published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Chinese Historical Studies / Master / Master of Arts

No description available.

Over the last twenty years, the People's Republic of China has exhibited behaviour consistent with that of a great power attempting to elevate itself to a global power, with monumental effects on the evolving international order. Unlike rising global powers of the past, China faces two powerful constraints, which have prevented the country from taking the traditional paths of territorial expansion and political-economic domination in order to develop as a global power. The first obstacle has been the presence of the United States, which became the world's only superpower after the cold war. The second is the existence of nuclear weapons, which has made direct great-power conflict unacceptably costly. Faced with these barriers, China has chosen a more distinctive path to greater power acquisition via a post-cold war international system containing more institutions than ever before. The main argument of this thesis is that China's opening to international institutions has developed into a key component, more than that of previous rising global powers, in that country's multilateral approach to foreign policy and to the advancement of state power. This method of power acquisition is in opposition to traditional realist theories, which have not recognised such cooperation as being crucial to global power development. / Within the analyses of this thesis, four case studies of international institutions with which China aligned itself will be assessed using six "goods" which Beijing has been determined to pursue through these institutions (state security, regime security, information acquisition, economic benefits, an improved position vis-a-vis other great powers, and prestige). Two cases are primarily economic institutions, the World Trade Organisation and two "exclusive economic regimes", the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and the newer, more informal "ASEAN-plus-three" (AP3) grouping. The other two cases, primarily strategic organisations, are the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the embryonic Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These case studies illustrate the growing importance which China has placed on international institutions as a means of developing a more effective foreign policy, while simultaneously protecting valuable domestic interests, all in the name of reaching for global power status.

The purpose of this thesis is to outline a framework of analysis for the study of foreign policy and to apply this framework to an analysis of the factors shaping the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. There are two basic approaches to the study of foreign policy. The first, the historical approach, is essentially descriptive and is primarily concerned with improving our factual knowledge of the behaviour of particular states. The second, the anayltical approach, focuses upon state behaviour in general and attempts to formulate valid generalizations about state behaviour. Its ultimate goal is the elaboration of a general theory of foreign policy. Each of these approaches is useful within its respective range. This thesis is concerned solely with an examination of the nature and utility of the analytical approach. [...]

The beginning of the 21st century has born witness to the regional rise of Turkey and global rise of China. The two countries have not only boomed economically but also politically, from their burgeoning role in international politics. Over the course of the 20th century they had little diplomatic relations with each other, despite their centuries old associations. Nevertheless, their bilateral relations have begun to warm up again in the last decade. At the turn of the new century, Turkey readjusted their policy on the Uyghur issue, one of the major obstacles against Turkey and China reinitiating relations after the diplomatic recognition in 1971. A policy orientation study, conducted from 1996 to 2000, resulted in a joint communiqué (signed in 2000) that envisioned an "enhanced partnership" between the two countries. From the year 2000, there was a boost in reciprocal visits and trade between Turkish and Chinese organizations. These relations grew rapidly, and in 2010 Turkish and Chinese prime ministers signed an agreement to upgrade their relationship status from "enhanced partnership" to "strategic partnership". From 2010, Turkey and China started to make surprising moves in fostering political dialogue, cooperating in the space and technology industries, cooperating with each other's militaries and mass investing in the other country's projects. The most important of these relationship-building developments was Turkey's dialogue partnership with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the country's interest in buying military equipment from China. There are additionally many other Turkish developments that have started to become attractive for China in global politics; given Turkey is a longstanding US ally, NATO member, and EU candidate. In light of these developments, while Turkish-Chinese relations have become more significant for international relations, there has been little work on the topic. This thesis, therefore, aims to address this problem. In order to do so, the study first attempts to identify where Turkey and China stand in terms of their international relations. Then, this thesis illustrates and analyzes the contexts that influence Turkey's relationship with China. Finally, this thesis emphasizes the two countries' bilateral relations. In order to effectively research this topic, the student has employed a post-positivist stance for International Relations. Understood from its emphasis on identity and context, constructionist and analytical eclectic approaches will be used to understand the phenomena, Turkish-Chinese relations and its evolution, with the help of realist and constructivist theories, through applying discourse analysis, interviews, participant observations methods.

The foreign policy of imperial China had two major aspects: 1) ideological purity, based on the Chinese cosmological view of the state, and emphasizing the all embracing rule of the Chinese Son of Heaven. 2) Practicality and flexibility, which provided imperial rulers the justification for conducting foreign relations on an equal footing with their neighbors, and allowed for retreat from claims of Chinese superiority, or even paying tribute to "barbarians." These two aspects have been noted and studied previously. In this dissertation I examine the interplay of the twin aspects in Sui-Tang foreign policy decisions and their implementation, how they clashed with or accommodated each other both when China was strong and when it was weak. Chapter I provides a survey of the tribute system, its roots in the pre-Qin period, its development in Han and the challenges it faced in the Period of Division. The Sui-Tang policy of resettlement of the Turks who had submitted, is the theme of Chapter II. The chapter examines the Tang system of the "subordinated area commands and prefectures." The Sui-Tang settlement policy was intended to bring the "barbarians" under Chinese administration and to use the nomads as a military force against other "barbarians." It also drew a distinct line between the non-Chinese and the Chinese so that the "barbarians" would not disturb the Chinese and would undergo a gradual process of sinification. But the success of the policy depended basically on the balance of power. The war policy of the Sui-Tang Chinese towards Koguryŏ, its motives and result are studied in Chapter III. For the better part of a century the Chinese made persistent efforts to establish their administration on the Korean peninsula through force. While there is a contrast between the pragmatism of Emperor Wen on the one hand, and the obsession with military glory of Emperor Yang and Taizong on the other, all three emperors insisted on Chinese superiority over the Koreans and all haconsiderations for frontier security. The differences in their attitudes lay mainly in the extent to which China should claim the superiority. Eventually, the Chinese were quite happy to withdraw beyond the Yalu River and accept Korea as a peaceful tributary. The alliance between Tang and the Uighur empire is the topic of Chapter IV. While before the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion in 755 the Uighurs were at times subjects of Tang, the period after 755 saw the growth of the Uighur empire and the weakening of Tang superiority. In both periods their relations were characterized by an alliance based on common interests. In the latter period the Chinese had to treat the Uighurs as an equal power but the relationship was still maintained under the tribute system, which served to maintain the outward form of Chinese superiority. The seven Tang-Tibetan treaties are discussed in Chapter V. Compared with Tang relations with other peoples, the Tang-Tibetan relationship was remarkably equal. This was shown both in diplomatic reciprocity and in the conclusion of treaties. Nevertheless, some Chinese officials still held strongly to the idea that the Tibetans were "barbarians," which hindered the maintenance of the treaties. In the making of foreign policy in imperial China, the two major aspects, ideological purity and practicality, were reflected in two principles of Confucian doctrine: "the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm," and "having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out." While the first principle represented the ideological purity and provided justification for Chinese expansion, the second stressed practicality, thus the two aspects achieved a balance. / Arts, Faculty of / Asian Studies, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.