Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Delaware, 2008. / Principal faculty advisors: William Latham, III, Dept. of Economics; and Helen M. Bowers, Dept. of Finance. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (PhD) -- AUT University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references. Also held in print (xi, 120 leaves ; 30 cm.) in City Campus Theses Collection (T 658.422 BAT)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2009. / Title from file title page. Harley E. Ryan, committee chair; Conrad Ciccotello, Omesh Kini, Jayant Kale, committee members. Description based on contents viewed July 1, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 72-74).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Laura Starks. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Com.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-219). Also available via the World Wide Web.

The proposed study examines the effect of CEO-board social connections on corporate policies. Motivated by the independent board view and collaborative board view, I propose two opposing hypotheses explaining the effect of CEO-board connections on corporate policies: monitoring hypothesis and advising hypothesis. In my first essay, I validate the two competing hypotheses of CEO-board connections by investigating the effect of CEO-board connections on monitoring and advising role of the board, and firm valuation. I find that CEO-board connections have a negative effect on board monitoring and positive effect on board advising and firm valuation. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns and different model specifications. Disentangling the Channels, I also show that the predicted effect of CEO-board connections on board monitoring and advising have opposite effects on firm valuation. Lastly, I provide evidence that the effect of CEO-board connections on firm performance is stronger in firms with high growth opportunities. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, for state-owned enterprises, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in Hong Kong stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. However, there is no such pattern for non-SOEs. Second, as a consequence, CEOs' political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance for SOEs. There is no such political connectedness effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in non-SOEs. Third, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can (1) get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and (2) tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem. / Yuan, Qingbo. / Adviser: T.J. Wong. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.