University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of Government and Public Administration

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No description available.

With the introduction of the people’s communes in the People’ s Republic of China in 1958, a far-reaching ideological dispute arose between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. In the years following the death of Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had embarked upon a domestic policy which largely ignored many of the directives laid down by the fathers of Communism, and which often subordinated ideological considerations to pragmatic economic considerations. The people's communes embodied an attempt by the Chinese communists to realize all the prerequisites to Communism which the Soviet Union had forsaken in their drive to increase production and thus constituted a challenge to the "revisionist" policies of the Soviet Union. This was especially true in the light of the specific rejection of communes by the Soviet leaders a few months before the Chinese communes were introduced. Moreover, because "anti-party" groups existed both within the Chinese and Soviet parties, and were given ideological support by the opposing party, the dispute over the principles involved in the communes was turned from a theoretical dispute into a concrete struggle with in the separate parties. Besides being an ideological dispute over the correct policies to follow during the transition to Communism, the commune controversy also related directly to the more predominant issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The military significance of the communes provided one such link; the detrimental effect of the communes on the world's image of Communism provided another such link, and the existence of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions within the two parties, provided the other link; the latter situation was especially significant in the commune controversy since the C.P.S.U.’s support for the anti-commune faction of Marshall Peng Teh-huai and Chang Wen-tian, was at the same time support for a faction more in sympathy with the "revisionist" foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In a broader perspective, the commune controversy also raised important issues concerning ideological authority, particularly over questions of domestic policy during the transition to Communism. Since the Chinese party remains determined to proceed with their commune program as soon as economic conditions allow, and since the C.P.S.U. continues to make a more and more liberal interpretation of Communist society, it can be expected that the issues embodied in the commune controversy will continue to be strongly contended by the two parties. Moreover, the fact that the commune issue is related to the more predominant issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, suggests that the debate over the communes will continue as long as differences remain between the two giants of the Communist world. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this study is to examine the variables responsible for the fact that Southeast Asian Communist parties sided with Peking In the latter’s ideological dispute with Moscow. The analysis is to a large extent based upon a comparison of Communist journals, the most important being the Peking Review and the World Marxist Review. I have assumed that the latter, controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will print only those items reflecting its interpretation in the dispute. And the former, published by the Communist Party of China, will do likewise. In addition, the author has relied heavily on Western sources which specialize in translating Communist material relating to Sino-Sovlet polemics. The assumption of this paper has been that Southeast Asian Communists would realistically assess which protagonist in the dispute offered the best advice on the question of how to gain power and, consequently, would confer their loyalty to that side. However, after an analysis of differing Chinese and Russian opinions of the best way to obtain power and an examination of the domestic position of the individual Communist parties the above assumption had to be qualified. It was found that although all parties examined opted for the Chinese side, this was not so much a consequence of the greater utility of Chinese- advocated strategy but more a factor of domestic necessity for and Chinese organizational control of the Southeast Asian Communist parties. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This paper will present a study of the Far East Agreements of the Yalta Conference, held from February 4-11, 1945, and will trace them through to their conclusion in the agreements signed by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China in August of the same year. These wartime agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, subscribed to by Great Britain and later Nationalist China, reflected then existing distributions of power. The Far East Agreements, on the part of the United States, were concluded in the national self-interest of the United States for reasons thought necessary at the time. The majority of the information in this paper was obtained from United States Government documents and first-hand accounts by men who took part in, or observed at meetings and conferences that dealt with the issues being discussed. Reed College documents library supplied the greater bulk of the material, with additional materials being obtained at Portland State University library and Multnomah County library. All other information was obtained on order through the offices of Portland State University library from various libraries throughout the Pacific Northwest. A background and history of the issues are presented to give the reader the proper perspective before the issues are discussed. Strategic positions and conditions of World War II, both prior to and after the Yalta Conference are presented to give the reader a further knowledge of the conditions surroundings the issues discussed. The actual negotiations involving the Far East Agreements and the Sino-Soviet agreements are discussed in greater detail. Certain of the concessions regarding China agreed upon by the United States at the Yalta Conference were thought necessary at the time. Though it was known that these concessions were made at the expense of China the conclusions drawn in this paper will show that the Far East Agreements were a compromise of the continuing viability of the great powers, pending the final defeat of Japan, and not a compromise of principles on the part of the United States, as believed by many historians and critics. In the late 1940’s, and early 1950’s, after the Chinese Communists assumed the predominant position in China, these agreements came under heavy attack and criticism from many sources, including a Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. This paper will show that much of the criticism and many of the critics were completely unjustified in their beliefs, in that they failed to look at the complete picture and benefited greatly from hindsight. The Far East Agreements were not a radical shift in American China policy. They were not a radical change in traditional American policy. They were thought necessary for both military and political reasons. These agreements were a carefully worked out plan to accomplish three goals: (1) to insure the Soviet participation in the Pacific War at the earliest possible date; (2) to bring about the best possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government of China; and (3) to limit Soviet expansion in China and prevent China from being divided and torn apart after the war. With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations in August of 1945, it was thought that these three goals had been accomplished.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.