The Qing conquest of 'Xinjiang' ('New Dominion' or 'New Territory') in 1759 proved to be a watershed development in the complex and often ambiguous relation between China and the amorphous Xiyu or 'Western Regions' that had lay 'beyond the pale' of Han Chinese civilisation since the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang (618-907) dynasties. The Qing destruction of the Mongol Zunghar state in the process of conquering 'Xinjiang' brought to a close the era of the dominance of the steppe nomadic-pastoralist world of Inner Asia over sedentary and agricultural China that had existed since at least 300 BCE with the expansion of the Xiongnu. Immediately following the conquest, as chapter two shall demonstrate, the over-arching goal of Qing rule in the region was to segregate Xinjiang from the Chinese regions of the empire. Yet, at the beginning of the 21st century the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintains that the 'Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region' (XUAR) is, and has been throughout recorded history, an 'integral' province of China. This thesis is thus focused on the evolution of the Chinese state's perception of Xinjiang as a dependent appendage in the late 18th century to that of an 'integral' province at the beginning of the 21st century. As such there are two key questions that are the focus of the thesis. First, how - by what processes, means and strategies - did Xinjiang arrive at its contemporary position as a province of the PRC? Second, how has this process impacted on China's 'foreign policy' along its western continental frontiers since the Qing conquest? The thesis is therefore not simply focused upon a discrete period or aspect of the historical development of China's interactions with Xinjiang, but rather an encompassing exploration of the processes that have resulted in China's contemporary dominance in the region. Two encompassing and related themes flow from these questions regarding the Chinese state's response to the dilemmas posed by the rule of Xinjiang. The first stems from the recognition that the present government of China's claims to the 'Chinese-ness' of Xinjiang are more than simply a statement of fact or an attempted legitimisation of current political realities. The statement that Xinjiang is an 'integral' province of the PRC, although indeed a statement of contemporary political reality, is also a profound statement of intent by the Chinese state. It is in fact one manifestation of an over-arching theme of integration and assimilation within the state's perceptions of Xinjiang across the 1759-2004 period. The second theme stems from the question as to how the processes associated with the first theme of integration and assimilation impacted upon the Chinese state's conception of its relation to those regions beyond its orbit. Xinjiang throughout most of Chinese history has been perceived as a 'frontier' region from which non-Chinese influences have entered and at times threatened the North China plain 'heartland' of Han civilisation. This is essentially a theme of confrontation between or opposition of 'external' to Chinese influences. The relationship between these two themes across the 1759-2004 period has been one of 'permanent provocation' whereby their interaction has produced mutual continuity and contestation. The Chinese state's goal of integration, and the concrete strategies and techniques employed in Xinjiang to attain it, have required the continued operation and vitality of opposing tendencies and dynamics. This process has provided (and continues to provide) both impetus and legitimation, in the perception of the state, for the exercise of state power in Xinjiang. Yet, as will become evident in the proceeding chapters, this interaction has not developed along a constant trajectory. Rather, the process has been characterised by fluctuations in the state's commitment to the goal of integration and in its ability to implement appropriate strategies with which to achieve integration. The thesis will thus argue that from the early 19th century onward the goal of integration became embedded in the state's perception of the 'correct' relation between itself and Xinjiang. Moreover, across the 1759-2004 period the notion of integration has evolved to become both the end and means of state action in Xinjiang.