The literature on gender, peace and security and the growing body of critiques of contemporary peacebuilding have developed largely in isolation from one another. Although there have been some recent attempts to make linkages between the two, specific feminist critiques of the liberal peacebuilding consensus are lacking. This is despite the potentially valuable contribution that such a merging could bring to our understanding of both the goals and the means through which peacebuilding is understood and practiced by the international community. Furthermore, applying the critiques of liberal peacebuilding approaches could also deepen the analysis and cast light on the way that the international community integrates gender issues into peacebuilding processes, and the inherent problems in their approach. This thesis will contribute to bridging this gap by drawing on both sets of literature, and through an in-depth case study of Sierra Leone, will assess the UN's efforts to integrate gender issues into its peacebuilding policies and programming from 2002-2007. The central argument of the thesis is that the international community's gender and peacebuilding agenda in Sierra Leone is based on liberal feminist assumptions which inherently limit and challenge the extent to which the UN has been able to bring about a positive transformation in gender roles and relations. By contrasting UN liberal peacebuilding with the locally-rooted and context- specific experiences and approaches of women's organisations and networks working for peace at the community and national levels in Sierra Leone, this thesis will argue that building on these informal activities may represent an opportunity for a more emancipatory and gender-sensitive form of peacebuilding.

This dissertation explores the process of building peace in terms of the making of complex legitimacy in post-Soviet, post-conflict Tajikistan. Since 2000, Tajikistan's citizens have seen major political violence end, order across the country return and the peace agreement between the parties of the 1990s civil war hold. Superficially, Tajikistan appears to be a case of successful international interventions based on neoliberal internationalist assumptions. Yet, puzzlingly, the inter-Tajik peace is interpreted in a variety of often contradictory ways and correlates with authoritarian government and the tenure of a new oligarchy. On closer inspection it is evident that neoliberal international interventions in Tajikistan have largely failed to achieve the aims of peacebuilding. However, I argue they have served to facilitate an increasingly authoritarian peace and have indirectly fostered popular accommodation and avoidance strategies, as well as localised resistance. Moreover, this peace is founded upon complex relations of legitimacy. It is the product of discourse (the formation of community through communication), politics (the acquisition of power and authority in that community), and space (the differentiation of that community from other communities). I study the political relations between three discourse/spaces ('selves') of Tajikistan from 2000 to 2005: those of subordinates, elites, and the international community. In addition to the discourse and spaces of neoliberal international peacebuilding, are those of popular tinji (Tajik: 'peacefulness'/ 'wellness') and elite mirostroitelstvo (Russian: 'peacebuilding'). In studying the relationships between subordinate, elite and international actors I show how they both accommodate one another via discursive re-interpretation, and avoid each other by retreating into their own 'hidden' spaces and transcripts. These intrinsically political practices have specific material impacts on people's lives. Moreover, I show how they have constituted new forms of authority, livelihoods and sovereignty. In each of these cases, subordinates resign themselves to power and 'peacefulness' and get on with their lives. These practices constitute peace as complex legitimacy.

The pulling nature of crises on the 'frontiers' stimulates Western interventionism focused on state building. This interventionism is fundamentally dependent upon collaboration with indigenous politics and 'collaborative systems', the relationships linking interventionist actors with indigenous ones, determine its structure and dynamics. State building interventions rely on collaborative systems because they define the interface of the external forces of the intervening power with indigenous politics. Unless the energy and resources of the intervening power can be translated and internalised into terms of indigenous politics, the intervention will be unable to achieve its state building goals. Presently, Western states are both failing to build appropriate collaborative systems and to manage their collaborative partners. However, if Western states can improve their approach to and implementation of collaboration with indigenous politics, they can better manage insecurity on the frontiers through state-building interventionism.

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the emergence, nature, and significance of non-state transnational governance. This research objective is pursued by examining an aspect of transnational non-state governance often neglected, the role of the state in the emergence and operation of non-state governance schemes. The role of the state in this context is illuminated by identifying and explaining the emergence of a particular type of authority, called transnational regulatory authority. Transnational regulatory authority emerges when the authority of creating regulation bearing a degree of legal obligation about an issue-area or industry at a global level, is delegated to non-state actors. This delegation of regulatory authority is puzzling, as it implies a loss of regulators' control over the regulatory governance of their jurisdictions, but also raises significant normative concerns, since authority has been entrusted to the state under specific procedures which form the very foundation of a democratic political association. An explanation to this puzzle is proposed by a theoretical framework created through the synthesis of insights provided by the economic theory of international regulation and the political theory of authority. The propositions that emerge from this synthesis are tested through the examination of two case-studies, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceutical Products (ICH). The principal finding of the thesis is that the delegation of rule-making authority to transnational organizations is the result of explicit redistributive regulatory strategies, domestic or international, designed to satisfy specific domestic constituencies. However, regulators need to allay the normative concerns raised by this delegation of authority. To do this, they have to justify their decision by persuading the political establishment and the public that this delegation is necessary for the provision of adequate regulatory governance.

This thesis addresses Anglo-French intelligence liaison between 1909 and 1940. It seeks to illuminate relations between Britain and France in this turbulent period and to consider the processes and outcomes of intelligence cooperation between sovereign states as a phenomenon. A theoretical framework for intelligence liaison is used to examine examples derived from the Anglo-French case over this thirty-year period, How intelligence liaison functioned and what benefits and drawbacks participation in liaison brought to the British and French are highlighted, During the three decades addressed in this thesis, Anglo-French relations were ambiguous: allied twice in the period, the two countries were also rivals. The contradictory nature of Anglo-French relations provided the context for intelligence cooperation, which functioned during peacetime mostly at a micro-level through professional individuals. During war, liaison was heightened, and formal mechanisms for cooperation were employed. Liaison occurred over political, operational and technical intelligence. Reasons for the discernible gap between peacetime liaison and wartime cooperation are explored. Important themes examined include the role of the individual and their personality in intelligence cooperation and the role of national stereotyping in intelligence liaison.

This thesis examines the role played by the pro-Israel lobby during the Clinton Presidency, a time which could be described as one the most crucial moments in the history of United States involvement of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Overall, this research challenges the idea of an all-powerful or monolithic "Israel Lobby", a concept most famously put forward by Mearsheimer and Walt (2006, 2007). The thesis argues that understanding how it is possible for United States foreign policy to operate in a seemingly consistent pro-Israel direction, requires a consideration of American identity and the various but limited types of structured foreign policy discourse(s) this identity creates. I argue that the visibility of pro-Israel groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) stems from its ability to operate within and utilise existing themes within foreign policy discourse to reproduce, reinforce and amplify representations of subjects and objects and strategic priorities in ways which are compatible with policy preferences.

What determines whether states pursuing nuclear weapons ultimately acquire them. More specifically, why do so few states stay committed to their nuclear weapons programmes over time. Theories of nuclear proliferation have not accounted for the causal role of external systemic factors and domestic agents in defining the political sustainability of nuclear weapons programmes. The efforts of entrepreneurial alliances between nuclear bureaucrats and governmental sponsors determine whether states remain committed to pursuing, and thus acquire, nuclear weapons. These alliances employ three causal mechanisms in seeking to secure their states' commitment to their nuclear weapons programmes: linking nuclear weapons with external threats, overcome resistance to investing in a nuclear infrastructure, and institutional 'insulation' from domestic critics. The entrepreneurial alliances are enabled and constrained by the economic and security environments facing their states. The entrepreneurial alliance hypothesis is tested in a series of case studies. First, the hypothesis is applied to detailed analyses of Libya and Iraq's nuclear weapons programmes. The hypothesis is tested as an explanation for why these states pursued nuclear weapons yet failed to acquire them. Furthermore, these cases facilitate process-tracing of the causal mechanisms and processes determining the outcomes of each state's nuclear weapons programme. Then, the hypothesis is applied to a corroborative analysis of four smaller case studies: India, Pakistan, Egypt and Australia. These cases include two authoritarian and two non-authoritarian states comprising two successful nuclear weapons programmes (India and Pakistan) and two that failed to cross the nuclear weapons threshold (Egypt and Australia). The entrepreneurial alliance hypothesis is found to provide a strong and unique explanation for what determines whether states pursuing nuclear weapons ultimately cross the nuclear weapons threshold. This framework identifies the determinants of the political sustainability of a nuclear weapons programme and what factors influence a state's prospects for acquiring such weapons.

No description available.

The thesis provides a systematic understanding of the media-government relationship in the conduct of foreign policy and a rigorous approach of the media's role and impact on decision - making processes. It particularly covers a deficiency in the existing literature, with regard to the media's potential to Influence decision outcomes and cause policy changes. The thesis is a theory-based investigation while a case study is employed for illustration purposes. The thesis approaches the media within the context of an interaction with the government that reflects a complex interconnection of the media and politicians' decisions and is here explored with the employment of rational choice and game theory. The thesis develops a game - theoretic model, which identifies the media as a purposeful actor rather than a mere instrument in the hands of politicians; and provides a rigorous interpretation of the media - government relationship as one between two profit - maximising actors. It examines the payoffs and costs entailed in their decisions within this interaction, and concentrates on the potential influence that media decisions have on the government's payoffs. In this model, the media influence is conceptuallsed as an outcome of their ability to frame information according to their self-interests, which are tied to their organisational structure and lead to the production of audience - driven news stories. With the introduction of framing theory the thesis demonstrates the power inherent in the media's content to affect the recipient's perception of a given situation; and with the aid of prospect theory, it incorporates media frames into the decision-making process and exhibits their potential implications on perceptions of the risk entailed in political decision - making. The model develops a strategic cause - effect relationship between media frames and governmental decisions that is applied to and tested through the press coverage of two Greek - Turkish territorial crises. The investigation of the two events within the game - theoretic framework draws upon the media's power to create conditions of domestic/national cost for the government that can trigger apparently irrational and risky decisions. The findings suggest a strategic media impact on decision making processes and highlight the media's role as an actor plausible to affect decision outcomes and cause policy changes independent of the policy at hand.

This dissertation deals with the American military build-up of 1950-1951, a crucial event in starting the Cold War arms race. It examines the decision to initiate the arms build-up, and some consequences of that decision. In considering the beginning of the arms build-up, it accounts for the influence of external events, such as Soviet and European capabilities and actions, as well as internal factors, including public pressure and lobbying. In doing so, it seeks to assess the relative importance of the object being perceived, the Soviet military, and the lens through which that object was viewed, the political culture of the American foreign policy establishment. The dissertation makes critical judgements as to the timing, nature, and cause of the arms build-up. It argues that the critical period was between 25 June 1950 and 19 September 1950, that the decisive influence came from the President, and not from the military, and that it was the perception of the Soviet threat in Central Europe that was important, not the war in Korea.