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This study argues that despite the basic inertia in U.S. China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years, the period nonetheless witnessed a fundamental evolution in the strategic presumptions underlying Washington’s approach to the China “problem.” By increments, U.S. policymakers began to seriously question the wisdom of a policy predicated on the idea that the containment of the People’s Republic of China necessitated its political and economic isolation. Inversely, a basic consensus emerged in interested corners of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy that considered attempts to engage the Chinese—on levels bilateral and multilateral, official and unofficial—could serve to socialise China’s revolutionaries, thereby facilitating a reduction in Sino-American tensions and paving the way to a bilateral rapprochement. Critically, in this analysis “engagement” was seen as a means of enhancing, rather than simply supplanting, the larger effort to contain China. The dynamics involved in the emergence of this consensus are manifold and complex, and cannot be properly understood without close reference to changes in both the international strategic environment and the domestic political context through the 1960s. At the heart of this process, however, were advocates of policy moderation within the U.S. bureaucracy, mediating external pressures for policy movement, and championing the case for a more conciliatory approach to Sino-American relations. The growing acceptance of what was sometimes articulated as “containment without isolation”—shorthand for a policy framework that implicitly rejects the either/or choice between containment and engagement—found expression in, and was in turn fostered by, basic adjustments in Washington’s posture toward Mao’s China. By the end of 1968 senior U.S. officials had repeatedly signalled that Washington was reconciled to the reality of a Communist-controlled mainland China, and would in fact welcome expanded efforts toward bilateral accommodation and even cooperation. These postural shifts may not have been matched by concrete policy changes, yet they remain significant. In the most immediate sense, the less provocative posture toward China enhanced Washington’s capacity to communicate U.S. intent to China’s leadership, thereby helping avert a direct Sino-American conflict in the 1960s, even as the two sides pursued antithetical objectives in the Asian region. In a longer-term frame of reference, the more flexible posture adopted in the 1960s played an important role in challenging the domestic politicisation of China policy, while establishing a rhetorical framework and conceptual foundation for more substantive policy movement. In the course of tracing these developments, this study also provides new interpretative insights on a number of specific issues pertaining to U.S. China policy in the Kennedy and Johnson years, including the policy preferences, relationships, and roles of key U.S. officials in shaping the policy process; the impact of domestic politics, alliance politics, and various Cold War strategic concerns on policy outcomes; the question of how to deal with China’s nuclear development; and the manner in which major China-related events and developments in the 1960s—such as the failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the 1962 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, China’s involvement in Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution— were interpreted by U.S. officials, and, in turn, shaped understandings of and responses to the China problem. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1330812 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008

Orientador: Sebastião Carlos Velasco e Cruz / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T21:50:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ferreira_KellydeSouza_M.pdf: 993965 bytes, checksum: 3ef539284f8c3b0704d3e65c6c8c217e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Nas últimas duas décadas, os Estados Unidos aumentaram substancialmente sua presença na Ásia Central. Por sua vez, a China sempre buscou construir um ambiente estável e pacífico ao redor de seu próprio território, tendo sob sua influência todos os países da Ásia Central; por isso,o incremento da presença norte-americana na região causou desconforto nos políticos chineses. Uma das formas utilizadas pelos últimos para se aproximar dos países dessa região se dá por meio do petróleo. Dessa forma, as companhias de petróleo da China compram direitos de exploração de reservas ou indústrias de petróleo e gás natural de países da Ásia Central e, por meio das empresas chinesas, estabelece e aprofunda os laços de amizade com países como Cazaquistão, Quirguistão, Uzbequistão, Turcomenistão e Tadjiquistão. A prática ficou conhecida como diplomacia do petróleo. Essa nova ferramenta do governo chinês possibilita um duplo efeito: aumentar a projeção chinesa e diluir a influência norte-americana na região, o que desagrada os Estados Unidos, que, por sua vez, buscam ser ainda mais presentes na Ásia Central. O objetivo desta pesquisa é: como a diplomacia do petróleo possibilita um duplo efeito: aumentar a projeção chinesa e diluir a influência norte-americana na região. E como os Estados Unidos usa sua presença na Ásia Central e nas rotas marítimas de transporte de petróleo para conter a expansão chinesa / Abstract: In the last two decades, the United States have substantially increased their presence in Central Asia. Therefore their presence left China in an uncomfortable position, as China seeks to build a stable and peaceful environment in its near abroad, having under its influence all the countries of Central Asia. One of the ways used by the Chinese government to get closer to the countries of this region is through the oil. Being so, the Chinese oil companies buy rights of exploitation of oil and gas reserves in Central Asia and through this establishes and deepens friendly ties with these countries. This practice became known as oil diplomacy. This new tool of the Chinese government has a double effect: it increases the projection of the Chinese power and dilutes the American influence in the region. In other words, it displeases the United States, and in turn tries to be even more present in Central Asia. The main goal to be worked in this study is how the oil diplomacy increases Chinese influence in Central Asia and dilutes American power in the region. It also aims to explain how the United States uses its presence in Central Asia and on sea lines of communication used to transport oil to contain the Chinese expansion / Mestrado / Paz, Defesa e Segurança Internacional / Mestre em Relações Internacionais

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many authors, critics, and policy makers question the presence of a unified grand strategy with which the United States has striven toward in recent years. This is a topic worthy of pursuit since such a strategy is responsible for identifying how this nation intends to accomplish its goals. This thesis defines what, if any, grand strategy the United States is currently pursuing. It observes several prominent theories of grand strategy, from both the realist and liberal perspectives. This analysis is set in context of historical grand strategy decisions since World War II and uses the framework of Taiwan as the case study. The thesis then compares the three theories, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, and the Liberal Milieu and their recommendations to real-world activities of the United States with a focus primarily on military deployments and national objectives. The study reveals that of the three in question, the Liberal Milieu grand strategy is the only one that is supported by ongoing deployments in the East Asia region as well as by the national rhetoric which define our policy objectives.