With the introduction of the people’s communes in the People’ s Republic of China in 1958, a far-reaching ideological dispute arose between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. In the years following the death of Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had embarked upon a domestic policy which largely ignored many of the directives laid down by the fathers of Communism, and which often subordinated ideological considerations to pragmatic economic considerations. The people's communes embodied an attempt by the Chinese communists to realize all the prerequisites to Communism which the Soviet Union had forsaken in their drive to increase production and thus constituted a challenge to the "revisionist" policies of the Soviet Union. This was especially true in the light of the specific rejection of communes by the Soviet leaders a few months before the Chinese communes were introduced. Moreover, because "anti-party" groups existed both within the Chinese and Soviet parties, and were given ideological support by the opposing party, the dispute over the principles involved in the communes was turned from a theoretical dispute into a concrete struggle with in the separate parties. Besides being an ideological dispute over the correct policies to follow during the transition to Communism, the commune controversy also related directly to the more predominant issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The military significance of the communes provided one such link; the detrimental effect of the communes on the world's image of Communism provided another such link, and the existence of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions within the two parties, provided the other link; the latter situation was especially significant in the commune controversy since the C.P.S.U.’s support for the anti-commune faction of Marshall Peng Teh-huai and Chang Wen-tian, was at the same time support for a faction more in sympathy with the "revisionist" foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In a broader perspective, the commune controversy also raised important issues concerning ideological authority, particularly over questions of domestic policy during the transition to Communism. Since the Chinese party remains determined to proceed with their commune program as soon as economic conditions allow, and since the C.P.S.U. continues to make a more and more liberal interpretation of Communist society, it can be expected that the issues embodied in the commune controversy will continue to be strongly contended by the two parties. Moreover, the fact that the commune issue is related to the more predominant issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, suggests that the debate over the communes will continue as long as differences remain between the two giants of the Communist world. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Doctrine of 1932. Some statistics are also given of the scope of U.S. economic interest in China up to Pearl Harbour. Chapter II delves into FDR's overall attitude toward China, the material help provided her to 1942, the logistics involved in its delivery, and the early American attempts to identify China with the three great powers. Chapter III follows American diplomatic moves to have China accepted by Britain and the U.S.S.R. into the U.N. Organization during its formative years at the Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences and the gradual relegation of China to a secondary role in the war in the Pacific. Chapter IV investigates the complexities of the Stilwell Mission, some Chinese reactions to it, the modest help provided China, and her relative neglect by the three great powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The Yalta concessions to foster the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war in the Pacific are also examined in the context of a planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. Chapter V assesses the relative value of four years of U.S. diplomacy toward China which concentrated on raising the Nationalists to great power status with a seat in the U.N. Security Council whilst ignoring the growing potential for power of the Chinese Communists. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this study is to examine the variables responsible for the fact that Southeast Asian Communist parties sided with Peking In the latter’s ideological dispute with Moscow. The analysis is to a large extent based upon a comparison of Communist journals, the most important being the Peking Review and the World Marxist Review. I have assumed that the latter, controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will print only those items reflecting its interpretation in the dispute. And the former, published by the Communist Party of China, will do likewise. In addition, the author has relied heavily on Western sources which specialize in translating Communist material relating to Sino-Sovlet polemics. The assumption of this paper has been that Southeast Asian Communists would realistically assess which protagonist in the dispute offered the best advice on the question of how to gain power and, consequently, would confer their loyalty to that side. However, after an analysis of differing Chinese and Russian opinions of the best way to obtain power and an examination of the domestic position of the individual Communist parties the above assumption had to be qualified. It was found that although all parties examined opted for the Chinese side, this was not so much a consequence of the greater utility of Chinese- advocated strategy but more a factor of domestic necessity for and Chinese organizational control of the Southeast Asian Communist parties. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The problem driving this research stems from the lack of a systematic and theoretically, informed framework to identify the dynamics of Pakistan is strengthening alignment with China. Pakistan developed close defence and strategic ties with China during the Cold War period as both states balanced against a common adversary i.e. India. However, Pakistan has attempted to bolster and expand its' links with China in the aftermath of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan due to a host of regional and global developments that widened the cracks and increased the mistrust that has existed between Pakistan and U.S. This study hypothesises that Pakistan has maintained a policy of alignment with China prior to 2005 however; from 2005 onwards, Pakistan has attempted to diversify its scope of relations with China as in response to external changes and circumstances in the geopolitical and geo-economic sphere. Therefore, the objective of this research is to analyse why Pakistan has attempted to strengthen its' alignment towards China from 2005 onwards. The existing literature on the subject is outdated, rigorously descriptive and is void of conceptual connections. To address these gaps; this research adopts a theoretical framework of analysis that is informed by neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy analysis to help analyse Pakistan's China policy. This framework offers a two-level analysis of Pakistan's behaviour. The independent variable is the set of system-level drivers such as international power relations, external threat perceptions and international economic interdependencies. The intervening variable, which affects the way Pakistan's decision-makers perceive the system-level developments, is the strategic culture at the unit level. This study suggests that the principle driver of Pakistan's accelerated alignment policy towards China during this period is Pakistan's perceptions of international systemic/structure drivers, which are; the external developments that have occurred in its region. In addition, how Pakistan perceives those external developments is determined by its' strategic culture; which an intervening role. The strategic culture, the author argues, is dominated by Pakistan's distrust of India and, it narrowly confines the idea of Pakistan's national interest to military security whilst neglecting the economic aspect of it. The thesis finds that Pakistan has actively tried to cultivate a broader and robust relationship with China to limit its' dependency on U.S. for strategic, economic and diplomatic support. Pakistan has become increasingly sceptic of the U.S. for its carrots-and-stick approach towards Pakistan. Whereas China has enabled Pakistan to continue in its' revisionist agendas which to some extent are tolerable for China. It finds that growth in China's economic and military power has provided Pakistan with an alternate patron from whom it can procure weapons, conventional and non-conventional and it can seek financial support. This study also finds that although there is evidence of a deeper relationship beyond the traditional security-centric one, however; it is developing into more of a client-patron relationship, given, that Pakistan is increasingly becoming a country highly indebted to China.

China's policy toward the Korean peninsula has shifted from a one-Korea policy to a de facto two-Korea policy. Beijing's constant policy is recognition of Pyongyang as the sole legitimate regime on the peninsula. What Beijing has changed is to acknowledge the existence of the Seoul regime and to inaugurate Sino-South Korean unofficial ties. The main thrust of this research is to examine China's relations with South Korea and North Korea during the period between 1984 and 1989 and to identify the national interests which made Beijing leaders shift their Korea policy. The hypothesis of this study is: China's economic priority is the determining factor and changes in the international environment in East Asia are a contributing factor which made China incrementally shift policy toward the Korean peninsula. The decision to adopt the policy of "revitalizing the economy internally and implementing the open door policy externally" in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1978 resulted in revolutionary changes in Chinese foreign policy. These changes resulted from new foreign policy orientations, namely, pragmatism, the growing magnitude of economic elements, open door policy, and entente diplomacy. These new orientations were able to be applied to the Korean case when changes in the Northeast Asian international milieu provided chances in the early 1980s. These changes were the growing positive Sino-Soviet relations, the emergence of South Korea as an economic power, the improvement of Soviet-North Korean relations, and the failure of North Korean diplomacy. Through empirical studies of Chinese foreign behavior and official media, the hypothesis is proven valid. In the early 1980s, China evidently changed its Korean policy priority from strategic interests to political interests with a desire for a peaceful international environment. The growing unofficial Beijing-Seoul contacts show that China desires to pursue its economic interests in South Korea but under the premise of not jeopardizing its relations with North Korea. This line will not change until North Korea is willing to accept cross-recognition.

In studying Western, especially French, imperialist action in China during the nineteenth century, this thesis argues that contemporary Sino-Western relations took various forms across various social strata on both sides, and the general terms used to classify them are erroneous: in effect, there was no "Chinese" response to "the West," since there were several, and vice-versa. In the first main section of the thesis, the historiographical accepted wisdom about China's reactions to Western intrusion are repudiated or qualified. The next section of the thesis deals with French imperialism, through the eyes of the French and other Westerners. In so far as one can speak generally of French aims, it is demonstrated that the French both at home and abroad in general exploited China almost solely for national prestige. The next part looks at the variety of responses among four classes of Chinese people to Western intrusion, and the lasting legacy of Western thought as it relates to change in China. It is posited that although imperialist actions certainly served as a catalyst for Chinese nationalism, the transition between "traditional" and "modern" China was not a completely new break caused entirely by Western influence, but a series of rational changes brought about at least as much by China's domestic structure as external relations. / Graduation date: 1999

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

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University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration