This thesis examines the administration of the Late Roman or Early Byzantine Empire under Maurice (582-602). His reign is not commonly known, and he is often given brief mention only together with the other rulers following the reign of Justinian the Great, although his era spans twenty eventful years. / Indeed, his rule is of considerable importance since it is in his time that we first hear about new administrative structures such as the Exarchates of Carthage and Ravenna. / The focal point of this thesis is the military and civil administration of the Empire at the end of the sixth century. In order to arrive at a more precise picture of these subjects, different types of materials have been analyzed, such as military handbooks, numismatic data and laws, as well as the literary sources of the reign. Among the latter, the most valuable is the Histories of Theophylact Simocatta. It has been seen as important, or even essential, to relate the more technical material to this literary source. / The conclusions reached from this study are various. From the numismatic evidence we can see that there was considerably more stability in monetary matters in the East and the West than is sometimes assumed. By comparing expenditures in general, and subsidies paid especially, at different times in Late Roman or Byzantine history, we learn that the "gold drain" on the Empire's resources was not necessarily as devastating as is sometimes thought. With regard to the military administration, the malaise of frequent unrest among the soldiers is traced to problems of internal structure besetting the military establishment for various reasons, including bad choices of commanding officers. / Finally, changes in both military and civil administration are often seen as developments of an evolutionary kind rather than as arbitrary innovations established by Imperial fiat.

No description available.

In 533, Justinian I ordered the conquest of the former Roman provinces of Africa, which had been lost to the Vandals a century earlier. The 'reconquest' has been regarded, by contemporaries and modern scholars alike, as one of the defining successes of the reign. However, despite the evident achievements of the campaign, Roman victory over the Vandals marked little more than the beginning of the Eastern Roman Empire's attempt to consolidate its position in Africa. The unanticipated threat posed by hostilities from the Berber tribes would continue until 548. Roman-Berber relations, unlike other aspects of Justinian's foreign relations, have received comparatively little attention, and this study aims to reassess the establishment of Roman authority in Africa and the Eastern Roman Empire's response to the Berber threat. In particular, it considers whether this response should be seen as a series of ad hoc reactions to immediate circumstances, or whether it is possible to identify a coherent Roman policy vis-à-vis the Berbers. The major conclusions of this study fall in two areas. First, it argues that Roman objectives in Africa were far more limited than has generally been supposed, with the empire's territorial ambitions not extending beyond key coastal positions which offered strategic and commercial advantages, and from which the empire could project its limited authority into the interior. Second, this study concludes that the Eastern Roman Empire's actions with respect to the Berber tribes lacked coherence. Attempts to implement a system of client rulers were unsuccessful, partly as a result of the competition between individual Berber leaders as they sought to establish independent polities within the frontiers of the former Roman Empire; and partly as a result of an increasing lack of resources, as well as the instability caused by constantly changing leadership within the African civil and military administrations, which prevented the development of coherent long term strategies for addressing the Berber threat.