Firms must access capital to remain in business.  Small firms have greater difficulty accessing financial resources than have large firms because of their limited access to capital markets.  These difficulties are exacerbated by information asymmetries between a small firm’ s management and capital providers.  It has been theorized that many information asymmetries can be reduced through networks that link those in need of capital with those who can supply it. This research is about these relationships and their impact on the firms’ capital structure. This research has been limited to a sub-set of small firms, family firms.  I have collected data through a survey using a systematic sampling procedure. Both self-administered questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were utilized. The data analysis was based on the responses from two-hundred-and-fifty-six small manufacturing firms in Thailand. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), logistic regression, multiple discriminant analysis and Mann-Whitney U test were employed in the analysis. The hypothesis that firms apply a pecking order in their capital raising was confirmed although the generally accepted rationale based on poor access (and information asymmetries) was rejected.  Instead, at least for family firms, the desire to maintain family control had a significant impact on the use of retained earnings and owner’s savings. My results also indicated that while the depth of relationships had a positive effect on direct funding from family and friends, networks did not facilitate capital access from external providers of funds. Instead direct communications between owner-managers and their capital providers (particularly bank officials) mattered. A comparative analysisof small manufacturing firms in general and small family manufacturing firms revealed that there were differences between them in regard to their financial preferences, suggesting that family firms should be considered separately in small firm research. Further, the results of this research raise some questions about the appropriateness of applying theories directly from one research context to another without due consideration for  the impact of cultural influences. Through this research I have added evidence to the dialogue about small firms from a non-English speaking country by investigating the impact of networks on capital structure and the rationale behind family firm capital structure decisions.

This dissertation consists of two essays on the impact of managerial entrenchment and ethical corporate citizenship on capital structure decisions of the firm. The first essay examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility and capital structure decisions of firms. Agency conflicts and asymmetric information between managers and shareholders of firms exacerbate managerial entrenchment, which is operationalized using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms within the same 3 digits SIC code is the proxy for financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as proxied by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. Results indicate that compared to managers who are not entrenched, entrenched managers obtain less rather than more debt, and they use long-term rather than short-term debt maturity. Also, entrenched managers keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for firms in small and large market value groups compared to medium sized firms. Results do not change before, during, and after the 2008 global economic crisis. The second essay examines the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value in the context of stakeholder theory. Firms listed as World's Most Ethical Companies (WMECs) exemplify ethical corporate citizenship, which is operationalized as a binary variable of 1 for WMECs, and zero for non-WMECs. This paper matches WMECs and non-WMECs control firms in the same 3 digits SIC code, and within 10 percent of total assets. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. Tobin's q is the proxy for firm value, and cost of capital is measured as the market value weighted cost of debt, and cost of equity. Results indicate that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than matched control sample of non-WMECs. Firms led by powerful CEOs have significantly lower cost of debt capital, and lower industry-adjusted Tobin's q than firms led by weak CEOs. The negative impact of CEO power on firm value is consistent with agency theory that self-interested CEOs extract firm value for personal advantage, subject to managerial controls. Results have implications for research and practice in capital structure, corporate governance, CEO compensation, and corporate social responsibility. / Doctor of Philosophy / This study consists of two essays. Essay 1 examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility, and leverage decisions of the firm. Managerial entrenchment is measured using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms measures financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as measured by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. I find that entrenched managers use less debt than managers who are not entrenched. Also, entrenched managers prefer using long-term rather than short-term debt, and they keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for small and large firms compared to medium sized firms. Essay 2 investigates the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value. Ethical corporate citizenship (ECC) refers to firms' commitment to a culture of ethics, effective governance, leadership, and innovation. ECC is measured as a binary variable of one if a firm is listed on World's Most Ethical Companies (WMEC), and zero otherwise. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice that is calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. WMECs and non-WMECs in the same 3 digits standard industry classification, which have similar total assets as the WMECs are compared. I find that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than non-WMECs. Powerful CEOs often utilize their influence to reduce cost of debt capital, but also reduce firm value compared to weak CEOs. Self-interested CEOs who extract firm value for personal advantage partly explains the negative effect of CEO power on firm value.