Firms face a big challenge in matching the supply of perishable goods with uncertain demand in real time. In practice, the traditional supply chain models are proved not efficiently enough to lower firms' risk exposure. The purpose of the dissertation is to provide the theoretical framework of roles of several stylized markets in firms' risk management. In particular, we explore the influence of the spot business-to-business exchange market, forward contract market and credit-default swap market respectively. The dissertation is divided into the following three chapters. In chapter 1, we show that when the exchange market lacks perfect liquidity, a firm's capital structure has a greater influence on its output-level decisions, then the market is perfectly liquid. The impact may be even greater than that without an exchange market. This is primarily because the introduction of the exchange market causes firms to act strategically in absence of perfect liquidity. In chapter 2, we study the essential relationship between producers' forward contracts and their supply strategies in business-to-business exchange market. Specifically, we focus on the application of the electricity power exchange market in the US. Our model reveals that the strategic incentive makes producers to join in forward contract market voluntarily and increases social welfare. We show in chapter 1 that even when firms' risks are independent of each other, there is a chance that the realization of market uncertainty turns out to be the same. As a result, there is no exchange market as a platform to help firms hedge their risks. Therefore, we need other instruments in firms' risk management portfolio. In chapter 3, we propose a financial market, credit-default swap market, in which firm s can temporarily transfer default risks to outside investors. However, the "lemon" problem may cause social cost.