Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, School of Business, 2008. / Title from home page (viewed on May 11, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: A, page: 3198. Adviser: Geoff Sprinkle.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-02, Section: A, page: 0657. Adviser: Clifton Brown. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 63-65) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-11, Section: A, page: 4760. Adviser: Theodore Sougiannis. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-84) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Oklahoma State University, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 88-91).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2635. Adviser: A. Rashad Abdel-khalik. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-112) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, 2006. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2222. Advisers: Laureen Maines; Joseph Fisher. "Title from dissertation home page (viewed June 21, 2007)."

In this paper I examine how one construction management company uses contract design and incentive design to respond to aspects of task complexity and relationship complexity present in its construction projects. In terms of contract design, I find that the company is unable to increase its use of cost-plus pricing when faced with technically complex projects. Instead, the company uses increased pre-execution design modification and price markups when technically complex projects are contracted with fixed-pricing. Further, I find that design modification is only margin-improving when used in projects that are both technically complex and fixed-price and that price markups are only margin-improving when projects are fixed-price. In terms of incentive design, I find that the company provides more qualitative feedback to employees and quantitatively rates employees with less centrality bias (i.e. more dispersed ratings) when employees work on fixed-price projects. Further, when employees work on fixed-price projects, they are granted greater average financial rewards, their financial rewards are relatively more based on input-behaviors (i.e. less based on output-results), and their bonuses, raises and promotions appear to be awarded with more managerial discretion (i.e. are less systematic.)

Organizations increasingly empower their employees to conduct local experimentation and generate innovation ideas. The aim of this dissertation is to understand the role of management control mechanisms in motivating and managing employee-driven innovation. Specifically, I provide empirical evidence – both quantitative and qualitative – on the specific channels and mechanisms through which employee-driven innovation is facilitated within real-world settings. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I conduct a field study in a gaming company to examine how innovation ideas are generated and selected. I provide details on the various channels through which employee-driven innovation occurs, as well as the management control mechanisms used to manage employee-driven innovation. The rich descriptive evidence enabled me to uncover important themes in the management control mechanisms that balance innovation and execution. The second chapter is based on my job market paper (“Boss, Cut Me Some Slack: Control and Innovation in a Multitasking Environment”) which examines the problem of motivating innovation in the presence of existing execution tasks. Using employee- and project-level data from a software company, I examine the relationship between reduced time pressure on execution tasks and employee-level innovation by exploiting variations in the extent to which predetermined time constraints on execution tasks were loosely enforced by managers in decentralized teams. I find that reduced time pressure on execution tasks is significantly associated with a greater probability of self-initiated innovation. Consistent with theories on employee selection and relational contract, the above effect is more pronounced (1) for employees without significantly negative outcomes on past execution tasks, (2) for employees with a greater preexisting propensity to innovate, or (3) when the supervisor has a history of working with innovating employees. Conditional on submitting innovation prototypes, reduced time pressure on execution tasks is also significantly associated with higher-quality innovation. Despite the formal permission to innovate, many employees in established organizations seem unable to fully and effectively use the granted discretion to experiment. In the third chapter of my dissertation, I turn my attention to whether certain informal control mechanisms (such as social norms) affect the extent of local experimentation. Using detailed loan- and employee-level data from a financial institution that removed its rule-based formal control system, I analyze changes in decision-making patterns and find that employees who are exposed to two different initial control environments (i.e. before and after removing the rule-based control system) have both increased local experimentation over time after being given the right to make their own decisions. But employees from the initial control environment with zero-experimentation rely much more on managers’ or peers’ degree of experimentation to guide their own experimentation.

Abstract Not Available.

This thesis presents a capital budgeting problem faced by a major telecommunications company. The purpose of this thesis is to address the capital budgeting problem in order to establish a framework for the measurement and evaluation of alternative capital allocation decisions which are compatible with the mission of the company. The solution method follows three major avenues of optimization: multiple criteria, multiple constraints and interactivity. The problem is solved using the Analytic Hierarchy Process to obtain an initial solution which is then improved by an interactive method allowing users to direct the search for an acceptable allocation. The method is implemented by a decision support system hinging on a graphic user interface. The support system has been used by practitioners to evaluate alternatives of a real problem. Results and enhancements are discussed.