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Doctrine of 1932. Some statistics are also given of the scope of U.S. economic interest in China up to Pearl Harbour. Chapter II delves into FDR's overall attitude toward China, the material help provided her to 1942, the logistics involved in its delivery, and the early American attempts to identify China with the three great powers. Chapter III follows American diplomatic moves to have China accepted by Britain and the U.S.S.R. into the U.N. Organization during its formative years at the Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences and the gradual relegation of China to a secondary role in the war in the Pacific. Chapter IV investigates the complexities of the Stilwell Mission, some Chinese reactions to it, the modest help provided China, and her relative neglect by the three great powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The Yalta concessions to foster the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war in the Pacific are also examined in the context of a planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. Chapter V assesses the relative value of four years of U.S. diplomacy toward China which concentrated on raising the Nationalists to great power status with a seat in the U.N. Security Council whilst ignoring the growing potential for power of the Chinese Communists. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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This thesis examines America's post-Cold War relations with China in the context of the neoliberal vs. neorealist debate. It concludes that neorealism - the dominant school of thought in the international relations literature - is incapable of explaining America's response to China's rise in the post-Cold War era. Because America was the leading global power and China was its most obvious potential rival, a neorealist theory that prioritized the distribution of relative power would anticipate this relationship to be a most-likely case for American policymakers to pursue containment and prioritize relative gains. However, I leverage insights from more than 100 personal interviews to demonstrate that in reality American leaders have overwhelmingly preferred a strategy of neoliberal engagement with China that has remained decidedly positive-sum in nature. My explanation for this consistent, bipartisan preference is that American policymakers have not adopted the neorealist assumption that conflict is inevitable between existing and rising great powers. As a result, policymakers have not focused exclusively on how to minimize the relative costs of a potential conflict with China by trying to contain China's relative power and limit America' exposure to China (as they did with the Soviet Union in the Cold War). Instead, policymakers have subscribed to the neoliberal belief that conflict can be avoided, and that increasing engagement and interdependence is the best strategy to maintain peace. They have pursued this strategy despite acknowledging that engagement and interdependence have increased the costs of a potential conflict by helping to facilitate China's rise in both an absolute and relative sense, and by increasing America's exposure to China. This thesis helps to define the differences between hedging and containing strategies. It argues that while relative material power is often important in deciding whether to hedge or not hedge, these purely material calculations play no role in decisions of whether to pursue containment or engagement. Instead, the decision to contain or not hinges on the target state's behavior and what that reveals about the regime's underlying intentions. Within this new framework, I argue that American policymakers' strategy has been to engage China economically while simultaneously hedging militarily. Furthermore, to the extent that American policymakers have expressed increased concerns about China in recent years, this has been primarily a consequence of China's increased assertiveness - not changes in its relative power.

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University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

The continued funding of America's persistent trade and fiscal deficits has sparked debate among international economists. One controversial explanation argues that East Asia is pursuing "Bretton Woods II" and funding American deficits as part of a greater development policy. This paper examines the Chinese policy response to the global economic crisis and finds that China's policy actions provide evidence for "Bretton Woods II." Furthermore, the Sino-American relationship is now characterized by codependence which has implications for the policy decisions of each country.

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