This dissertation focuses on designing new structural election models and applying modern estimation techniques to quantify policy reform questions. All three chapters use models that are based on individual decision-making and estimate the parameters using a novel data set of U.S. House of Representative elections. These models provide new opportunities to analyze and quantify election policy reforms. The first chapter utilizes a unique compilation of primary election expenditures to see if general election voters value the primary nomination signal. While producing new results on the relationships between primary elections and general elections and between candidate characteristics and vote shares, this model allows me to show that campaign finance reform can have an unintended consequence. A limit on expenditures would have little effect on the competitiveness of elections and substantially decrease voter turnout in the U.S. House elections. In contrast, it is shown that a mandatory public funding policy is predicted to increase competitiveness and increase voter turnout. The second chapter examines why unopposed candidates spend massive amounts on their campaign. The postulated answer is that U.S. House of Representative candidates are creating a barrier to entry to discourage candidates from opposing them in the next election. This barrier reduces competition in the election and limits the voters’ choices. An unbalanced panel of congressional districts is used to quantify how an incumbent’s expenditure in previous elections impacts the probability of running unopposed in a later election. The third chapter estimates the value of a congressional seat based on the observed campaign expenditures. Campaign expenditures are modeled as bids in an asymmetric all-pay auction. The model produces predictions on how much a candidate should spend based on the partisanship leaning of each district. The predictions and observed expenditures are then used to estimate the value of a congressional seat. Along with analyzing how expenditures would change with new campaign finance reforms, this model has the capability of quantifying the effect of redistricting. After 2010 Census results become available, the majority of states will redraw their congressional districts changing the distribution of partisan votes. This model can be used to quantify the effect that the change in voter distribution has on campaign expenditures. / text

This thesis examines the recently decided Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The case regards campaign finance reform, and has raised significant controversy recently. This thesis will evaluate the arguments from both the dissent and the majority opinions, contextualize these arguments with respect to the history of campaign finance reform and the history of the legislation with regard to corporations, and will ultimately pass judgment on whether the Court was correct in its decision. Implications for the post-Citizens world will also be considered.

One of the underlying themes in American politics is that the addition of campaign finance laws at the presidential election level will have a negative relationship with amount of influence and money in campaigns and the amount of regulation. In other words, as regulation goes up the amount of money and influence will decrease. However, with the recent 2004 presidential election this concept has surely been shown to be problematic, at least at the outset. The purpose of this thesis is to examine this relationship and to further expand upon the limited knowledge of this sub-field of political science. This thesis will suggest that the intended result of campaign finance reform may not necessarily be realized. Subsequently, we must ask ourselves whether or not campaign finance regulations actually result in the intended consequences. Federal campaign finance laws do not necessarily reduce the amount of money and influence by special interests in presidential elections. In examining presidential campaign finance regulations do higher levels of regulations really have an impact upon the amount of money (influence) collected and spent in a particular campaign? The McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Act of 2002 (officially implemented in 2002), or the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), was a rudimentary attempt to dramatically change the electoral system in terms of money. In fact, this bill was the most comprehensive overhaul of the electoral system in a quarter of a century (at least since the 1970's) and one of the underlying reasons, arguably, for the bill was to limit soft money and interest group contributions to presidential candidates or to the presidential campaigns during a given election cycle. Basically, the attempt was made to limit the "money" in politics and particularly in presidential campaigns. However, as most media outlets have claimed (such as CNN) that money or contributions given by individuals and various organizations and the amount of money spent by each campaign (President Bush and Senator Kerry) in the most recent presidential election of 2004 surpassed that of any previous presidential election cycle. Part of the reasoning for the limitation of soft money in presidential elections is the whimsical "myth" that more money in presidential elections will inevitably lead to more influence of the executive branch by big time donors such as labor unions, business, wealthy persons, and by interest groups to name just a few. In other words, wealthy interests such as those mentioned in the previous sentence, would theoretically have a greater impact on the electoral process than by individuals. This concept is briefly examined. Of course, the data will come from many sources with government resources being the dominant resource. The FEC began collecting campaign finance data since the 1970's and much of the data comes from published data files from the FEC. Additionally, data will be taken from other government resources such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S Bureau of Labor statistics. Other data contained within in this will be properly noted.

State legislative campaign finance reform varies considerably among states and over time. Over the past 35 years states have adopted increasingly stronger reform policies; however, many disparities between states still exist. Current state legislative campaign finance laws range from disclosure only to clean elections programs. All states have disclosure laws, while only three have clean elections regulations. Many studies of state campaign finance reform examine the regulatory effects on campaigns and elections (e.g., Thompson and Moncrief 1998; Francia and Herrnson 2003) but none consider the causes of such reforms. This dissertation employs a unique research strategy by individually analyzing the specific types of state legislative campaign finance reform: 1) disclosure, 2) contribution limits, and 3) expenditure limits and public funding from 1970-2005. What emerges from these analyses indicates the conditions under which states have adopted more and less stringent types of legislative campaign finance reform. It examines the extent to which legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and the initiative affect the stringency of campaign finance reform in the states. Just because a state requires legislative candidates to disclose campaign finance figures does not mean that the requirement is strong when compared to what other states are doing. Measuring the type of campaign finance reform based on a unique stringency scale allows us to understand the conditions under which a state supports strong or weak campaign finance laws. / Political Science

Since its ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concern regarding corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from political quid pro quo arrangements and the deleterious consequences it may have on citizens’ democratic behavior. However, no standard has been set as to what constitutes “the appearance of corruption,” as the Court was and continues to be vague in its definition. As a result, campaign finance cases after Buckley have relied on public opinion polls as evidence of perceptions of corruption, and these polls indicate that the public generally perceives high levels of corruption in government. The present study investigates the actual impact that perceptions of corruption have on individuals’ levels of political participation. Adapting the standard socioeconomic status model developed most fully by Verba and Nie (1972), an extended beta-binomial regression estimated using maximum likelihood is performed, utilizing unique data from the 2009 University of Texas’ Money and Politics survey. The results of this study indicate that individuals who perceive higher levels of quid pro quo corruption participate more in politics, on average, than those who perceive lower levels of corruption. This suggests that at least part of the Supreme Court’s rationale for upholding the FECA contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo was unfounded. A similar test was performed using questions from the 2008 American National Election Study that have been used as proxies for corruption in previous studies, with inconclusive results. The more precise measure in the Money and Politics survey relates directly to the role of money in politics and provides better information than the ANES proxies have in the past, as those have been found to be related to factors other than money in politics. / text

This thesis compares the public policies of campaign finance in Canada with those in the U.S. and the U.K. in the period 2000-2011. The majority of the Canadian literature on party finance demonstrates a belief in the efficacy and necessity of the enterprise. This dissertation suspends this disposition and offers a critical approach to the regulation of money in Canadian elections. This thesis situates the discussion of party finance regulation in the context of contending models of democracy. Campaign finance rule changes are conceptualized within a new institutionalist framework. Changes in campaign finance rules are seen as changes in incentives and are seen to work in configurations, that is, interacting with existing formal and informal constraints. New institutionalism provides the avenue of inquiry into the position of political parties on the boundary of the public and private spheres and how campaign finance regulation may shift that boundary. This thesis adopts a mixed-method approach, incorporating the results of 65 semi-structured interviews with academics and political practitioners with primary document research. This thesis demonstrates that campaign finance rule changes interact with other electoral rules, types of parties and the nation’s historic institutions. The need to meld Quebec’s statist and civil-code traditions with Westminster democratic traditions, the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the role of subsequent court decisions, and the role of Elections Canada in its political finance oversight capacity, constitute major catalysts for Canadian party finance rule changes and for understanding the impact of rule changes. Contrary to the majority of literature on campaign finance reform, this thesis demonstrates that there may be diminishing marginal returns to additional campaign finance regulations, at least in a mature democracy such as Canada. Campaign finance rules reveal preferences for different models of democracy. As such, they must be carefully monitored.

This thesis compares the public policies of campaign finance in Canada with those in the U.S. and the U.K. in the period 2000-2011. The majority of the Canadian literature on party finance demonstrates a belief in the efficacy and necessity of the enterprise. This dissertation suspends this disposition and offers a critical approach to the regulation of money in Canadian elections. This thesis situates the discussion of party finance regulation in the context of contending models of democracy. Campaign finance rule changes are conceptualized within a new institutionalist framework. Changes in campaign finance rules are seen as changes in incentives and are seen to work in configurations, that is, interacting with existing formal and informal constraints. New institutionalism provides the avenue of inquiry into the position of political parties on the boundary of the public and private spheres and how campaign finance regulation may shift that boundary. This thesis adopts a mixed-method approach, incorporating the results of 65 semi-structured interviews with academics and political practitioners with primary document research. This thesis demonstrates that campaign finance rule changes interact with other electoral rules, types of parties and the nation’s historic institutions. The need to meld Quebec’s statist and civil-code traditions with Westminster democratic traditions, the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the role of subsequent court decisions, and the role of Elections Canada in its political finance oversight capacity, constitute major catalysts for Canadian party finance rule changes and for understanding the impact of rule changes. Contrary to the majority of literature on campaign finance reform, this thesis demonstrates that there may be diminishing marginal returns to additional campaign finance regulations, at least in a mature democracy such as Canada. Campaign finance rules reveal preferences for different models of democracy. As such, they must be carefully monitored.