The financial crises experienced worldwide have contributed to the rising importance of corporate governance. South Africa is unique in that it has strong corporate governance structures and as a result, it would prove useful to assess the effects of these corporate governance structures on critical sectors such as the long-term insurance industry, which is the largest insurance industry in Africa. The objective of this study is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms and firm efficiency in the South African long-term insurance industry using data on 73 long-term insurers from 2007 to 2014 in a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, firm efficiency is estimated using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) bootstrapping technique of Simar and Wilson (2007), which corrects for biases associated with non-parametric techniques. In the second stage analysis, the truncated bootstrapping regression technique is employed to examine the effect of corporate governance on the estimated efficiency scores. The corporate governance variables used were board size, board independence, audit committee size, CEO tenure and audit independence, while controlling for firm size, reinsurance usage and leverage. The findings indicate that long-term insurers in South Africa operated at approximately 21% of their optimal capacity which suggests high levels of inefficiency in the provision of life insurance services. The results of the second-stage analysis identify board size, non-executive directorship, CEO tenure and audit independence as the significant corporate governance indicators that impact on efficiency over the study period. In addition, firm size, reinsurance usage and leverage were also observed to be significantly related to the estimated efficiency scores. The findings suggest that non-executive directors are not as effective as expected, which may be due to a myriad of reasons, such as under-representation on sub-committees, a lack of relevant skills, experience or financial expertise. Insurers should use more stringent criteria to screen potential non-executive directors and provide training and regular updates to adequately capacitate the non-executive directors with the necessary skills and knowledge. The positive relationship between CEO tenure and efficiency suggests that frequent CEO rotation is not advisable. Most of the corporate governance indicators have a negative effect on efficiency, which is not the intended effect. This is an indication that corporate governance measures should not be viii enforced on insurers as a 'one size fits all’ measure, rather, a focus should be placed on corporate governance measures that have the intended impact, such as audit committee independence.

In recent years, corporate textual disclosure has gained considerable attention in accounting and finance research. The textual disclosures complete the picture of a firm's economic performance in addition to the quantitative information. Many studies have investigated various determinants and consequences of textual disclosure attributes. This thesis aims to contribute to this growing strand of literature that studies the drivers of the textual attributes of narrative disclosure. The thesis consists of three essays related to political uncertainty, CEO characteristics, and corporate social responsibility. The first essay (Chapter 2) investigates the impact of political uncertainty on the informativeness of a firm's narrative disclosure. Using conference calls, the results show that firms exposed to political uncertainty provide less readable disclosure, more ambiguous tone, and rely more on scripted responses to analysts. Further analysis reveals that obfuscatory disclosure has predictive power over a firm's future poor performance, suggesting that managers use obfuscation to opportunistically mask poor future performance during high political uncertainty periods. The second essay (Chapter 3) examines the impact of the CEO's tenure on the firm's disclosure complexity. Based on upper echelon theory, the results show that early tenured CEOs with greater career concerns have more incentive to provide more readable disclosure to affect the market perception about their ability. However, long-tenured managers get more entrenched and provide obfuscated disclosure. In addition, the results indicate that the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms in improving the quality of a firm narrative disclosure depends on the CEO's tenure. In particular, board oversight (internal governance by subordinate executives) is more effective in constraining new (long-tenured) CEOs' myopic disclosure practices. The third essay (Chapter 4) explores the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) orientation and textual attributes of financial disclosures. The results show that firms with high CSR orientation provide more readable disclosures and use a less ambiguous tone in their annual reports. These findings are consistent with the notion that managers in CSR-conscious firms adhere to high ethical standards and commit to improving the transparency of their firms' financial disclosures. In addition, the study provides evidence that corporate governance mechanisms and CSR are substitutes for each other to ensure transparent disclosure. Overall, the findings of these studies provide insights to the investing community, the firm's board of directors, and standards-setters to better understand the implications of firm CSR engagement, political exposure, and CEO characteristics in financial reporting contexts beyond quantitative metrics.

It is widely held that CEOs are central to the successful financial performance of companies. Yet, little attention has been given to the correlation between CEO tenure and financial performance of companies specifically. The purpose of this study was to determine whether CEO tenure has an impact on financial performance of companies in South Africa. The financial performance variables for the study were ROA and ROE. The performance of 30 JSE listed companies from three industries, namely, mining, retail and real estate, between 1995 to 2007 was examined. This gave a total of 62 data observations across the selected three tenure categories: short tenure (one to three years); medium tenure (four to five years); and long tenure (six or more years). The results showed that the average tenure for South African CEOs was four years; this was slightly lower than the findings of previous studies conducted in the USA. Medium and long tenure showed better financial performance for ROA than short tenure, while there was no statistically significant finding for ROE. Therefore from an ROA point of view, as tenure increases so does financial performance, until a certain point at which it is anticipated that lengthy tenure will lead to a decline in financial performance. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Företag är av stor vikt för det svenska samhället. Presterar de dåligt, drabbar det inte enbart den svenska ekonomin utan även de anställda och deras liv. De senaste åren har antalet noterade aktiebolag på Nasdaq Stockholm ökat, ökningen medför att företagens intressenter blir allt fler. Det är därför även viktigt för aktieägarna att företagen leds av den mest lämpade VD:n och presterar optimalt. I tidigare forskning har det observerats att faktorer såsom lön, kön samt företagsspecifik erfarenhet kan påverka VD:ns agerande och således även företagets prestation. Motstridiga resultat har presenterats mellan företagets prestation och kön samt företagsspecifik erfarenhet, samtidigt som positiva resultat observerats mellan prestationen och lön. Covid-19 har varit brännande aktuellt de senaste åren och en mängd åtgärder har införts från den svenska staten. Forskning från andra länder har konstaterat att företagens prestation har påverkats negativt av Covid-19 pandemin. Vidare har det observerats från tidigare kriser som drabbat den svenska ekonomin, att egenskaper som VD:n besitter haft en stor påverkan på hur företaget klarat sig under kriserna. Detta examensarbete ämnar därmed att undersöka hur de svenska företagens prestation har påverkats av Covid-19, samt om VD:ns egenskaper i form av lön, kön samt företagsspecifik erfarenhet har någon koppling till hur företaget presterar under denna ekonomiska kris. Examensarbetet präglas av en kvantitativ metod där publika företag på Nasdaq Stockholm har legat till grund för studien. Ett antal företag har exkluderats på grund av avgränsningar samt bortfall. Slutligen har det resulterat i att 277 företag observerats under åren 2017 till 2020. Resultaten som återfunnits har visat på att det inte finns något signifikant samband mellan Covid-19 och företagets prestation, däremot finns det tendenser som tyder på detta. Dessutom har det observerats att vissa egenskaper hos VD:n har olika betydelse beroende på om företaget befinner sig i en tid med Covid-19 eller ej. Resultatet visar på att VD:ns kön har större betydelse för prestationen under Covid-19. Detta pekar på att en manlig VD bidrar till ett högre resultat under Covid-19 än vad kvinnliga gör, vilket inte går att konstatera för perioden innan. Däremot är det tydligt att företagen presterar bättre både innan samt under Covid-19, om VD:n har en lång företagsspecifik erfarenhet. Avslutningsvis kunde det observeras att den totala lönen har ett svagt negativt samband med företagets prestation innan men inte under Covid-19.

The hospitality industry, with its dynamic business environment, has experienced unprecedented disruption and reconfiguration due to the emergence and success of sharing economy firms and online travel agencies. This turbulence calls for effective governance structures that can motivate managers to act in their shareholders' best interests. Despite the importance of effective corporate governance for firm performance and the topic receiving extensive scholarly attention in the management and finance literatures, there seem to be several gaps and mixed findings in the hospitality academic field. To facilitate scholarly advancement, identify gaps in the current knowledge base, and provide direction for future research, in the first essay I undertake a systematic review of research on corporate governance in the hospitality literature. Based on 115 peer-reviewed articles published since 1961, I identify 21 themes explored by scholars, and find that topics related to institutional ownership, executive compensation determinants, board size, and merger and acquisition (MandA) outcomes are commonly examined, whereas topics related to family ownership, debt, and regulation/law are seldom explored. This review contributes to the literature by taking stock of what we know and offering a one-stop-shop for scholars to understand and extend corporate governance literature published in the hospitality field. While evidence in the general business literature suggests that targets, instead of acquirers, are better off after the acquisition, limited studies in the hospitality industry have shown that both bidders and targets are better off after the merger, suggesting that MandAs are more successful in the hospitality industry than in other industries. In the second essay, I empirically examine whether this is indeed the case and what may explain the potential discrepancy in merger performance. Using a comparative study design and a comprehensive sample over 41 years, I find that overall acquirers gain from MandAs, and hospitality MandAs outperform non-hospitality MandAs. Bidders in the hospitality industry are more likely than non-hospitality bidders to acquire large, related targets, using an all-cash mode of payment. Except for industry relatedness, relative size, cash payment, and unlisted target are all positively related to merger performance. This study contributes to the literature by identifying several factors that can explain the differences in MandA performance between hospitality and non-hospitality firms. Despite the fact that MandAs are frequently pursued as a growth strategy in the hospitality industry, their effect on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has not been systematically examined. Considering that CEO compensation is an important topic related to firm performance, management, and social responsibility, in the third essay I examine the relationship between MandAs and CEO compensation in a sample of hospitality firms consisting of 1,514 firm-year observations over a period of 27 years. The regression analyses find that CEO compensation is significantly higher in the year after large acquisitions; well-governed firms identified via tenure, the Entrenchment-index, and board independence pay their CEOs higher post-acquisition than poorly-governed firms; the fraction of equity-based compensation is unrelated to MandA propensity; and the fraction of cash-based compensation is negatively related to MandA propensity. The additional analyses indicate that CEOs are rewarded for positive stock returns but not penalized for negative stock returns, and even more so in well-governed firms after acquisition. This study finds that MandAs and corporate governance are determinants of CEO compensation and the form of CEO compensation matters to acquisition decisions in hospitality firms. The findings are of importance for shareholders and the board of directors to design compensation plans that align the interests of managers and shareholders. / Doctor of Philosophy / The hospitality industry, with its dynamic business environment, has experienced unprecedented disruption and reconfiguration due to the emergence and success of sharing economy firms and online travel agencies. This turbulence calls for effective governance structures that can motivate managers to act in their shareholders' best interests. Despite the importance of effective corporate governance for firm performance and the topic receiving extensive scholarly attention in the management and finance literatures, there seem to be several gaps and mixed findings in the hospitality academic field. To facilitate scholarly advancement, identify gaps in the current knowledge base, and provide direction for future research, in the first essay I undertake a systematic review of research on corporate governance in the hospitality literature, and find that topics related to institutional ownership, executive compensation determinants, board size, and merger and acquisition (MandA) outcomes are commonly examined, whereas topics related to family ownership, debt, and regulation/law are seldom explored. This review contributes to the literature by taking stock of what we know and offering a one-stop-shop for scholars to understand and extend corporate governance literature published in the hospitality field. In the second essay, I empirically examine whether MandAs are more successful in the hospitality industry than in other industries and what may explain the potential discrepancy in merger performance. I find that overall acquirers gain from MandAs, and hospitality MandAs outperform non-hospitality MandAs. Bidders in the hospitality industry are more likely than non-hospitality bidders to acquire large, related targets, using an all-cash mode of payment. Except for industry relatedness, relative size, cash payment, and unlisted target are all positively related to merger performance. This study contributes to the literature by identifying several factors that can explain the differences in MandA performance between hospitality and non-hospitality firms. In the third essay I examine the relationship between MandAs and CEO compensation in a sample of hospitality firms, and find that CEO compensation is significantly higher in the year after large acquisitions; well-governed firms identified via tenure, the Entrenchment-index, and board independence pay their CEOs higher post-acquisition than poorly-governed firms; the fraction of equity-based compensation is unrelated to MandA propensity; and the fraction of cash-based compensation is negatively related to MandA propensity. The additional analyses indicate that CEOs are rewarded for positive stock returns but not penalized for negative stock returns, and even more so in well-governed firms after acquisition. This study finds that MandAs and corporate governance are determinants of CEO compensation and the form of CEO compensation matters to acquisition decisions in hospitality firms. The findings are of importance for shareholders and the board of directors to design compensation plans that align the interests of managers and shareholders.