This dissertation deals with the American military build-up of 1950-1951, a crucial event in starting the Cold War arms race. It examines the decision to initiate the arms build-up, and some consequences of that decision. In considering the beginning of the arms build-up, it accounts for the influence of external events, such as Soviet and European capabilities and actions, as well as internal factors, including public pressure and lobbying. In doing so, it seeks to assess the relative importance of the object being perceived, the Soviet military, and the lens through which that object was viewed, the political culture of the American foreign policy establishment. The dissertation makes critical judgements as to the timing, nature, and cause of the arms build-up. It argues that the critical period was between 25 June 1950 and 19 September 1950, that the decisive influence came from the President, and not from the military, and that it was the perception of the Soviet threat in Central Europe that was important, not the war in Korea.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:645515 |
| Date | January 1998 |
| Creators | Ojserkis, Raymond |
| Publisher | London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2607/ |
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