The first part of the dissertation aims to determine whether and how variances in reinsurance relationships impact insurers' financial performance during the sample period of 2002-2012. Such impact on insurers' financial performance is measured by accounting measurements of ROA and ROE and by the efficiency scores (cost, revenue, and profit) estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA). This essay analyzes how the usage of captive reinsurance affects life insurers’ firm performance using multivariate regression model. Results show that firm performance is negatively related to captive reinsurance arrangements. The second essay analyzes the value effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the global insurance industry by conducting an event study of M&A transactions that occurred during the period of 1990-2014, including two M&A waves before the financial crisis and the M&A activities after it. Our results show that (1) M&As are value-enhancing for both acquirers and targets over the whole sample period; (2) for acquirers, within-border transactions are more likely to be value-enhancing, while for targets, both cross-border and within-border transactions are value-enhancing; and (3) for acquirers, the cross-industry M&As are more likely to be value-enhancing, while for targets both cross- and within- border M&As are value-enhancing. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance

This dissertation discovers an important development in the life reinsurance market and investigates two problems behind the rapid growth of shadow insurance -- the motivation of shadow insurance activities and the underlying risks. The first part investigates why U.S. life insurance groups use shadow insurance, i.e., reinsure their risks using affiliated, unauthorized, and unrated off-balance-sheet entities rather than traditional reinsurers, and how such activities are allocated to individual group members. We find that regulatory arbitrage through shadow insurance activities is motivated by a large deviation from an insurance group's optimal capital structure and is primarily exercised by larger groups with relatively lower capital adequacy. Rather than smoothing capitalization across firms using affiliated reinsurers' capacity, insurance groups allocate the amount of shadow insurance to only a few highly leveraged, less capitalized, and larger life insurers within the group. The se / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance