This dissertation examines the movement for political union that existed in Canada and the United States between 1885 and 1896. During this period the Dominion was plagued by economic malaise, “racial” tension, and regionalism, all of which hindered national growth and the creation of a distinct Canadian nationality. The Republic, meanwhile, experienced substantial economic growth thanks to increasing industrialization, and many Americans sought to expand the territory of their nation. It was in this atmosphere of Canadian political and economic uncertainty and American expansionism that the idea of forming one grand continental republic re-emerged. To provide a more complete understanding of the movement for political union this study examines its emergence, development, and ultimate failure. Although at no time did it become a mass or popular movement, political unionism became an important element in the public discourse in both Canada and the United States. Furthermore, this dissertation shows that political unionism was not only an English-speaking phenomenon, as several of the core group of advocates identified herein were French Canadian, and there was a serious debate about French Canada’s future in North America. Many previous studies that have explored this era in Canadian-American relations have overlooked the significance of the movement for political union, largely by focusing on the tense economic relationship and the debate over free trade. However, as this dissertation argues, economic considerations for political union were secondary amongst its proponents. They did not support political union for personal gain. Rather, supporters of the movement shared a conviction in the need to unite the continent due to a sense of shared racialism and the belief in the superiority of republicanism. This dissertation also offers a new perspective on the core group of advocates of political union. They were not “traitors” who had turned their back on Canada and wished to “sell out” the Dominion to the United States. These figures did not want “annexation”; they desired a true political union.

Canada and the United States are faced with many cross-border environmental issues and therefore must negotiate potential solutions with one another. Complicating such negotiations is the fact that both countries are federal systems which require negotiations and decision-making interactions amongst various levels of government domestically which, in turn, influence and are influenced by bilateral relations. Therefore, this study focuses on governmental relations both within each country (intergovernmental relations) and between the two countries (bilateral/international relations). Using the Ontario-Michigan Municipal Solid Waste dispute (1996-2006) as a case study, this thesis advances an organizational framework for the examination of the role of formal and informal interactions in shaping bilateral environmental policy. Through application of this framework, it is revealed that both formal and informal federal level relations in the U.S. prevented sub-national and local level authorities from effectively developing a solution to the dispute. Future studies which apply the organizational framework used in this thesis to other cross-border environmental issues are needed in order to determine whether such conclusions hold true in the case of all cross border disputes.

Canada and the United States are faced with many cross-border environmental issues and therefore must negotiate potential solutions with one another. Complicating such negotiations is the fact that both countries are federal systems which require negotiations and decision-making interactions amongst various levels of government domestically which, in turn, influence and are influenced by bilateral relations. Therefore, this study focuses on governmental relations both within each country (intergovernmental relations) and between the two countries (bilateral/international relations). Using the Ontario-Michigan Municipal Solid Waste dispute (1996-2006) as a case study, this thesis advances an organizational framework for the examination of the role of formal and informal interactions in shaping bilateral environmental policy. Through application of this framework, it is revealed that both formal and informal federal level relations in the U.S. prevented sub-national and local level authorities from effectively developing a solution to the dispute. Future studies which apply the organizational framework used in this thesis to other cross-border environmental issues are needed in order to determine whether such conclusions hold true in the case of all cross border disputes.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

Heather Metcalfe Doctoral Abstract, Ph.D. program, 2009 Department of History, University of Toronto “It’s All About War: Canadian Opinion and the Canadian Approach to International Relations, 1935-1939.” Canadians in the 1930s did not appear eager to focus on foreign affairs. The social and economic difficulties caused by the dislocation of the Great Depression meant that international developments often seemed remote and irrelevant. However, despite this focus on domestic issues, many Canadians were concerned with the trend of international events. As a result, the debate regarding the appropriate Canadian response remained an ongoing, if underlying, factor. In addition, the political issues raised by Canadian foreign policy, particularly through the Canadian involvement in the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations, meant the issue could not simply be ignored. During the later part of the decade, as the possibility of international conflict became ever more likely, increasing numbers of Canadians turned their attention to Canada’s international role. They also turned their attention to what this debate meant in terms of the Canadian sense of identity. These individuals were concerned as well with the response of Canadian public opinion to involvement overseas. This question, of the nature and susceptibility of Canadian public opinion to attempts to direct it, remains an intriguing one. The nature of this response remained open to question, and was the subject of significant debate among Canadian intellectuals, politicians and public figures. In response, a number of individuals and groups, including members of the Canadian press, attempted to influence Canadian public opinion. Many also pressured the Canadian government, led by William Lyon Mackenzie King’s administration, to play a more active role in shaping public opinion. Canadian intellectuals, for instance, influenced by contemporary writings on public opinion, seemed convinced of their natural role as ‘shapers’ of public opinion, particularly in a time of domestic and international crisis. These assumptions, and the ways in which Canadian public opinion both responded to, and rejected these attempts at direction, provide an interesting window into the question of public opinion, particularly in regards to international events. The debate regarding the Canadian response to the crises of the late 1930s can thus aid in gaining a greater appreciation of how public opinion shifts in response to outside challenges and the attempts to influence its course.

Heather Metcalfe Doctoral Abstract, Ph.D. program, 2009 Department of History, University of Toronto “It’s All About War: Canadian Opinion and the Canadian Approach to International Relations, 1935-1939.” Canadians in the 1930s did not appear eager to focus on foreign affairs. The social and economic difficulties caused by the dislocation of the Great Depression meant that international developments often seemed remote and irrelevant. However, despite this focus on domestic issues, many Canadians were concerned with the trend of international events. As a result, the debate regarding the appropriate Canadian response remained an ongoing, if underlying, factor. In addition, the political issues raised by Canadian foreign policy, particularly through the Canadian involvement in the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations, meant the issue could not simply be ignored. During the later part of the decade, as the possibility of international conflict became ever more likely, increasing numbers of Canadians turned their attention to Canada’s international role. They also turned their attention to what this debate meant in terms of the Canadian sense of identity. These individuals were concerned as well with the response of Canadian public opinion to involvement overseas. This question, of the nature and susceptibility of Canadian public opinion to attempts to direct it, remains an intriguing one. The nature of this response remained open to question, and was the subject of significant debate among Canadian intellectuals, politicians and public figures. In response, a number of individuals and groups, including members of the Canadian press, attempted to influence Canadian public opinion. Many also pressured the Canadian government, led by William Lyon Mackenzie King’s administration, to play a more active role in shaping public opinion. Canadian intellectuals, for instance, influenced by contemporary writings on public opinion, seemed convinced of their natural role as ‘shapers’ of public opinion, particularly in a time of domestic and international crisis. These assumptions, and the ways in which Canadian public opinion both responded to, and rejected these attempts at direction, provide an interesting window into the question of public opinion, particularly in regards to international events. The debate regarding the Canadian response to the crises of the late 1930s can thus aid in gaining a greater appreciation of how public opinion shifts in response to outside challenges and the attempts to influence its course.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

Le litige concernant la frontière de l’Oregon, ou la question de l’Oregon, est le résultat des revendications britanniques et américaines pour la région du Pacifique Nord-Ouest de l’Amérique du Nord pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis ont des aspirations territoriales et commerciales sur cette région. La région est pour les Britanniques une zone d’exploitation pour le commerce de la fourrure pour la Compagnie de la Baie d’Hudson, tandis que les Américains y voient une région peuplée de fermiers. Le différend sur l’Oregon est devenu important dans la diplomatie entre l’Empire britannique et la république américaine. / The Oregon boundary dispute, or the Oregon Question, arose as a result of competing British and American claims to the Pacific Northwest of North America in the first half of the 19th century. Both Great-Britain and the United States had territorial and commercial aspirations in the region. For the British, the area was a fur-trading division of the Hudson’s Bay Company, while for the Americans the region was to be settled by farmers. The Oregon dispute became an important diplomatic issue between the British Empire and the American Republic.