Freedom is universally valued and fundamentally affects social life. In this thesis, I examine how freedom affects an important dimension of business: long-term commitment (LTC). The LTC of corporations is vital for economic growth because economic development is reliant on entrepreneurs continuously investing in physical and social capital. Corporate opportunism will never lead to long-term economic growth. Specifically, this study examines the effects of political freedom (PF) and economic freedom (EF) on two LTC-related variables: investment and the commitment to maintaining a loyal shareholder base, both of which are essential topics in the business literature. This study consists of two essays. The first essay investigates the effects of a country's political versus economic freedom on corporate investment based on a sample of 19,605 companies operating in 49 countries for the timespan covering 1995 to 2015. First-differencing (FD) regressions show that PF and EF are positively associated with corporate investment, but PF's effect is larger. I also find that the effect of EF is conditional on the development of PF but not vice versa. Further, the effect of PF does not seem to be due to concurrent changes in uncontrolled factors: major changes in PF have larger effects than minor changes, and I do not observe a reversion in the effect of PF. Lastly, I find that an improvement in PF is associated with a larger growth in investment among firms with state ownership or political connections, suggesting a larger distorting effect of low PF on these firms' investment decisions. Overall, the findings shed new light on the economic reforms designed by policymakers: economic reforms, no matter how easy they seem, may not work well without political reforms. The second essay examines the impacts of a country's political compared with economic freedom on corporations' commitment to maintaining a loyal shareholder base. With a sample of 45 countries spanning 12 years, the FD result shows that PF and EF are positively associated with corporations' commitment to shareholder loyalty (CSL). More importantly, PF has a greater effect than EF. It is also determined that the impact of EF is dependent on the advancement of PF, but the reverse is not true. Furthermore, the impact of PF is not caused by concurrent changes in uncontrolled factors: major changes in PF are more impactful than minor changes, while a reversion in the impact of PF is not observed. Finally, I find that an enhancement to PF is correlated with a more significant increase in CSL among firms with state ownership or political connections than in firms without. This implies that low PF has a greater distorting effect on the CSL of such firms. In general, these results indicate that while it is comparatively easier for policymakers to enact economic reforms, their effectiveness may be reduced in the absence of concurrent political reforms.

Xia Xiang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-102). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract (in English) --- p.i-iii / Abstract (in Chinese) --- p.iv-v / Acknowledgement --- p.vi-vii / List of Figures --- p.xii / List of Tables --- p.xiii / Abbreviations --- p.xiv / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1-7 / Chapter 1.1 --- The Rationale of the Study --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Scope of the Study --- p.1-2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Objectives of the Study --- p.2-3 / Chapter 1.4 --- The Methodology of the Study --- p.3-4 / Chapter 1.5 --- Significance and Limitations of the Study --- p.4-6 / Chapter 1.6 --- The Organization of the Study --- p.6-7 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.8-29 / Chapter 2.1 --- Theory of Corporatism and Its Criticism --- p.8-11 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Definition of Corporatism and Two Different Types --- p.8-10 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Some Critiques on Corporatism --- p.10-11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theory of Civil Society and Its Criticism --- p.12-17 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Definition of Civil Society --- p.12-14 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Some Critiques on Civil Society --- p.14-17 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Applicability of Corporatism/Civil Society to China --- p.17-25 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Discussions on Corporatism --- p.17-19 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Discussions on Civil Society --- p.19-22 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Social Organizations: both corporatist and civil society features? --- p.22-25 / Chapter 2.4 --- Studies on the Private Business Associations in China --- p.25-29 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Federation of Industry and Commerce --- p.30-54 / Chapter 3.1 --- The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce --- p.30-35 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Establishment and Objectives --- p.30-31 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Functions of the A CFIC --- p.32 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- "Organization, Staffing and Budget" --- p.32-34 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- "Structure, Local Chapters and Membership" --- p.34-35 / Chapter 3.2 --- Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce and Its District Chapters --- p.35-45 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Functional Changes over the Fifty Years --- p.36-39 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Representative Function of the FIC --- p.39-41 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Funding and Spending --- p.41-43 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Membership --- p.43 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Selection of Leaders --- p.44-45 / Chapter 3.3 --- Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the State: are there any changes? --- p.45-54 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Corporatist Features of the Dual Management System and 1989 & 1998 Document --- p.45-48 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the State --- p.48-54 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Associations --- p.55-80 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Self-Employed Laborers Association at the National Level --- p.55-59 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Establishment and Objectives --- p.55-56 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Functions of the SELA --- p.56-57 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- "Organization, Staffing and Budget" --- p.58 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- "Structure, Local Chapters and Membership" --- p.58-59 / Chapter 4.2 --- Shanghai Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Association and Their District Chapters --- p.59-73 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Organizational Structures of the SELA and PEA --- p.61-63 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Functional Changes --- p.63-65 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- The Representative Function of the SELA and PEA --- p.65-68 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Funding and Spending 68- --- p.71 / Chapter 4.2.5 --- Membership --- p.71-73 / Chapter 4.2.6 --- Selection of Leaders --- p.73 / Chapter 4.3 --- The Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Association: a new form of government appendages? --- p.74-80 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- The Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the Private Enterprises Association --- p.81-88 / Chapter 5.1 --- The PEA as A Group Member of the FIC --- p.81-82 / Chapter 5.2 --- The FIC and the PEA: Lack of Interaction --- p.82-83 / Chapter 5.3 --- Perceived Competition between the FIC and the PEA --- p.83-84 / Chapter 5.4 --- Perceived Advantages by the FIC and the PEA's Staff --- p.84-88 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.89-95 / Bibliography --- p.96-102 / Appendix I: Profile of the Interview --- p.103-105 / "Appendix II: Interview Questions for the FIC, the SELA and PEA" --- p.106 / Appendix III: Interview Questions for Members --- p.107 / Appendix IV: Interview Questions for the BICA --- p.108

Tsui, Sing Yan Eric. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 135-145). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Concern on State-Business Relations / Introduction: Political Debates on State-Business Relations / Theorietical Debates on State-Business Relations / Cipher State Models / Guardian State Models / Partisan State Models / Theories on Hong Kong´ةs Situation / Synarchy and Administrative Absorption / Boundary Politics and Bureaucratic Politics / Overview / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Power and Network / The Problem of Power / Dahl and his Critics / Power and Networks / "Power, Brokerage and Closure" / Centrality and Power / Lessons from Social Capital Studies / Brokerage and Closure as Indicators of Power / Conclusions / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Methodology and Research Design / Concepts of the Study / Data Collection and Research Design / Executive Council as Decision Making Network / Measuring Social Linkages / "Measuring Brokerage, Closure and Power" / Assessing the Business Community / Comparing State and Business Power / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Research Findings / The Network of Executive Councilors / The Network of HSIC firms / HSIC firms´ةs representative in Executive Council / Comparing the Power of the State and Prominent Business / Summary of Findings / Chapter Chapter 5. --- State-Business Relations from 1982 to 1988: On the Edge of Transformations / Findings in the Period / Events in the Period / The Problem of Political Future / Beijing-Business Relations / Localization of the Business Community / Impacts of the Events / Impacts from the role of Sovereigns / Impacts from Localization of the Business Sector / Summary / Chapter Chapter 6. --- State-Business Relations from 1989 to 1996: Transition and Transformations / Findings in the Period / Events in the Period / Changes in British Policy / The Strengthening of Beijing-Business Alliance / Impacts of the Events / The Pushing Effect of London´ةs Policies / The Pulling and Fragmenting Effect by Beijing / Summary / Chapter Chapter 7. --- State Business Relations from 1997 to 2005: From Fragmentation to Disarticulation / Findings in the Period / Events in the Period / Business Invasion and the Decline of the State / Principal Official Accountability System: The Heffalump Trap / Analysis of Findings and Events / Business Sector: A Disunited and Incompetent Ally / Administrative Officers: The Ultimate Survivor / Summary / Chapter Chapter 8. --- Prospects: State-Business Relations in Post-Tung Hong Kong / Dominance of Administrative Officers / Transformations Expected in the Future / Weakening of Bureaucratic Networks / Increasing Public Demands / The Path Towards Democracy / Prepare for the Future / Expansion of Political Appointments / Business Sector and Electoral Politics / State-Business Relations after Political Reform / Chapter Chapter 9. --- Conclusions / Conclusion of the Findings / Significance of the Study / Limitations of the Study / Prospects of Political Network Studies / "Appendix 1. Sociograms of Executive Councilors,1982-2005" / "Appendix 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage, Closure and Power Index Score of Executive Councilors,1982-2005" / Appendix 3. Sociograms of Firms with their stocks listed as Hang Seng Index Component / "Appendix 4. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage, Closure and Prominence of HSIC firms" / Appendix 5. Representatives of HSIC firms in Executive Council / Appendix 6. Prominent HSIC firms and their Representatives in Executive Council / "Appendix 7. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors,1982-2005" / Appendix 8. List of directors in the boards of HSIC firms

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 1981. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography: leaves 175-179. / by Sandra Kanter. / Ph.D.

"April 2004" / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 138-143) / xii, 143 leaves : ill. (col.) ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2004

This study examined the determinants of public pension fund performance through the lens of agency theory. The study sought to answer the following questions: (1) How much of the fluctuation in the performance of pension plans is due to political interference - either directly from decisions made by legislatures or through the governance structure of the pension boards, after controlling for asset allocation, plan size, and other external factors? (2) Do pension board expertise, education and training, and information disclosure requirements improve the performance of pension plans? (3) Do pension trustees strategically determine the actuarial rate of return (discount rate) in order to reduce contributions in times of fiscal stress for the pension sponsor? Using longitudinal data of pension fund performance over the period 2000 to 2009 and instrumental variables methods to address endogeneity issues, the study found partial support for the agency theory hypotheses. The results indicate that political interference through reduced contributions was the main factor explaining pension performance. There was no direct evidence about the negative impact of politically appointed trustees on pension performance. The impact of these findings for current policy and future research are discussed.

This study examined the determinants of public pension fund performance through the lens of agency theory. The study sought to answer the following questions: (1) How much of the fluctuation in the performance of pension plans is due to political interference - either directly from decisions made by legislatures or through the governance structure of the pension boards, after controlling for asset allocation, plan size, and other external factors? (2) Do pension board expertise, education and training, and information disclosure requirements improve the performance of pension plans? (3) Do pension trustees strategically determine the actuarial rate of return (discount rate) in order to reduce contributions in times of fiscal stress for the pension sponsor? Using longitudinal data of pension fund performance over the period 2000 to 2009 and instrumental variables methods to address endogeneity issues, the study found partial support for the agency theory hypotheses. The results indicate that political interference through reduced contributions was the main factor explaining pension performance. There was no direct evidence about the negative impact of politically appointed trustees on pension performance. The impact of these findings for current policy and future research are discussed.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 263-283).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 310-346).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Washington University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 311-336).