O Direito Internacional da Concorrência é o ramo do direito que protege o exercício da liberdade de concorrência. Liberdade esta que, com o desenvolvimento do mundo globalizado, vem sendo atacada pelas multinacionais, causando prejuízo às economias tanto locais quanto internacionais, assim como aos consumidores, se fazendo necessária a intervenção estatal para regulação desses conflitos. Entretanto, emerge um novo conflito quando o Estado detém o controle acionário de uma empresa, como é o caso das empresas estatais. Tal panorama vem se agravando e causando conflitos concorrenciais no cenário global. A China, país em que tradicionalmente o governo detinha controle de todas as empresas nele constituídas, após a abertura de mercado, vem adotando constantes reformas de políticas de mercado com o viés de introduzir a alta tecnologia e expandir as relações comerciais com os demais países do mundo. Hodiernamente, após as reformas comerciais e estruturais das empresas estatais, a China determinou que setores-chave considerados importantes para segurança econômica chinesa serão de controle estatal, isto é, com monopólio estatal. Isto posto, a presente investigação procurou verificar se as empresas estatais chinesas estariam abusando de sua posição dominante para além das fronteiras e infringindo, sobretudo, a própria legislação concorrencial da China, cuja promulgação fora exigida pelos demais membros da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A investigação se dividiu em três partes essenciais: primeiro sobre as transformações econômicas, mercantis, sociais e jurídicas chinesas, principalmente no período posterior ao século XX; na segunda parte, se tratou do direito concorrencial na China, confrontando-o com as empresas estatais; e no último capítulo, foram verificados casos administrativos e judiciais perante os órgãos de regulamentação concorrencial. Pretendeu-se, pelo método dedutivo de pesquisa, verificar se a dicotomia formada entre a proteção governamental às empresas estatais fere a liberdade de um mercado competitivo. Buscou-se, assim, verificar se a atividade das empresas estatais chinesas ocupou fatia relevante de mercado a ponto de abusar da sua posição dominante e se é a China um palco para a aplicação de penalidades, visando à ordem e à liberdade concorrencial. Conclui-se que ocorre tratamento desigual na imposição de penalidades por práticas de abuso de posição dominante quando se tratam de empresas estrangeiras e empresas estatais chinesas. Denotou-se por meio da análise casuística que os esforços dos órgãos de fiscalização concorrencial chineses no combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais são alcançados, até o presente momento, quando versam sobre empresas estrangeiras, enquanto que as empresas estatais recebem tratamento dessemelhante e permissivo às práticas monopolistas. / The International Competition Law is the law that protects the freedom of competition. Freedom of which, with the development of the globalized world, comes under attack by multinationals, causing damage to the economies both local and international, as well as consumers, making it necessary the state intervention to regulate these conflicts. However, emerges into a new conflict when the state holds a controlling stake of the company, such as state-owned enterprises. This scenario has been growing worse and causing conflicts competitive on the global stage. China, which traditionally held control of all companies set up in it, after the opening of the market, has been adopting constant market policy reforms with the bias to introduce high technology and expanding trade relations with other countries worldwide. In our times, after trade and structural reforms of state-owned enterprises, China has determined that key sectors of the economy considered important to China's economic security will be of state control. Accordingly, the present investigation sought to ascertain whether chinese state-owned enterprises were abusing their dominant position beyond the borders and in particular violating China's own competition law, which was demanded by the other members of the World Trade Organization The investigation was divided into three essential parts: first on the chinese economic, mercantile, social and legal transformations, mainly in the period after the twentieth century; on the second part, it dealt with competition law in China, confronting it with state enterprises; and in the last chapter, administrative and judicial cases were verified before the regulatory bodies of competition. It was intended, by the deductive method of research, to verify if the dichotomy formed between governmental protection of state-owned enterprises hurts the freedom of a competitive market. It was therefore sought to ascertain whether the activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises occupied a relevant market share to the extent of abusing its dominant position and whether China is a stage for the application of penalties for order and competitive freedom. It is concluded that there is unequal treatment in the imposition of consequences for abuse of dominant positions when dealing with foreign companies and chinese state-owned enterprises. The case-by-case analysis has shown that the efforts of Chinese competition authorities in the fight against anticompetitive practices have so far been reached when dealing with foreign companies, while state-owned enterprises are treated differently and permissively from monopoly practices.

O Direito Internacional da Concorrência é o ramo do direito que protege o exercício da liberdade de concorrência. Liberdade esta que, com o desenvolvimento do mundo globalizado, vem sendo atacada pelas multinacionais, causando prejuízo às economias tanto locais quanto internacionais, assim como aos consumidores, se fazendo necessária a intervenção estatal para regulação desses conflitos. Entretanto, emerge um novo conflito quando o Estado detém o controle acionário de uma empresa, como é o caso das empresas estatais. Tal panorama vem se agravando e causando conflitos concorrenciais no cenário global. A China, país em que tradicionalmente o governo detinha controle de todas as empresas nele constituídas, após a abertura de mercado, vem adotando constantes reformas de políticas de mercado com o viés de introduzir a alta tecnologia e expandir as relações comerciais com os demais países do mundo. Hodiernamente, após as reformas comerciais e estruturais das empresas estatais, a China determinou que setores-chave considerados importantes para segurança econômica chinesa serão de controle estatal, isto é, com monopólio estatal. Isto posto, a presente investigação procurou verificar se as empresas estatais chinesas estariam abusando de sua posição dominante para além das fronteiras e infringindo, sobretudo, a própria legislação concorrencial da China, cuja promulgação fora exigida pelos demais membros da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A investigação se dividiu em três partes essenciais: primeiro sobre as transformações econômicas, mercantis, sociais e jurídicas chinesas, principalmente no período posterior ao século XX; na segunda parte, se tratou do direito concorrencial na China, confrontando-o com as empresas estatais; e no último capítulo, foram verificados casos administrativos e judiciais perante os órgãos de regulamentação concorrencial. Pretendeu-se, pelo método dedutivo de pesquisa, verificar se a dicotomia formada entre a proteção governamental às empresas estatais fere a liberdade de um mercado competitivo. Buscou-se, assim, verificar se a atividade das empresas estatais chinesas ocupou fatia relevante de mercado a ponto de abusar da sua posição dominante e se é a China um palco para a aplicação de penalidades, visando à ordem e à liberdade concorrencial. Conclui-se que ocorre tratamento desigual na imposição de penalidades por práticas de abuso de posição dominante quando se tratam de empresas estrangeiras e empresas estatais chinesas. Denotou-se por meio da análise casuística que os esforços dos órgãos de fiscalização concorrencial chineses no combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais são alcançados, até o presente momento, quando versam sobre empresas estrangeiras, enquanto que as empresas estatais recebem tratamento dessemelhante e permissivo às práticas monopolistas. / The International Competition Law is the law that protects the freedom of competition. Freedom of which, with the development of the globalized world, comes under attack by multinationals, causing damage to the economies both local and international, as well as consumers, making it necessary the state intervention to regulate these conflicts. However, emerges into a new conflict when the state holds a controlling stake of the company, such as state-owned enterprises. This scenario has been growing worse and causing conflicts competitive on the global stage. China, which traditionally held control of all companies set up in it, after the opening of the market, has been adopting constant market policy reforms with the bias to introduce high technology and expanding trade relations with other countries worldwide. In our times, after trade and structural reforms of state-owned enterprises, China has determined that key sectors of the economy considered important to China's economic security will be of state control. Accordingly, the present investigation sought to ascertain whether chinese state-owned enterprises were abusing their dominant position beyond the borders and in particular violating China's own competition law, which was demanded by the other members of the World Trade Organization The investigation was divided into three essential parts: first on the chinese economic, mercantile, social and legal transformations, mainly in the period after the twentieth century; on the second part, it dealt with competition law in China, confronting it with state enterprises; and in the last chapter, administrative and judicial cases were verified before the regulatory bodies of competition. It was intended, by the deductive method of research, to verify if the dichotomy formed between governmental protection of state-owned enterprises hurts the freedom of a competitive market. It was therefore sought to ascertain whether the activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises occupied a relevant market share to the extent of abusing its dominant position and whether China is a stage for the application of penalties for order and competitive freedom. It is concluded that there is unequal treatment in the imposition of consequences for abuse of dominant positions when dealing with foreign companies and chinese state-owned enterprises. The case-by-case analysis has shown that the efforts of Chinese competition authorities in the fight against anticompetitive practices have so far been reached when dealing with foreign companies, while state-owned enterprises are treated differently and permissively from monopoly practices.

O Direito Internacional da Concorrência é o ramo do direito que protege o exercício da liberdade de concorrência. Liberdade esta que, com o desenvolvimento do mundo globalizado, vem sendo atacada pelas multinacionais, causando prejuízo às economias tanto locais quanto internacionais, assim como aos consumidores, se fazendo necessária a intervenção estatal para regulação desses conflitos. Entretanto, emerge um novo conflito quando o Estado detém o controle acionário de uma empresa, como é o caso das empresas estatais. Tal panorama vem se agravando e causando conflitos concorrenciais no cenário global. A China, país em que tradicionalmente o governo detinha controle de todas as empresas nele constituídas, após a abertura de mercado, vem adotando constantes reformas de políticas de mercado com o viés de introduzir a alta tecnologia e expandir as relações comerciais com os demais países do mundo. Hodiernamente, após as reformas comerciais e estruturais das empresas estatais, a China determinou que setores-chave considerados importantes para segurança econômica chinesa serão de controle estatal, isto é, com monopólio estatal. Isto posto, a presente investigação procurou verificar se as empresas estatais chinesas estariam abusando de sua posição dominante para além das fronteiras e infringindo, sobretudo, a própria legislação concorrencial da China, cuja promulgação fora exigida pelos demais membros da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A investigação se dividiu em três partes essenciais: primeiro sobre as transformações econômicas, mercantis, sociais e jurídicas chinesas, principalmente no período posterior ao século XX; na segunda parte, se tratou do direito concorrencial na China, confrontando-o com as empresas estatais; e no último capítulo, foram verificados casos administrativos e judiciais perante os órgãos de regulamentação concorrencial. Pretendeu-se, pelo método dedutivo de pesquisa, verificar se a dicotomia formada entre a proteção governamental às empresas estatais fere a liberdade de um mercado competitivo. Buscou-se, assim, verificar se a atividade das empresas estatais chinesas ocupou fatia relevante de mercado a ponto de abusar da sua posição dominante e se é a China um palco para a aplicação de penalidades, visando à ordem e à liberdade concorrencial. Conclui-se que ocorre tratamento desigual na imposição de penalidades por práticas de abuso de posição dominante quando se tratam de empresas estrangeiras e empresas estatais chinesas. Denotou-se por meio da análise casuística que os esforços dos órgãos de fiscalização concorrencial chineses no combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais são alcançados, até o presente momento, quando versam sobre empresas estrangeiras, enquanto que as empresas estatais recebem tratamento dessemelhante e permissivo às práticas monopolistas. / The International Competition Law is the law that protects the freedom of competition. Freedom of which, with the development of the globalized world, comes under attack by multinationals, causing damage to the economies both local and international, as well as consumers, making it necessary the state intervention to regulate these conflicts. However, emerges into a new conflict when the state holds a controlling stake of the company, such as state-owned enterprises. This scenario has been growing worse and causing conflicts competitive on the global stage. China, which traditionally held control of all companies set up in it, after the opening of the market, has been adopting constant market policy reforms with the bias to introduce high technology and expanding trade relations with other countries worldwide. In our times, after trade and structural reforms of state-owned enterprises, China has determined that key sectors of the economy considered important to China's economic security will be of state control. Accordingly, the present investigation sought to ascertain whether chinese state-owned enterprises were abusing their dominant position beyond the borders and in particular violating China's own competition law, which was demanded by the other members of the World Trade Organization The investigation was divided into three essential parts: first on the chinese economic, mercantile, social and legal transformations, mainly in the period after the twentieth century; on the second part, it dealt with competition law in China, confronting it with state enterprises; and in the last chapter, administrative and judicial cases were verified before the regulatory bodies of competition. It was intended, by the deductive method of research, to verify if the dichotomy formed between governmental protection of state-owned enterprises hurts the freedom of a competitive market. It was therefore sought to ascertain whether the activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises occupied a relevant market share to the extent of abusing its dominant position and whether China is a stage for the application of penalties for order and competitive freedom. It is concluded that there is unequal treatment in the imposition of consequences for abuse of dominant positions when dealing with foreign companies and chinese state-owned enterprises. The case-by-case analysis has shown that the efforts of Chinese competition authorities in the fight against anticompetitive practices have so far been reached when dealing with foreign companies, while state-owned enterprises are treated differently and permissively from monopoly practices.

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In this thesis, I exploit accounting issues in the Chinese context with a particular focus on the role of government. The thesis consists of three empirical essays, examining how the state coordinates among the state-owned enterprises in executive compensation (essay 1), how the government regulates the dividend payouts of listed firms (essay 2) and how the delisting regulation influences the accounting choices of listed firms (essay 3).The first essay examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) in China. Previous studies of RPE for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent theoretical setting assumed by Holmstrom (1982). In this study, I exploit the existence of a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China to examine RPE in a setting closer to the theoretical assumption. I find that SOEs are more likely to use RPE for executive compensation than non-SOEs. This is consistent with better cross-firm coordination in executive contracting among SOEs under a common “state” principal than among non-SOEs with dispersed principals similar to Western firms. Furthermore, I find a more pronounced RPE effect among SOEs that are larger or have poorer past performance. This implies that the state principal has greater incentives to monitor strategically important firms or those in distress. The second essay examines the market reaction to and earnings management choices around changes in the regulations requiring a higher minimum dividend payout in China to shed new light on the determinants of dividend payout policy. I find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that paid less than the new required minimum payout than for those that paid more than the new required minimum, consistent with agency cost explanations of dividend payout. In addition, I find that low dividend payers exhibit a greater tendency to manage their earnings downwards to comply with the earnings-based threshold, and investors can “see through” such earnings management behaviors. My findings support the view of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2009) that agency costs of free cash flow retention are an important part of the dividend payout story. The third essay explores the earnings-based delisting rule in China that provides particularly strong motivation to manage earnings above the loss/profit threshold. I identify two groups of firms that successfully avoid being ST-ed, i.e. firms with a one-year loss before returning to profit, and firms with consecutive small profits. I provide a comprehensive examination of earnings management in terms of accruals management, real earnings management and non-operating income, to investigate whether Chinese firms manage earnings either to avoid reporting a loss or to avoid reporting two consecutive losses. Though there are mixed results sensitive to the research design for earnings management pattern in the two groups of firms, this study provides insights into earnings management induced by a government regulation.