Chinese media control has been repressive, systematic, and successful. This thesis explores how it has been achieved in Post-Tiananmen China. Many outstanding scholars and authors of Chinese media politics assert that such a Chinese media control has been attained by the Party censorship system. Though this was the case before the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre and during the suppressive period from June 1989 to January 1992, I argue that the major part of Chinese media control since 1992 has been accomplished not by the Party censorship, but by marketizing media control. Marketizing media control is triggered by the job responsibility system. Job responsibility for media managers or contract responsibility for journalists in Chinese media imposes both a survival pressure and a compliance pressure on media professionals and organizations. Under the backdrop of the predatory Chinese political economy, the “Survival of the Fittest” logic encourages media professionals to begin their psychological transformation for pursuing their personal interests. The rich material compensation resulting from marketizing media control consolidates such a psychological transformation. Collective interest protection of media organizations reinforces collective self-censorship. Yet punishment pushes them further into compliance with the Party ideology. Marketizing media control works well as long as the Party-state structure remains unchanged and as long as the Chinese economy is still running.