal federalism concepts in Switzerland, USA and EU.Havlíček, Jan January 2013 (has links)
In this thesis I investigate the application of various instruments of fiscal federalism in the Swiss Confederation, the United States of America and the European Union. Based on the knowledge of the theory and the works of authors dealing with this topic in stated regions I conclude that while the USA and Switzerland are quite similar in their competitive approach to fiscal federalism, the fiscal federalism mindset in the EU is entirely opposite to that of theirs. That is partly given by the fact that the EU is not a true federation with a strong central government but a union of sovereign states. But the fact that the responsibility in the USA and Switzerland lies upon the deciding policy makers and that they are at the same time constrained by certain fiscal rules whereas the standard in the EU is the socialization of losses and the fiscal rules are only being implemented now is in my opinion a more significant factor.
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Investment behaviour, corporate control, and private benefits of control: Evidence from a survey of Ukrainian firmsMykhayliv, Dariya, Zauner, K.G. January 2015 (has links)
No / We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model,a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence forthe presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non-monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.
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The Q Theory of Investment with Private Benefits of Control, Soft Budget Constraints and Financial ConstraintsMykhayliv, Dariya, Zauner, K.G. 12 1900 (has links)
Yes / In this paper, we extend Tobin’s Q model under financial frictions (Hennesy, Levy, and Whited, Journal of Financial Economics (2007)), using a discrete-time version of their model, to include private benefits of control of managers and other stakeholders and soft budget constraints in the form of money injections into the firm. Managers are not viewed to maximise shareholder value, but to maximise the value of their shareholding plus their private benefits of control. Private benefits of control introduce elements of asset stripping into the model. We characterize the optimal investment policy, analyse comparative statics and discuss applications to firms in transitional economies.
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The Impact of Ownership on Companies’ Investment Rates in UkraineMykhayliv, Dariya, Zauner, K.G. January 2016 (has links)
Yes / In this paper, we empirically analyze the impact of ownership groups on companies’ investment rates in Ukraine using a new dynamic Tobin’s Q model allowing investment rates to depend on present and lagged Q. We find that the presence of a majority in and increases in state, non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership has a significantly negative impact on investment rates. State and insider ownership are associated with soft budget constraints whereas non-domestic, financial companies’ and financial and industrial groups’ ownership with hard budget constraints. The dynamic model shows persistence in the market-to-book value of equity, the proxy for Q.
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The Impact of Ownership on Companies' Investment Rates Using Present and Past Values of ProfitabilityMykhayliv, Dariya, Zauner, K.G. January 2016 (has links)
Yes / We empirically analyze the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment rates in Ukraine allowing investment rates to depend on present and past market-to-book values of equity. We relate the impact to the presence of soft and hard budget constraints, to the free cash flow and the cash constraint hypothesis and discuss over- and under-investment. Several robustness checks, in particular, the potential endogeneity of ownership variables are considered.
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