by Chau Ho Wai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-140). / Abstract also in Chinese. / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / ABBREVIATIONS --- p.vi / CHAPTER / Chapter ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- The Question: How the civil-military relations evolved during the post-Deng era? / Chapter 1.2 --- The Case of the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis / Chapter 1.3 --- Framework: Allison's Model of Decision-Making / Chapter 1.4 --- Data and Organization / Chapter TWO --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1 --- Non-Communist Regimes / Chapter 2.2 --- Communist Regimes / Chapter 2.3 --- Post-Communist World / Chapter 2.4 --- Military Politics in China / Chapter THREE --- INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF PLA: FROM DENG TO POST-DENG ERA --- p.34 / Chapter 3.1 --- PLA in the Deng Era / Chapter 3.2 --- PLA in the Post-Deng Era / Chapter 3.3 --- "Professionalization, Differentiation and Institutionalization" / Chapter FOUR --- ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS OF PLA IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS --- p.64 / Chapter 4.1 --- The War Games and the Policy Handle / Chapter 4.2 --- Employing the Organizational Process Model / Chapter 4.3 --- Organizational Interests and Demands of the PLA / Chapter 4.4 --- Information Processing of the PLA / Chapter 4.5 --- Resource Acquisitions of the PLA / Chapter FIVE --- BRINGING THE PLA INTERESTS INTO GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS --- p.100 / Chapter 5.1 --- Employing the Governmental Politics Model / Chapter 5.2 --- Perspectives of Jiang Zemin and PLA on the Taiwan Question / Chapter 5.3 --- Political Pulls and Hauls in the Taiwan Straits Crisis / Chapter 5.4 --- Legitimacy and Leadership Succession / Chapter SIX --- CONCLUSION --- p.126 / Chapter 6.1 --- Summary of Findings / Chapter 6.2 --- Prospects of Future Research / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.134

This three-paper dissertation merges theory and practice to explore the internationalpolitical economy (IPE) of emerging technologies, with a focus on artificial intelligence (AI). Through three interconnected papers, it examines how states and firms interact in a dynamic cycle of action and reaction around technological development. The first two papers explore complementary aspects of this relationship: how states strategically invest in emerging technologies, and how other states react to these investments and technological progress through economic coercion. The third paper then reveals a crucial causal mechanism underlying both state investment decisions and coercive responses—how states gauge each other’s technological capabilities through the actions of firms. Together, these papers explore how states optimize investment strategies, impose economic sanctions, and gauge technological capabilities based on firm actions. The first paper addresses the core problem of balancing state investments against the risk of foreign restrictions in strategic sectors. It highlights how sectoral characteristics, such as capital intensity and reliance on global networks, influence the relative importance of state investment and foreign access. It then offers a game theoretic framework to explain how governments determine their optimal investment levels based on the trade-off between the two factors. To test the empirical viability of the theory, I use comparative case studies of the semiconductor and AI sectors in China and the space technology and robotics sectors in the U.S. The second paper investigates the timing of economic sanctions through the framework of “calculated coercion.” Using a dynamic game theory model, this paper argues that states often impose sanctions not when their leverage is strongest but when it is at the brink of erosion. This theory explains why the U.S. imposed semiconductor export controls as China neared technological independence, why Russia weaponized energy exports as Europe diversified its energy sources, and why China has so far refrained from weaponizing its manufacturing leverage. These findings reveal that, paradoxically, attempts at pursuing economic independence could trigger economic coercion. The third paper turns the attention to the role of firms, focusing on how states gauge each others’ capabilities through the capabilities of firms. Using the case of Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo AI model release in 2016, the paper employs the synthetic control method and a unique dataset of over 11,000 Chinese military publications to show how AlphaGo’s release served as a “Sputnik moment” for China, spurring a significant increase in military AI publications by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Qualitative analysis confirm the hypothesis that the Chinese military used DeepMind’s capabilities as a signal for U.S. AI power. Together, these three papers contribute to the understanding of the IPE dynamics of AI, revealing how states navigate emerging technologies, global competition, and geopolitical tensions.

魏英杰. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 189-196) / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Wei Yingjie.