In this thesis, I examine the factors associated with analysts’ voluntary practice of issuing cash flow forecasts and earnings forecasts on the same day. I draw on Hughes and Pae’s (2004) management partial disclosure equilibrium and predict how an analyst decides to issue a cash flow forecast revision along with and according to her bad news and good news earnings forecast revision. In particular, I predict that analysts strategically choose to supplement earnings forecasts with positive cash flow news when they deliver bad news earnings forecasts. Consistent with my prediction, I find that analysts are more likely to issue cash flow forecast revisions in the opposite direction to their earnings forecast revisions when they issue downward earnings forecast revisions than when they issue upward earnings forecast revisions. The results suggest that analysts may not make their decisions to issue cash flow forecasts as objectively as they ought to do in their role as independent information intermediaries. Rather, analyst decisions to issue cash flow forecasts are akin to managers’ strategic decisions to voluntarily disclose supplemental information to affect investors’ confidence in their primary news (earnings forecasts). / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2009-05-27 16:20:09.248

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