Abstract Not Available.

The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether children classified as Type A and Type B differed on a number of measures of social functioning. A total of 176 children from grades 4 and 6 participated in the study. The entire sample of children was asked to fill out the Hunter-Wolf A/B Rating Scale, a self-report measure of Type A behavior, and the Children's Social Support Scale, a self-report measure of the availability of social support from significant others and of the quality of available support. The Pupil Evaluation Inventory, which provides peer nominations of Aggression, Withdrawal, and Likeability, was also administered. A subsample of 50 children were observed during free play at recess. Results indicated that children classified as Type A were evaluated by their peers as higher on aggression than their Type B counterparts. There was no significant difference between the two groups on peer-rated likeability or withdrawal. Type A children also indicated that the quality of their available social support was significantly poorer than that reported by Type B children. While Type A children's social support did not differ as a function of grade level, Type B children in grade 6 reported significantly more social support than Type B children in grade 4 or Type A children in grade 6. Females reported significantly more social support available to them than did males, and males received higher scores on aggression. While Type A children in grades 4 and 6 did not differ in the amount of low-involvement watching behavior engaged in, Type B children in grade 4 displayed significantly more watching behavior than Type As at the same grade level or than Type B children in grade 6. Implications of the results were discussed with reference to the social consequences of Type A behavior and suggestions for future research were noted.

No description available.

Le rêve incorpore souvent des expériences récemment vécues et parfois, du expériences de vie très lointaines et oubliées. Cependant, nous ne savons toujours pas s'il existe un patron selon lequel les mécanismes oniriques pigent des éléments mnémoniques dans le vaste répertoire de souvenirs personnels. Foulkes (1985) a postulé que le rêve est un acte cognitif dont l'organisation cognitive reflète celle de l'éveil. Durant l'éveil, on a observé que la distribution des souvenirs autobiographiques (SA) d'adultes de plus de 60 ans, épouse une forme cubique, à trois composantes: (1) une fréquence élevée de souvenirs pour les 10 à 20 dernières années qui diminue au fur et à mesure qu'ils deviennent lointains; (2) une recrudescence de souvenirs qui remontent à l'adolescence et au début de l'âge adulte; (3) très peu de souvenirs qui remontent à la petite enfance. Selon Rubin, Rahal et Poon (1998), les souvenirs d'événements appartenant aux époques de l'adolescence et du début de l'âge adulte sont plus facilement repérables parce qu'ils ont été encodés à un moment de la vie où la nouveauté et l'apprentissage sont en effervescence. Nous nous sommes donc demandé s'il serait possible que l'organisation temporelle dite "inconnue" des sources mnémoniques auxquelles se réfère l'activité onirique pendant le sommeil soit la même que l'organisation temporelle des sources mnémoniques auxquelles se réfère la mémoire autobiographique à l'éveil? Vingt-huit étudiantes universitaires (âge moyen = 22 ans) et trente enseignantes/infirmières retraitées (âge moyen = 65 ans) ont tenu un journal de rêve pendant une semaine et ont dormi une nuit en laboratoire au cours de laquelle elles ont été réveillées à toutes les périodes de sommeil paradoxal. Le matin, elles ont été invitées à identifier les références temporelles (RT) par rapport à cinq éléments du contenu manifeste (personnages, objets, lieux, événements, activités). En plus, elles ont été invitées à fournir un échantillon de SA suivant la méthode du stimulus sémantique de Galton (1879). Tous les SA et seulement les RT oniriques rapportées comme n'ayant pas accédé à la conscience depuis l'expérience vécue en réalité ont été classifiées dans des catégories temporelles. Un total de 148 rêves en laboratoire (80 pour les jeunes et 68 pour les aînées) et 173 rêves à la maison (82 pour les jeunes et 91 pour les aînées) ont été analysés. En ce qui a trait aux rêves des aînées, des analyses de comparaisons planifiées ont indiqué que tant les SA, que les RT dans les rêves en laboratoire et à la maison, ont suivi une tendance cubique statistiquement significative. Cette étude démontre donc que la distribution des RT dans les rêves ressemble à celle des SA repérés à l'éveil. Elle suggère en plus, que pendant le sommeil, les mécanismes oniriques sembleraient également bénéficier de l'enchérissement mnésique et de la facilité de repérage des éléments mnémoniques initialement stockés pendant l'adolescence et la vie de jeune adulte.

In establishing the core of his psychotherapeutic perspective, Eugene Gendlin constantly refers to the natural sciences in general terms and the behavioural sciences in particular terms, stressing their limitations in addressing human foundations of subjective experience. He argues, for instance, that science does not have concepts or methodologies to properly address the process of bodily felt experiencing. He argues that science is based on the empirical testing of logical statements, and that these impose an artificial order on the natural concretely felt human experience, as if everything was reducible to mathematical formulas. This paper examines Gendlin's arguments on the matter in some detail focusing on Gendlin's 1962 book (Experiencing and the creation of meaning) and 1991 book chapter (Thinking beyond patterns: Body, language, and situations), which contain his main arguments. Gendlin's reference to Logical positivism in his characterization of the ways of science is presented and critically examined. Gendlin's claims to a phenomenological perspective is also presented and critically examined. It is concluded that (1) Gendlin overlooked the possibility that the debate over what science is might not be resolved with the proposals of Logical positivism, (2) that, consequently, he overlooked the possibility that more recent views of what science is might satisfactorily address some or all of the difficulties raised by his possibly outdated view, and (3) that his phenomenology was idiosyncratic rather than profoundly rooted in the philosophical tradition. Popperian Critical Rationalism, as a philosophy of science. is shown to resolve some of the major difficulties noted by Gendlin, and the limitations of this more recent epistemological perspective vis-a-vis the understanding of the conscious flow of human experience are discussed.

With the aim of better understanding the concept of coping, the objectives of the study were to (1) examine the concordance of subjective and contextual coping indices, (2) investigate changes in the use of coping strategies as a natural stressor unfolds, and (3) predict levels of psychological stress from coping strategies used when faced with a health threat. A sample of 828 women undergoing routine breast screening completed subjective measures of stress and coping at four time points (prior to the screen as well as 24 hours, 20 days and three months follow-up). Contextual coping was gathered at the three-month follow-up for all participants with a false positive screen along with matched negative-screen counterparts (n = 132). Correlational analyses revealed poor concordance between the subjective and contextual indices of coping, with a trend toward overreporting approach and underreporting avoidance strategies compared to experimenter ratings of coping. The use of contextual avoidance and approach strategies over time peaked following the result of the screen for the positive screen group, yet remained relatively stable across time for those with the negative screen group. A stage effect was noted on subjective strategies, with all participants reporting higher levels of approach coping from pre-screen to post-result. At post-result, group differences showed that women with a positive screen displayed, but did not report on the subjective measure, more behavioral and cognitive avoidance strategies than the negative screen group. No differences between groups were noted at follow-up on either coping measure. In the prediction of stress, prospective levels of subjective cognitive avoidance predicted higher levels of stress after notification of the result. The use of contextual strategies was not found to be a significant predictor. The strengths and limitations of the study are presented in the discussion along with the research and clinical implications.

Couples in which at least one partner was rated as insecurely attached were randomly assigned to an Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT) treatment group or a waitlist control group to determine whether EFT could improve attachment working models of self and other. Fifteen couples received a minimum of 15 sessions of EFT. Eleven couples served as the control group. Assessment of the EFT group took place at recruitment, at the end of therapy, and four months later. The control group was assessed at recruitment, and 4 and 8 months later. Measures included two self-report measures of Bartholomew's four category model of attachment and a measure of marital satisfaction. Results indicated that at the end of therapy the EFT group showed significantly greater improvement in model of self, and in 3 of the 4 attachment prototypes for one attachment measure and in 2 of the 4 for the second measure of attachment. Gains were not maintained at 4-month follow-up. Changes in marital satisfaction did not differ significantly between groups from either pre- to posttreatment or from pretreatment to follow-up. For the EFT group as a whole, gains in marital satisfaction from pre- to posttreatment were predicted by increases in models of self and other scores, and improvement in secure and avoidant-fearful ratings of attachment. Gender differences were found for the treatment group. Increases in DAS scores for females in the treatment group were predicted by increases in model of self scores and in secure ratings. For males in the treatment group, improvement in DAS scores was predicted by an increase in model of other scores, and by improvement in secure and avoidant-fearful ratings.

A theoretically and clinically important cognitive deficit in clinical depression is the inability to be specific in recalling personal memories. This phenomenon has been coined "overgeneral memory" (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) and has, thus for, been interpreted to represent a cognitive vulnerability that renders some individuals more susceptible to depression (Williams, 1996). Although there is a general consensus that this pattern of non-specific recall is not state-dependent, most of the evidence has come from studies that have examined this effect in clinical populations. To gain a better understanding of whether overgeneral memory is independent of the current mood-state, two experiments examined this effect at the level of mood. The two components of mood, affect and arousal, were manipulated to examine their influence on the specificity of autobiographical memory in a non clinical population of women. In Experiment 1, a modified Velten procedure was used to induce elated, depressed, and neutral mood states. Self-reported mood was measured using the POMS-SF and the PANAS-X. The results showed that the induction procedure successfully altered mood in the desired direction. The depressed group reported increased depression, tension, confusion, and fatigue, and also reduced joviality and positive affect immediately following the manipulation, The elated group, in comparison, reported increased joviality and positive affect, and also reduced depression, tension, confusion, and fatigue. The neutral group reported no change in mood. Results from the Autobiographical Memory Test, in which participants were requested to provide a self-defining memory for each of 5 positive and 5 negative cue words, revealed no differences in autobiographical memory specificity between the three groups. There were also no differences in the proportion of general memories produced between positive and negative memory cues across the three groups. However, participants in the depressed condition produced a greater proportion of categoric compared to extended general memories, within the total proportion of general memories produced. In Experiment 2, high and low arousal states were induced through physical exercise. Participants in the low arousal condition, who exercised on a Stairmaster for 45 minutes, reported increased fatigue, and decreased vigor and depression, whereas participants in the high arousal condition, who walked briskly for 10 minutes, reported decreased fatigue and depression, and increased vigor. A low arousal state resulted in an increased proportion of overgeneral memories compared to both the control condition and the high arousal condition. A high arousal state did not influence autobiographical specificity. No cue valence effects were found, and there was no difference in the proportion of categoric or extended memories produced for the three groups. Across both Experiments 1 and 2 the postulated role of working memory in the production of generic autobiographical memories (Williams, 1996) was examined by testing how the various manipulations influenced performance on the Trail Making Tests (TMT). No differences were found among the groups in either experiment, although ceiling effects may have been involved. Taken together, the results indicate that a reduction in the arousal component of mood decreases the capacity to recall specific autobiographical memories. These results suggest that overgeneral memory is a phenomenon at least partly dependent on current mood-state, and more specifically, on the level of energy available to the person at the time of recall.

Alzheimer's disease is an insidious neurodegenerative disorder characterized by gradual and progressive deterioration in intellect, cognitive skills, personality, and functional independence. There is significant heterogeneity of symptom presentation in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease, however, memory impairment is universal. Both secondary and primary memory systems are consistently reported in the literature to be affected by the disease. Primary memory is considered a limited capacity system characterized by a rapid rate of forgetting. Historically, primary memory was thought to be a unitary system necessary for the transfer of information into secondary memory and underlying a range of cognitive functions such as reasoning and language comprehension. However, research over the past decade has suggested an important role of a deficient putative central executive system in working memory as fundamental to the deficits in primary memory demonstrated by patients diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. Working memory is defined by two primary memory storage systems, the phonological loop, and the visuospatial sketchpad, controlled and organized by a central executive system. Research with respect to working memory in patients diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease has shown the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad to remain unaffected by the disease process during the mild stages of the disorder. Thus, deficits in primary memory were ascribed to a faulty central executive system. However, few, if any, empirical studies directly relating deficient primary memory with executive system dysfunction are available. The goal of this dissertation is aimed at providing empirical validation that executive system dysfunction underlies the primary memory disturbance in a sample of patients diagnosed with probable Alzheimer's disease within the mild stages of dementia. Performance on measures of primary such as Digit Span and the Consonant Trigrams Test were compared amongst patients identified with a possible executive system disturbance, patients assumed to have executive functions relatively intact, and normal controls. Furthermore, Alzheimer's disease patients and normal controls were compared on the Random Generation Task, assumed to be the prototypical measure of central executive functioning in working memory. The data supports the hypothesis that executive system disturbance may explain the difficulties that Alzheimer's patients have on measures of primary memory. Those patients identified with a putative executive system disturbance performed significantly worse on all measures of primary memory compared to those Alzheimer's patients assumed to have a relatively intact executive system. Furthermore, those Alzheimer's patients identified as having no executive dysfunction performed similarly to normal controls on measures of primary memory, thus further supporting the role of executive system disturbance in deficient primary memory functioning. Performance on the Random Generation Task also followed a similar pattern in that those patients with an assumed executive system disturbance performed significantly worse than those patients with a relatively intact executive system and normal controls. The current findings are discussed in the context of the working memory model proposed by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974.

Couple communication is an important aspect in relationship quality and has a pervasive impact on most aspects of marital functioning. The verbal self-disclosure of affect, although having received less empirical attention than other aspects of couple communication, has been found to relate to relationship satisfaction and adjustment and is implicated in relationship conflict resolution. The current study was designed to investigate self-reported levels of affective self-disclosure and its relation to various aspects of relationship conflict resolution, as well as to relationship satisfaction and adjustment in individuals cohabiting in a heterosexual relationship. These variables were examined with self-report data from 162 individuals (98 women and 64 men) who participated in a mail survey. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses demonstrate that affective self-disclosure scores accounted for a significant amount of variance in both relationship quality and various aspects of conflict resolution. In particular, affective self-disclosure scores were positively related with relationship satisfaction and relationship adjustment. Individuals who reported engaging in more frequent self-disclosure of feelings to their partner also reported greater satisfaction with their relationship and obtained higher scores on relationship adjustment. As well, affective self-disclosure was positively related to conflict resolution styles described as effective, and negatively related to conflict resolution styles described as ineffective. The more individuals reported that they viewed themselves and their partners as engaging in effective and satisfactory ways of handling relationship conflicts, the more they reported engaging in affective self-disclosures. As well, affective self-disclosure scores were positively related to effective styles and behaviors found at various stages of the conflict discussion and resolution process (i.e., the beginning stages of the conflict where the objective is to get the issues out as they are perceived by each partner; the middle stages of the conflict where the objective is for each partner to argue for their point of view and to understand the areas of disagreement. and the final stages of the conflict where the objective is to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise regarding the problem area). Further, affective self-disclosure scores were positively related to the self-reported frequency of resolved relationship conflicts. The more individuals reported self-disclosing emotions to their partners, the more they reported being able to resolve relationship conflicts more frequently. These preceding relationships were maintained once additional factors, such as impression management scores, gender, and demographic variables were controlled for. In some of the findings, the relation between affective self-disclosure and relationship satisfaction was moderated by the gender of respondent. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)