This paper examines the recruitment, characteristics, motivation and functions of "political exempt staff in Canadian government. These potentially influential individuals, free from the political restrictions on public servants, tend to operate in the shadows cast by senior elected officeholders. As a result, too little is known of their characteristics or activities, although they have been the subject of some research. An important aim of this paper is to determine whether political exempt staff, by working closely with prime ministers, premiers or cabinet ministers, have significant influence on public policy-making. Thus, researching the origins, attributes, motivations and roles of these unelected political acolytes may yield useful information concerning the operation of Canadian democracy. Since public office, elected or otherwise, forms part of our social system, a large number of questions may be raised. What are the socio-economic and educational characteristics of exempt staff? How and from where are they recruited? What is it about political life which attracts their interest and helps to fulfill their aspirations? What motivates such individuals? How do such persons influence public policy? In terms of the democratic process, what is the nature and relative importance of the function performed by political exempt staff? For example, how are their duties and responsibilities determined and delimited? To what extent are their activities partisan in orientation? Do they tend to have an appreciable influence on government policies and programs? Further, what degree of control do exempt staff exercise over access to elected officials? To what extent do they shape public office-holders' opinions and decisions? If they act as "gate-keepers" and confidants, do they constitute effective targets for professional lobbyists and others seeking to influence government action? This paper seeks to address these and other questions through analysis of data derived from interviews with 33 former exempt staff who served as political assistants and advisers, primarily in the federal government. The purpose is to gain useful operational insights into a unique position in our governmental system. The findings of this study suggest that political exempt staff play an important role in sustaining a government's "political impulse", the policy momentum it gains from an election mandate. The exempt staff also constitute a valuable point of contact for persons or organizations seeking information, support or a favourable decision from government.

This paper examines the recruitment, characteristics, motivation and functions of "political exempt staff in Canadian government. These potentially influential individuals, free from the political restrictions on public servants, tend to operate in the shadows cast by senior elected officeholders. As a result, too little is known of their characteristics or activities, although they have been the subject of some research. An important aim of this paper is to determine whether political exempt staff, by working closely with prime ministers, premiers or cabinet ministers, have significant influence on public policy-making. Thus, researching the origins, attributes, motivations and roles of these unelected political acolytes may yield useful information concerning the operation of Canadian democracy. Since public office, elected or otherwise, forms part of our social system, a large number of questions may be raised. What are the socio-economic and educational characteristics of exempt staff? How and from where are they recruited? What is it about political life which attracts their interest and helps to fulfill their aspirations? What motivates such individuals? How do such persons influence public policy? In terms of the democratic process, what is the nature and relative importance of the function performed by political exempt staff? For example, how are their duties and responsibilities determined and delimited? To what extent are their activities partisan in orientation? Do they tend to have an appreciable influence on government policies and programs? Further, what degree of control do exempt staff exercise over access to elected officials? To what extent do they shape public office-holders' opinions and decisions? If they act as "gate-keepers" and confidants, do they constitute effective targets for professional lobbyists and others seeking to influence government action? This paper seeks to address these and other questions through analysis of data derived from interviews with 33 former exempt staff who served as political assistants and advisers, primarily in the federal government. The purpose is to gain useful operational insights into a unique position in our governmental system. The findings of this study suggest that political exempt staff play an important role in sustaining a government's "political impulse", the policy momentum it gains from an election mandate. The exempt staff also constitute a valuable point of contact for persons or organizations seeking information, support or a favourable decision from government. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

During the 1968-1972 period attempts were made to introduce 'rationality' into the structures and processes of the Canadian Cabinet. It has usually been argued that these attempts by Prime Minister Trudeau provide an innovative and radically distinct departure from the 'diversified incrementalism' or 'crises management' decision-making under Prime Minister Pearson. Is the usual argument correct? This question is dealt with by examining in turn the role of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, the development of the committee system (with emphasis upon the Committee on Priorities and Planning), the place of the Treausury Board and especially of the Treasury Board Secretariat, the role of the Cabinet Secretariat, and the role of the Prime Minister's Office. The crucial difference between official actions and political actions is underscored in this examination. While the 1968-72 changes did establish , a more rational basis for decision-making, and may thus be seen as innovative, the changes did not amount to any radical departure — and, indeed, they were themselves the product of an incremental approach to change. While Prime Minister Trudeau presented the changes in terms of a philosophy of rationality, the actual changes must be seen as incremental extensions of changes which Prime Minister Pearson began. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The study, focuses on shadow cabinet organization, the practice; of appointing members to shadow the activities of cabinet ministers by Opposition parties. This practice is analyzed in Canada between 1963 and 1978, a period of continual Progressive Conservative Opposition. The underlying question is whether shadow cabinet organization has become more or less institutionalized during the period. In the introduction Samuel Huntington's four tests of institutionalization are outlined. They were used in assessing Canadian shadow cabinet institutionalization. To operationalize the tests for this study it proved useful to analyze the institution of the Canadian cabinet system along these dimensions. A comparative study of the British and Australian parliamentary systems in which the appointment of shadow cabinets is an accepted convention also helped isolate the variables to study in the Canadian context. Although the analysis centers on the period from 1963 to 1978, a brief history of Opposition organization is included. It provides the background for the period and an understanding of the roots of the present organization. The results of the study reveal that a shadow cabinet organization existed in Canada throughout the period 1963-78. For most of the 15 years its structure and practices were constantly changing. The change was in the direction of increased institutionalization on at least three of Huntington's four dimensions. On the basis of this study, therefore it is argued that shadow cabinet organization has become an established practice of at least Progressive Conservative Opposition in Canada. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate